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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
POLICY AND IMPACTS 
 
Higher education is the third largest state expenditure behind K-12 and Medicaid but is 
generally more discretionary than most other budget categories. As demographic trends 
and economic downturns constrain state budgets, the delivery of state subsidies in higher 
education has increasingly shifted toward students via grant aid and away from 
institutions via appropriations. Since the 1990s, many states have changed the 
composition of their state subsidies in higher education to varying degrees.  
 
There is a rich literature that examines the effects of state subsidies on various aspects of 
the higher education market. This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on two 
broad fronts. First, rather than state subsidy levels, theoretical and empirical emphasis is 
placed on subsidy composition, or the distribution of subsidies across three primary 
modes of delivery—appropriations, need-based grants, and non-need-based grants. This 
focus is meant to reflect the policy decision faced by states, especially during times of 
fiscal stress, and reveal insights into important economic considerations. Second, 
differential impacts of state subsidies are examined not only with respect to student 
ability and income but also college inputs of academic quality and amenities. College 
amenities are an important input in the higher education market in need of more 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
 
The introduction briefly discusses the economic rationale for public subsidies in higher 
education and the complexity confronting states to subsidize the cost of college under 
various constraints and policy goals. Chapter 2 aims to orient the reader to the policy, 
trends, and research pertaining to state subsidies in higher education. Chapter 3 
theoretically examines the response in student demand for educational resources and 
amenities to changes in state subsidy composition from which several policy implications 
and directions for future research are considered. Chapter 4 focuses on subsequent effects 
that changes in demand between educational resources and amenities may have on 
institutions. State subsidies and institutional expenditures between 1990 and 2016 are 
examined in order to determine whether the composition of state subsidies causes in-state 
institutions to alter expenditures in a way that reflects a divergence between educational 
and amenity inputs. Chapter 5 considers the role of college student migration with respect 
  
to state subsidies and student outcomes. State subsidies impact college choice, and in 
turn, alter the distance students migrate to attend college. The effect of distance on 
college student success is theoretically and empirically examined. Chapter 6 concludes 
with a summary and discussion of the main findings as well as ideas and directions for 
future research. 
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[1]  
INTRODUCTION 
PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Higher education in the U.S. garners a substantial public investment. The federal 
government spent approximately $45 billion on higher education programs in 2014, 
excluding loans, and forewent another $35 billion in related tax expenditures (Oliff, 
Robyn, & Thiess, 2017). In addition, $1.3 trillion in student loan debt, almost all of 
which is serviced by the federal government, costs about $5 billion to administer each 
year and the CBO estimates $130 billion in losses on loans through 2026 (Cooper, 2016). 
State and local governments spent $90.5 billion on higher education in 2016, most of 
which is provided by states and represents the third largest spending category behind K-
12 education and Medicaid. 
 This work examines the policy and impacts of state higher education subsidies 
across different modes of delivery. Before addressing such matters, let us first consider 
why governments make such investments. Behind the ongoing debate concerning public 
support for higher education lays two primary economic justifications for government to 
subsidize the cost of college: insufficient capital markets and positive externalities. 
Though policy might differ depending on which of the two government considers the 
dominant issue, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the case can be made that 
government intervention on the basis of insufficient capital markets is a narrower 
approach that still implies the presence of positive externalities that, in turn, ultimately 
explains the full assortment of public investment currently observed. 
 Attending college presents substantial upfront costs to an individual, while most 
of its economic benefit accrues over his or her lifetime via higher wages. Loans are a 
common financial product available to those wishing to purchase high-cost items with 
long-run returns, such as a house or car. The discount rate and risk of default inherent in 
all loans are accounted for in a loan’s interest rate and requirement to provide collateral, 
such as the house or car just purchased, to be repossessed in the event of default. 
However, most prospective college students do not have such collateral to offer, and 
lenders have yet to devise a way to repossess a student’s education. 
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 The high risk of college loans translates to high interest rates in the private loan 
market that would presumably cause a nontrivial portion of the population to forego or 
delay college if not for public intervention. The federal government supplies an array of 
loans with lower interest rates and more generous repayment terms than the private 
market provides. For instance, in 2017-18 undergraduates were able to borrow at a rate of 
4.45 percent through federal loans, while the average variable rate and fixed rate in the 
private market was 7.81 and 9.66 percent, respectively (Dickler, 2017). Without federal 
investment the private loan market would surely grow but not to comparable size nor 
offer comparable rates. As a result, the costs of college would rise, and college 
enrollment would decline.  
 Is fewer people going to college due to higher borrowing costs a negative 
outcome? Without much more information such a question is not remotely answerable. 
Whether public funds should be used to lower the cost of borrowing for college at all on 
economic grounds can be answered somewhat more easily. It depends. If higher 
education generates positive externalities, then a necessary condition has been met that 
potentially warrants the use of public funds to lower the cost of college. If capital markets 
are insufficient, then college loans are a promising area for public investment. 
 The chapters that follow are predicated on the presence of positive externalities in 
higher education. In other words, attainment of a college credential produces benefits that 
are not fully captured in the return received by the individual. In this respect, the higher 
education market is economically inefficient. Too few credentials would be pursued 
relative to what is socially optimal if left entirely to private market mechanisms. Standard 
theory suggests government can correct this inefficiency via subsidies commensurate 
with the value of the public benefit. 
  Additional options for public investment exist beyond college loans, namely 
direct subsidies to students in the form of grant aid or institutions in the form of 
appropriations. Again, provision of federal college loans on the basis of insufficient 
capital markets is another option. Of course, spending public funds with no intent of 
direct repayment, as is the case with grants and appropriations but not the case with 
loans, implies a degree of public benefit that many may find dubious (Rosen & Gayer, 
2010). The extent to which the public should support higher education is under constant 
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debate and there is significant variation in that support at the federal and state levels over 
time.  
 The question of whether and how much government should subsidize higher 
education is not examined here. Instead, this work examines the effects of state subsidies 
as they are or have changed over time. Still, the normative issues regarding public 
subsidies in higher education provide important context to their effects. As policymakers 
decide how to finance higher education each year, the normative debate serves as a 
reminder there are potentially broad societal impacts with such decisions. This 
intersection between the normative and positive economics of higher education is 
particularly critical and complex at the state level. 
STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
Unlike K-12 education, the public benefit of higher education is not so abundantly clear 
to the U.S. electorate as to gain enough consensus around the idea of free college for 
everyone. Although states such as Tennessee and New York are experimenting with free 
college under certain conditions, there remains considerable opposition to the notion of a 
completely democratized postsecondary system. The case against free college for all 
typically highlights the substantial private return of a degree and that an oversupply of 
college degrees would reduce that return. Moreover, there are issues other than positive 
externalities to consider when subsidizing higher education, such as equity or competing 
demands for public funds.  
 Measuring the public benefit of higher education is a challenge compared to the 
private monetary return of earning a degree. The latter is demonstrated via the wage 
differential between high school and college graduates, which suggests a private rate of 
return between 15 and 22 percent (Abel & Deitz, 2014; Zimmerman, 2014). Perhaps 
more important for policy, the college wage differential is easily observed by the public. 
Nevertheless, research consistently finds positive externalities associated with higher 
education. In a thorough review of this literature as well as his own analyses, McMahon 
(2009) determines that the total value of a bachelor's degree far exceeds its personal 
value, over half of which consists of public externalities. McMahon concludes 52 percent 
of the total investment in higher education should be publicly funded (p. 252).  
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  However, the decentralized and fragmented nature of higher education 
complicates McMahon’s recommendation that government should fund roughly half of 
the market. States are the legal administrators of higher education, but financial provision 
spans all levels of government. Federal government finances students via loans and 
grants as well as a significant portion of institutional research, state government primarily 
supports institutions but also students, and local government is an important contributor 
to community colleges. Even appropriations within the same state are not uniformly 
distributed across institutions in many cases (Chingos, 2017). Parsing out benefits that 
accrue to different levels of government so that each can invest accordingly is difficult. 
 Mobility of those who receive a degree presents yet another complication. Federal 
and state government invest in individuals' pursuit of a degree with the expectation of 
some return on that investment, but the way in which they do so differs substantially. 
Approximately 41 percent of federal spending on higher education is in the form of grant 
aid provided directly to students and only 5 percent is support to institutions. By contrast, 
about 13 percent of state spending is grant aid and 73 percent is appropriations. This 
difference between federal and state investments is due in part to the risk of losing on 
said investment under the assumption that benefits accrue to the government in which 
one resides. The likelihood that an individual exits the U.S. is lower than the likelihood 
he or she exits a state. Therefore, the federal government can attach most of its subsidy to 
the individual, while state governments direct most public funding to immobile 
institutions to lower tuition for in-state residents but also subsidize other aspects of 
institutional operations. 
 Meanwhile, state spending on higher education is being squeezed by rising costs 
in less discretionary budget categories such as K-12 education, Medicaid, pensions, and 
prisons (Kane, 2003; Delaney, 2011). Demographic trends and recent recessions have 
exacerbated state funding scarcity, leading to dramatic cuts to higher education. This, in 
turn, diminishes the positive externalities that would help reduce costs in competing 
budget categories (Muennig, 2000; Lochner & Moretti, 2002; McMahon, 2002). 
Moreover, a slow economic recovery has led to competition for new jobs through 
business tax incentives that further limit revenues. Recent trends have been described as a 
self-perpetuating cycle of disinvestment in higher education (Newfield, 2016). State 
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commitment to higher education as a public good, rather than a private enterprise, has 
come under intense scrutiny. Stated in a recent report from the State Higher Education 
Executive Officers Association (SHEEO), “For the first time in our nation’s history, more 
than half of all states relied more heavily on tuition dollars to fund their public systems of 
higher education than on government appropriations” (2017). 
 State financing of higher education has changed in terms of levels as well as 
composition. Institution-specific funding per full-time equivalent student began declining 
in the late 1970s (Kane, 2003), but the sharpest decline has occurred during the years 
surrounding the recessions of 2002 and 2008 (Hurlburt, 2012). State support declined 12 
percent in constant dollars nationwide between 2006 and 2015, falling from 61 percent to 
52 percent of total institutional funding (SHEEO, 2015). Meanwhile, state expenditures 
on grant aid rose 31 percent. Since 1993, merit-based aid has become a popular option for 
state higher education finance. As of 2015, 25 states had broad-based merit-aid programs, 
and of the 10.5 billion dollars in grant aid awarded, exclusively merit-based aid 
accounted for 18 percent of all aid to undergraduates, while programs with both need and 
merit components accounted for another 34.5 percent (NASSGAP, 2015).  
 The preference to allocate or reallocate state funds to financial aid rather than 
appropriations is referred to as the high-tuition, high-aid model (HTHA) and is a central 
theme in the chapters that follow. The rationale for HTHA policies is they increase 
economic efficiency and equity. Decreasing appropriations increases statewide tuition, 
but it provides more funding for financial aid to insulate low-income students from the 
price shock. The result is a removal of subsidies for students who can afford the full cost 
of college (Hansen, 1971; Hearn, 1985; Hoenack, 1971; Windham, 1976).  
 However, the economic case for HTHA policy is with respect to need-based aid. 
The proliferation of merit-based aid complicates the debate over HTHA as it 
disproportionately benefits higher-income students (Heller, 2002; Heller, 2004) and 
crowds-out funding for need-based aid (Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2002b; Long, 2007). 
Throughout this work, HTHA is used as a sort of shorthand for the broad state budgetary 
decision to allocate funds to grants rather than appropriations. While the level of funds 
available to subsidize higher education may be at the mercy of the demands of other 
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budget categories, states presumably have more control over the composition of 
subsidies.  
COMPLEXITY OF STATE SUBSIDIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
A mixed methods study exploring state trends and decision-making in higher education 
finance revealed that many states desired to implement HTHA policy but lacked a 
coherent strategy to link available funds to policy choices (Hossler, 1997). A report by 
SRI International (2012) echoes this revelation, noting that “in many cases, [state] higher 
education funding policies are a historical mash-up of different priorities and strategic 
decisions” (p. 3). While to some this may indicate incompetence in state government, if 
one considers merely the broad economic and political factors involved in policy to 
provide subsidies in higher education, then the challenge confronting state policymakers 
seems rather daunting. Challenges compound considering that different subsidies may be 
more or less effective at achieving different goals, such as access versus degree 
completion, and there is not even clear consensus on what should be the primary goal. 
States essentially have three modes of higher education finance:  appropriations, 
need-based financial aid, and non-need-based financial aid.1 In addition to the absolute 
amount of funding, there are two policy levers states have at their disposal with respect to 
the three modes of finance. First, states can alter the composition of funding. For 
example, South Carolina allocates almost 40 percent of funds to aid, almost all of which 
is non-need based. Virginia allocates a similar proportion to aid but divides it about 
evenly between need and non-need aid. Both Pennsylvania and Georgia allocate 20-30 
percent to aid, but the former uses only need aid while the latter funds only non-need aid. 
Meanwhile, New Hampshire allocates 100 percent of funds to appropriations 
(NASSGAP, 2015). 
The second policy lever pertains to financial aid eligibility criteria both in terms 
of whether a student is eligible for any funds as well as how much funding is available to 
each eligible student. Need-based aid is a fairly standard formula across states using the 
difference between cost of attendance (COA) and expected family contribution (EFC), 
                                                 
1 Aid based on a mix of need and merit could be considered a fourth mode but is excluded here for the sake 
of parsimony. 
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but the amount at which need aid is capped varies. Accounting for differences in COA, 
two states could allocate the same amount of total funds for need aid, one of which has a 
relatively high cap that provides greater subsidy for fewer students, whereas a low cap 
ensures more students receive funding that does not cover as much of COA.  
The criteria for non-need aid varies widely across states. These programs can be 
exclusively merit-based or a mix of need and merit. Merit can be based on high school 
GPA, scores on college entrance, state, or advanced curriculum exams, or class rank. The 
total amount awarded varies as well as the amount each merit component may be worth. 
Also, merit aid programs and their criteria are not very stable over time. The total number 
of programs fluctuates, and states modify criteria somewhat regularly, making it difficult 
for scholars and policymakers to stay up to date on the landscape. Though likely outdated 
now, Delaney and Ness (2010) developed a typology of state merit aid programs based 
on award magnitude and academic rigor. Their typology demonstrates the degree to 
which states differ with respect to the breadth of students whose college education is 
subsidized as well as the size of subsidy each offers.   
 As with any budget decision, how a state finances higher education reflects its 
politics and policy goals. Whatever those goals may be, state governments need to 
understand how each type of funding affects various types of students and institutions not 
only with respect to their own higher education market but also those in other states with 
which it interacts. Based on the variation across states, it is not clear if states have any 
common understanding regarding the impacts of its subsidies, their goals, or both. 
Perhaps the most broadly applicable description of state financing in higher education, 
given the discussion thus far, is that states are simply making tradeoffs among policy 
preferences in a budget-constrained environment.  
 Suppose a state government with no particular political or economic motivation 
other than to maximize the public benefits of higher education begins drafting the next 
budget. Economic downturn and structural budgetary imbalances require cuts in order to 
satisfy its balanced budget mandate, a portion of which must fall on appropriations. The 
cost of college will increase as a result, and in turn, decrease enrollment. Shifting a 
portion of the cut in appropriations to need-based grants can help insulate low-income 
students whose enrollment is most sensitive to the increase in price. This is a progressive 
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redistribution of wealth, though, and has limitations that depend on politics, but it is 
possible the state can maintain or even increase total enrollment while spending less on 
higher education if low-income students are induced to attend college by the larger 
subsidy. However, policymakers suspect such students are less likely to complete a 
degree and failing to do so places a burden on the student and possibly the state. 
Moreover, the smaller subsidy for higher-income students not eligible for need-based aid 
reduces the financial incentive to attend an in-state college. Attending an out-of-state 
college lowers the likelihood they will reside in state after graduation.   
 In response to these concerns, the state considers directing a portion of funds 
toward merit-based aid instead. On one hand, this will disproportionately subsidize 
college for high-income students who would have attended college anyway. On the other 
hand, it benefits talented and motivated students. Merit aid may also help retain some of 
the students who would have left the state to attend a higher quality college. However, by 
nature of their higher achievement and income as well as having more employment 
prospects, these students are more mobile after college graduation. Using public funds for 
merit aid poses its own political and economic issues regarding redistribution though. Of 
course, all of this is with respect to only a state's own market. States also stand to benefit 
from enacting policy that attracts and retains out-of-state students. 
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
A few broad questions arise that if answered could help inform a coherent strategy in 
financing higher education at the state level regardless of a particular objective. These 
include:  
1. How does a reallocation of state funds from appropriations to need- and/or merit-
based aid affect student demand of higher education? 
2. How might colleges and universities financially adapt to less guaranteed funding 
in exchange for potential grant dollars over which they must compete? 
3. What effects will such changes have on student access and success? 
This work attempts to contribute answers to each of the above questions through 
exposition of theory or empirical analysis. 
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 Chapter 2 aims to orient the reader to the policy, trends, and research pertaining to 
state subsidies in higher education. There are many perspectives from which trends in 
appropriations and grant aid can be viewed. The change in subsidy composition over time 
across states is emphasized as motivation for further inquiry. In addition, state subsidy 
programs are numerous, and their governance varies across states. An overview of how 
different subsidies operate, and their common characteristics is provided to add context 
for proceeding chapters. Lastly, existing literature pertaining to state subsidies in higher 
education is reviewed and discussed. For state governments, guidance for the above 
questions is dispersed across several lines of research in need of consolidation and, in 
some cases, reconciliation. 
 Chapter 3 theoretically examines the response of college students to changes in 
state subsidy composition. A model of student demand is developed to demonstrate the 
effect of state subsidies across various subsets defined by the change in price they 
experience. Specific attention is given to how effects vary according to dimensions of 
student ability and income as well as institutional inputs of educational resources and 
non-academic amenities. Policy implications and directions for future research are then 
considered in the concluding remarks. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the subsequent effects changes in demand pressures may 
have on institutions. State subsidies and institutional expenditures between 1990 and 
2016 are examined in order to determine whether the composition of state subsidies 
causes in-state institutions to alter expenditures. Of particular interest is if the shifting of 
funds from appropriations to grant aid results in a state’s postsecondary market becoming 
more heterogeneous with respect to educational quality and amenities. Provided 
institutional expenditures reflect college students’ preferences, changes in demand are 
expected to manifest through expenditures.  
 Chapter 5 considers the role of college student migration with respect to state 
subsidies and student outcomes. Various higher education policies impact college choice, 
in turn, altering the distance students migrate to attend college. Evidence suggests that 
behavior among states and institutions reflect financial incentives to attract more out-of-
state students, and whether state subsidy composition is a direct cause or not, college 
students are traveling farther to go to school. However, research concerning the effect of 
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distance on college student success is sparse. A theoretical framework that incorporates 
distance into the processes of college choice and success is developed to demonstrate that 
variation in distance has heterogeneous effects on success by type of degree pursued and 
sector of institution attended. 
 Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation with a summary and discussion of the main 
findings throughout the previous chapters. Additionally, ideas and directions for future 
research are considered. The debate concerning how much of higher education should be 
financed publicly is unlikely to end any time soon. Nevertheless, the fact that subsidies 
exist suggests state governments expect a return on this investment. As long as provision 
of higher education remains neither fully private nor public, what types of students 
receive subsidies and how much will remain a critical question. 
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[2]  
STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
TRENDS, POLICY, AND RESEARCH 
TRENDS IN SUBSIDIES AND DEFINING HIGH-TUITION, HIGH-AID 
The level and composition of state subsidies in higher education have changed 
substantially over the past three decades. Under mandates to keep budgets balanced, 
demographic trends and economic recessions have exacerbated state funding scarcity and 
allocations to K-12 education, Medicaid, pensions, and corrections generally take 
precedent over higher education (Kane, 2003; Delaney, 2011). Figure 2.1 displays 
average state appropriations and undergraduate aid in constant dollars per FTE between 
1990 and 2016. In this span, real appropriations have declined from $8,250 to $7,100, 
with significant drops corresponding to economic recessions. In contrast, grant aid per 
FTE has risen from $500 to $1,000 during this time.  
 Behind the rise in grant aid is a considerable change in the type of grants provided 
by states. States can provide grants to students solely on the basis of need, solely on the 
basis of merit, or a mix of need and merit. The latter two types are jointly described as 
non-need grant aid. Figure 2.2 separates the average grant aid trend in figure 1 by need 
and non-need components. Non-need aid was virtually non-existent in 1990. By 2016, 
states provided almost as much non-need aid as they did need aid. In fact, non-need aid 
accounts for roughly 80 percent of the rise in total grant aid. 
 Of course, states vary along economic, political, and demographic dimensions, 
which are overlooked when depicting nationwide averages. Figure 2.3 displays the 
percent change from 1990 to 2016 in appropriations on the horizontal axis and 
undergraduate grant aid on the vertical axis for each state. The dashed lines are located at 
zero percent change, thus creating a quadrant depicting whether states increased or 
decreased appropriations and grant aid. Only a few states have managed to maintain or 
increase appropriations, while most have decreased appropriations by 10 to 30 percent. 
Meanwhile, most states exhibit modest to substantial percent increases in grant aid since 
1990. The majority of states are located within or very near the upper-left quadrant. 
These states have altered the composition of subsidies, shifting toward grants over 
appropriations, and it is clear these shifts differ significantly in magnitude. 
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Figure 2.1 - Average State Grant and Appropriations Dollars, 1990-2016 
 
Figure 2.2 - Average State Need and Non-Need Grant Dollars, 1990-2016 
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Figure 2.3 - Percent Change in Grant Aid and Appropriations by State 
 
  
 A decline in appropriations coupled with stable or increasing aid levels is 
commonly referred to as the high-tuition, high-aid model (HTHA). This name can be 
misleading in several respects. It is not used to suggest that a decline in appropriations 
necessarily leads to an increase in tuition, though it often does but not in exact proportion 
since institutions can decrease cost or raise other revenues instead of tuition. In any case, 
HTHA refers more to appropriations than tuition. Perhaps a more accurate term then is 
low-appropriations, high-aid (LAHA). Still, these names lead one to wonder high or low 
relative to what? One option is to use national average per capita ages 18-24 as a baseline 
(Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010).  
 Figure 2.4 displays state appropriations and grant aid per capita ages 18-24 in 
2016. The dashed lines correspond with the average of each subsidy across all states. By 
this metric, a plurality of states falls into the low-appropriations, low-aid quadrant, 
though the distribution is fairly balanced across all quadrants. The examination of levels 
for each subsidy does not reflect the HTHA (or LAHA) narrative. According to figure 
2.4, it would seem HTLA (or LALA) is more accurate. This is because the increase in aid 
has not kept pace with the decrease in appropriations, which is precisely the outcome to 
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Figure 2.4 - State Grant and Appropriations Dollars Per Capita Ages 18-24 
 
 
expect given states have decreased total subsidies in higher education over time. Instead, 
HTHA more accurately describes the change in subsidy composition. For instance, only 7 
states were considered high-aid, while 35 states were considered high-appropriations in 
2006. Ten years later, the number of high-aid states has increased to 18, while the number 
of high-appropriations states has decreased to 18. 
 This work examines the policy and impacts of state subsidies in higher education 
with particular focus aimed at their composition, of which HTHA has been a fairly 
dominant trend since at least 1990. Moreover, basic economic theory suggests HTHA is a 
sensible strategy to increase the efficiency of state subsidies. As a result, HTHA will 
occur frequently throughout. Given the various perspectives one can use to examine state 
subsidies, it is therefore important to establish a clear definition of HTHA for the 
purposes of the work that follows.  
 As a fundamental budgetary decision, whether forced by declining revenues or 
driven by political will, HTHA is an increase (decrease) in the proportion of total 
subsidies provided via grants (appropriations) regardless of total subsidy levels. HTHA is 
typically described in the context of total subsidy decline but can also occur when there is 
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an increase in total subsidies. In other words, HTHA represents the decision to target 
whatever amount of state funds are available at a subset of the college student population 
on the basis of some characteristic(s) that subset shares rather than distribute funds more 
equally across all in-state students who attend an in-state public institution.  
 Figure 2.5 shows average need- and non-need undergraduate grant aid as a 
proportion of total subsidies (undergraduate grants plus appropriations) in real dollars for 
selected years. Despite current trends, the former remains a small proportion of total 
subsidy—10 percent—relative to appropriations. Nevertheless, the change in composition 
is rather substantial. The proportion of need grants has nearly doubled from 
approximately 3 percent in 1990 to almost 6 percent in 2016. The proportion of non-need 
grants has increased from less than 1 percent in 1990 to over 4 percent in 2016. 
 Figure 2.6 displays total undergraduate need- and non-need-based grant aid as a 
proportion of total subsidies in 2016, the remainder of which represents appropriations. 
For a few states, grant aid accounts for more than 20 percent of their total subsidy, all of 
which can be in the form of need-based aid, as is the case in Vermont, non-need-based 
aid, as in South Carolina or West Virginia, or a combination of the two. Similarly, a few 
states allocate their total subsidy via appropriations, such as Alabama or Hawaii. 
Figure 2.5 - Mean Need- and Non-Need Grants as Proportion of Total Subsidy 
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Overall, these trends demonstrate the basic motivation for examining the impacts of 
change in state subsidy composition. It should also be evident that the way in which 
higher education is publicly funded varies considerably across states. Driving these trends 
are numerous state grant aid programs and appropriations policies with various eligibility 
and payment features. It is important to understand how these state subsidies operate on a 
basic level as well as their general components over which states may or may not differ. 
Figure 2.6 - State Proportions of Need, Non-Need, and Appropriations, 2016 
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SURVEYING STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
The National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP) has 
conducted annual surveys since 1970 to report the landscape of financial aid provided at 
the state level. As of 2016, NASSGAP identified 583 unique state programs. Figure 2.7 
shows the distribution of these programs by type. Though states subsidize higher 
education through various programs, such as loans, tuition waivers, and work-study, 
almost 65 percent of all programs are grants. Of the $12 billion awarded in total, grants 
accounted for almost 90 percent and involve nearly 98 percent of recipients across all 
state programs. State grants may not make up the entire landscape of state subsidies 
targeted to students, but they represent most of it. 
 There is considerable variety in characteristics across grant programs, such as 
eligibility that is based residential status, whether the student attends an in- or out-of-state 
institution, enrollment intensity (e.g. full-time, half-time), and class (e.g. undergraduate, 
graduate). As previously mentioned, a key distinction between grant programs is whether 
they are awarded on the basis of need, merit, or a combination of both. Figure 2.8 shows 
the total number of grant programs according to this distinction for 2016. Over half of 
Figure 2.7 - Total Grant and Aid Programs by Type, 2016 
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Figure 2.8 - Total Grant Programs by Type of Aid, 2016 
 
all grant programs are exclusively based on need, one-third are based only on merit, 
while mixed aid accounts for the remaining 12 percent.2 
 Determining eligibility on the basis of need is fairly uniform across states. Need is 
calculated as the cost of attendance (COA) at the chosen institution minus expected 
family contribution (EFC). Tuition and fees, room and board, books, supplies, 
transportation, loan fees, and other miscellaneous expenses are included in the calculation 
of COA. To determine EFC, a family’s taxed and untaxed income, assets, benefits, family 
size and the number of family members attending college during the year are used. 
Students or families with incomes below $25 thousand have a $0 EFC.3  
  States determine how much to allocate to grant programs, so total expenditures 
on need grants is not mechanically responsive to the formula for need. Nevertheless, 
trends in COA and EFC determine how many students are in need and the size of award, 
which can place pressure on states to increase or decrease the total amount allocated. For 
example, the combination of rising tuition and stagnant incomes leads to more students 
needing larger awards. In turn, fewer eligible students receive aid if a state does not 
increase its allocation. In 2016, 24 percent of need grants funded all eligible students. 
                                                 
2 The number of merit aid programs includes those that are not considered broad-based merit programs. 
3 https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/fafsa/next-steps/how-calculated  
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 A variety of additional features can be used to impact how need grants are 
distributed across students. One such feature is the maximum award a student can 
receive. All else equal, a high max relative to COA implies fewer students will have more 
of their cost subsidized. Figure 2.9 displays the distribution of primary state need grant 
programs according to the proportion of the state’s COA that is covered by the maximum 
award in 2015. Most states cover between 0 and 20 percent of their average COA, though 
there is considerable positive skewness. Since students eligible for state need grants are 
also likely eligible for federal Pell Grants, it is expected that states do not cover the full 
COA. Taking the maximum Pell award for 2015 into account, the median percentage of 
remaining COA covered by the max state award is 44 percent. Without EFC, it is unclear 
how many programs approach the full COA accounting for family wealth. From a 
programmatic perspective, half of states have structured their maximum need awards so 
that over half of COA minus Pell is covered for students with a $0 EFC. 
 There has long been concern over the perverse incentive for institutions to 
manipulate tuition so as to maximize the amount of revenue received through need-based 
grants. Award caps guard against this incentive going unchecked. Similarly, some states 
also place caps on EFC or income eligible to receive funding regardless of need, thus 
Figure 2.9 - Proportion of COA Covered by Max Need Award, 2015 
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preventing need-based aid going to higher-income students who attend institutions with 
high tuition. Additionally, some states condition eligibility on attending a public 
institution, which typically does not have autonomous control over its tuition.  
 Comparatively, determining merit is much more variable across states. Specific 
eligibility criteria and how each are weighted in determining award amount are virtually 
unique to each state that has such a program. However, there are a few components over 
which merit programs can be categorized.4 Table 2.1 reports the percentage of merit and 
mixed grant programs that include common measures of merit, their source of funding, 
and the average award per recipient in 2016. Grades are the most commonly used merit 
component for both types of aid, followed by test scores for which the ACT or SAT are 
typically used. Relatively few programs use class rank or some other performance metric 
such as extracurricular involvement or community service. 
 Most of these programs receive general funds from the state, though some are 
funded via a state lottery. Very few are funded by a special tax or pooled tuition. The use 
of lottery funds for merit aid potentially complicates the narrative of state governments 
determining the composition of subsidies. Lottery funds are typically earmarked for  
Table 2.1 - Merit and Mixed Aid Characteristics, 2016 
 Merit Aid Mixed Aid 
Merit Components   
Test score 41% 31% 
Class rank 20% 14% 
Grades 81% 91% 
Other  20% 11% 
Funding Source   
General Funds 76% 70% 
Lottery 15% 9% 
Special Tax 1% 2% 
Tuition 0% 2% 
Average Award $5,844 $2,709 
Total 123 44 
 
 
                                                 
4 For a more formally developed typology of merit aid, see Delaney and Ness (2010). 
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certain programs. Therefore, the decision-making process is not as straightforward as 
dividing a common pool of funds across types of subsidy.  
 A common criticism of merit-based aid for which there is some evidence is that it 
crowds-out funding for need-based aid (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2006; Long & Riley, 2007; 
Adelson, 2006; Dynarski, 2002; Heller, 2002). However, the counter has been made that 
much of this criticism assumes funding for merit-based aid would be automatically 
transferred to need-based aid. Merit-based aid programs have been characterized as a 
kind of entitlement in many states since all eligible students are guaranteed funding, in 
turn, making any attempt to shrink such programs difficult compared to need-based 
programs (Doyle, 2010). This may especially be the case for lottery funded programs. 
Still, even among the broad merit-based programs that are at the center of this debate, 
more are funded via general funds than lottery (Delaney & Ness, 2010). 
 Much of the concern over merit-based grant programs stems from what some 
consider to be an inequitable distribution of subsidies toward higher-income students. 
Figure 2.10 compares how awards are distributed across income groups between the 
three types of grant aid using average dollars age 18-24 per capita in 2016. As expected, 
the amount of money distributed on the basis of need is decreasing in income with those 
Figure 2.10 - Average Dollars Distributed Age 18-24 Per Capita by Income, 2016 
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in the below $20 thousand and $20-$40 thousand receiving significantly more money on 
average than those in higher income groups. Mixed grants follow a similar pattern except 
that those in the $20-$40 thousand range receive slightly more than those below $20 
thousand presumably due to the inclusion of merit. The distribution of merit-based grant 
aid is drastically different. Those with incomes above $100 thousand receive the most 
funds; more per capita than the low-income groups for need or mixed grants. 
Interestingly, the distribution is fairly uniform across the low- and high-income groups 
with somewhat less going to the middle-income groups.  
 The final type of subsidy to consider here is appropriations. Unlike financial aid, 
there is not a well-known compendium of information on state appropriations policy. 
Aside from the general decline in the level of appropriations and the recent popularity of 
performance-based budgeting in higher education, differences in appropriations policy 
across states receives little attention compared to financial aid. Though appropriations are 
primarily driven by enrollment, the specific components upon which the amount of 
funding institutions receive from the state is determined vary considerably.  
 A 2012 SRI International report provides perhaps the most recent and 
comprehensive information regarding state appropriations according to Chingos & Baum 
(2017). Figure 2.11 comes directly from the report and displays the different methods 
states use for allocating appropriations. According to the report, 17 states use a formula to 
determine institutional funding, while another 14 states use a hybrid method where a 
formula may be used for some institutions or sectors but not all. Funding in 18 states is 
non-formula-based, the two most common varieties of which include a “Base Plus” 
method (i.e. incremental change from last year’s allocation) and funding based on 
legislative priorities, such as peer equity with other states. 
 State formulas vary, and many states do not fully fund the amount indicated by 
the formula in times of fiscal stress. SRI International found that formulas typically 
consist of a subset of 10 budgetary functional areas, but three elements are common 
across all states:  1) instructional activities based on either enrolled or completed credit 
hours, 2) operations and maintenance of the physical plant, and 3) other components 
based on a percentage of the instructional funding level and therefore indirectly tied to 
enrollment levels (SRI, 2012). The result of this complexity and variation is significantly  
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Figure 2.11 - States’ Methods for Distributing Appropriations 
 
 
 
different funding across institutions within states. According to a report from the Urban 
Institute, “In 18 states, the best-funded research university receives more than twice as 
much state appropriation per student as the research university with the lowest funding. 
The range is more than $10,000 a student in five states” (Chingos & Baum 2017, p. 8). 
 The within-state variation in appropriations has not been well-examined 
theoretically or empirically. Though not particularly impactful for the proportion of total 
subsidy that is ultimately allocated to institutions rather than students, it is important to 
be aware of the underlying mechanics of appropriations and their differences across 
states. These details highlight key comparisons when considering the allocation of state 
funds across subsidies. On one hand, appropriations are tied to enrollment and therefore 
share the fundamental purpose with grant programs to subsidize college. On the other 
hand, appropriations are distributed to institutions and fund operations with which 
students do not regularly interact or even observe. Whether or to what extent grant aid 
can substitute appropriations without significantly distorting the higher education market 
is unclear. As the next section will demonstrate, there is considerable literature examining 
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the effects of subsidies on aspects of higher education, but the specific impacts of subsidy 
composition need more study. 
RESEARCH ON STATE SUBSIDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
To some, the decline of state appropriations for public colleges and universities may 
seem like a recent phenomenon, but institution-specific funding per full-time equivalent 
(FTE) student began declining in the late 1970s (Kane, 2003). Some of the earliest 
research on state subsidies emerged just prior to this, examining the distributional effects 
of changes in California’s subsidies (Hansen, 1969; Pechman, 1970; Hansen, 1971). The 
key question was whether state funding of broad-based subsidies via appropriations 
disproportionately benefit higher-income students (i.e. regressive).  
Hoenack (1971) derived maximizing conditions for the state of California under 
various objectives of increasing equality between student income quartiles. He concluded 
that greater equality can be achieved if the state redirected its subsidies toward the bottom 
quartiles, but this comes at the cost of lower enrollment among the top quartiles, choosing 
to enroll into private institutions or out-of-state. Eventually, equality results in lower 
overall enrollment and a significant cost to the state. Enrollment changes were simulated 
using an estimated demand for higher education for each quartile. To estimate demand 
Hoenack used differences in travel costs between high schools and campuses, 
representing one of the first direct connections made between state finance policy and 
student migration. The results of the simulation showed that appropriations in California 
were regressive. 
 The prevailing thought was efficiency and equity could be improved by diverting 
appropriations to need-based aid (Hansen, 1971; Hearn, 1985; Hoenack, 1971; Windham, 
1976), but this argument has been challenged by more recent empirical work that found 
appropriations to be primarily neutral or slightly progressive (Johnson, 2006). 
Toutkoushian and Shafiq (2010) developed an economic model for optimal state funding 
between appropriations and need-based aid. They concluded that a state should 
implement a system of subsidy exclusively on the basis of need if the goal is to maximize 
college enrollment. The authors reach this conclusion assuming the positive externality of 
enrollment is the same for all students, thus the gain in positive externalities due to higher 
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enrollment among low-income students exceed any loss from lower enrollment among 
high-income students. 
 Broadly, the research indicates that appropriations increases overall enrollment 
and retention of college students within the state (Mixon & Hsing1994; Mak & Mancur, 
2003; Groen, 2004; Long, 2004; Perna & Titus, 2004; Orsuwan & Heck, 2009; 
Toutkoushian & Hillman, 2012). The effect of need-based aid is mixed in this regard 
(Heller, 1999; Perna & Titus, 2004; Somers, 1993; Kane, 1995; Toutkoushian & Hillman, 
2012). Lastly, the evidence is consistent that merit-based aid has a positive effect on 
enrollment and retention of resident students (Dynarski, 2002a; Kane, 2003; Cornwell, 
Mustard, & Sridhar, 2006; Desjardiins & McCall, 2009; Domina, 2014; Harrington, 
2016). 
 Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) stand out in the literature for modeling a system of 
simultaneous equations for need-based grant aid, resident tuition, nonresident tuition, and 
nonresident enrollment among flagship universities across states. Theirs represents the 
first attempt to empirically examine the effect of appropriations on nonresident 
enrollment. They find no evidence that institutions raise nonresident enrollment in 
response to a decline in appropriations, but rather, increase resident and nonresident 
tuition. They also find institutions raise resident and nonresident tuition as the average 
tuition in the region increases, and students migrate more when tuition in their region is 
higher. In sum, as states decrease appropriations, institutions raise tuition, and students 
respond with a higher likelihood to migrate out-of-state. 
Similarly, Jacquette and Curs (2015) investigated nonresident enrollment 
response to state appropriations utilizing a larger sample of four-year institutions during a 
more recent time period when state funding was changing more dramatically. They find 
decreases in appropriations are associated with higher nonresident enrollment but not 
resident enrollment. In other words, institutions increased the share of nonresident 
students as a source of additional revenue. The authors mention they could not determine 
how institutions achieved this change in nonresident enrollment but hypothesize that 
institutions utilize enrollment management techniques (e.g. prospective student searches 
and recruitment). The possibility that student demand also changes such that students are 
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more willing to migrate out-of-state, thus complementing institutional response to 
increase the supply of nonresident openings is not seriously considered.  
Perna and Titus (2004) analyze the relationship between a variety of state policies 
and student choice of public versus private as well as in-state versus out-of-state 
institutions using a multilevel model controlling for various student- and state-level 
factors. State appropriations, need-based grant aid, and tuition are included in the 
analysis. They find a decline in state appropriations increases the likelihood of attending 
a public out-of-state or private institution, while an increase in need-based aid increases 
the likelihood of in-state attendance to both public and private four-year institutions. The 
authors also include a composite measure of student SES to demonstrate systematic 
differences in college choice. They find out-of-state and in-state private four-year 
attendance is increasing in SES, while in-state public four-year attendance was strictly 
decreasing in SES. This suggests state policies that redistribute subsidies on the basis of 
wealth will have heterogeneous effects across students and college sectors. 
Using state-level panel data, Toutkoushian and Hillman (2012) examine similar 
relationships but also include state merit-based grant aid. They find appropriations to 
increase enrollment among in-state residents. Increases in merit-based aid had a larger 
impact on in-state enrollment than appropriations and reduced out-of-state enrollment. 
Lastly, there was no evidence that need-based aid had an effect on in-state or out-of-state 
enrollment. Overall, their study shares the most in common with this work in terms of 
framing state financing of higher education across these three types of subsidies.  
Work by Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006), Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg 
(2013), and Hoxby (1997; 2000) are particularly influential in considering the impacts of 
state subsidies on the higher education market when students differ along dimensions of 
ability and income. Each work develops partial or general equilibrium models of higher 
education to demonstrate a variety of outcomes. One outcome common across these 
models is that greater competition generally leads to higher costs/tuition, and greater 
stratification across institutions along student ability and income. This result is in part 
driven by the assumption that educational inputs, such as libraries or faculty quality, 
generate a greater return when used by higher-ability students or among higher ability 
peers. Institutional profit, quality, or prestige—however their objective may be 
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conceived—is increasing in the ability of its student body and therefore continually 
increase educational inputs to attract students of higher ability, which is positively 
correlated with income and requires higher income to attend. 
Hoxby (2000) identifies specific drivers of market competition which include 
technological advances in telecommunication and travel, more transparency with regard 
to institutional and student quality, and tuition reciprocity agreements between states. She 
shows in-state attendance has declined consistently among public universities during 
1949-1994 and the percentage of all students who applied to at least one out-of-state 
bachelor's-granting college has increased from 23.4 percent in 1972 to 43.2 percent in 
1992. Moreover, the deterrence of distance-from-home on college choice has declined, a 
phenomenon that has since been examined in some more detail (Long, 2004). 
Though not considered by Hoxby, a change in state subsidy composition 
consistent with HTHA also drives competition, analogous to school vouchers at the K-12 
level. Rather than public funds going to institutions on a more egalitarian basis vis-à-vis 
appropriations, funds are provided to students over which institutions must compete. 
Also, it is possible HTHA policy is similar to tuition reciprocity agreements with respect 
to interstate tuition differentials. For students who are ineligible for aid, the in-state cost 
of college is expected to increase, approaching the unsubsidized price of college, thus 
approaching the tuition of out-of-state options.   
Using their model of the market, Epple et al. (2013) simulate the impact of a 
$1,000 decrease in appropriations accompanied by a $1,000 increase in tuition for both 
in- and out-of-state students. Enrollment in state colleges declines 8 percent primarily 
among low-income students, while enrollment at private colleges increases slightly. This 
increase in demand for private colleges allows them to replace some higher-ability 
middle-income students for lower-ability higher-income students as well as increase 
tuition and expenditures. Meanwhile, the decrease in public college demand leads them to 
increase the ability admission threshold to in-state students (the authors model 
institutions to be quality-maximizing) and decrease the threshold for out-of-state 
students. As a result, the proportion on nonresident students increases.  
The work by Epple et al. (2013) and Hoxby (1997, 2000) complement many of 
the studies previously discussed, revealing some of the mechanisms responsible for the 
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observed effects of subsidies on student and institutional behavior. For instance, not only 
do public institutions seek more nonresident students to recoup revenue lost through 
lower appropriations, as Jacquette and Curs (2015) conclude, but the heterogenous 
demand across student ability and income also contribute to this compositional change in 
students. Student heterogeneity in ability and income is critical to the discussion of 
HTHA, as it represents a shift in funding based on those very same dimensions. Though 
not examined, a decrease in appropriations accompanied by an increase in grant aid 
among subsets of students based on ability or income would likely compound some of the 
outcomes already discussed. 
Models of the higher education market generally conceive institutional inputs as a 
single dimension of quality, which is indicative of the ubiquity of the human capital 
framework that explains college-going behavior as a function of the return to a degree. 
However, studies have shown college choice is also affected by college inputs that likely 
do not contribute to the value of a degree and instead a student’s consumption while in 
college (Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2018; Tuckman, 1970; Mixon, 1992; Mixon & Hsing, 
1994). Including amenities as an input separate from educational quality could lend new 
insights into how changes to state subsidies affect students and institutions. 
Recent work by Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2018) is especially relevant to the 
emergence of college amenities as an important factor in the higher education market. 
They are the first to demonstrate differential demand elasticities for educational quality, 
measured as expenditures on instruction and academic support, and amenities, measured 
as expenditures on student services and auxiliary enterprises across student ability and 
income. Higher-ability students, as measured by standardized math scores, have a 
substantially greater demand for academic spending but similar demand for consumption 
amenities. Conversely, higher-income students have a higher demand for consumption 
amenities than lower-income students but similar demand for academic spending.5  
The theoretical models just discussed only account for heterogeneous demand for 
academic quality as a function of ability and/or income, not amenities. Furthermore, no 
                                                 
5 The authors also include distance in their analysis and find that higher-ability and wealthier students are 
less sensitive to distance. I interpret this to be a byproduct of their higher demands for academic quality 
and/or amenities given that each are weakly increasing in distance—a subject that will be revisited in 
Chapter 5. 
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work has theoretically or empirically examined institutional supply-side behavior of 
academic quality along with amenities. Inclusion of amenities is arguably a small 
extension to existing theory, but it has serious implications for policy, including policy 
pertaining to state subsidies.  
To reiterate, state subsidy composition involves the weighing of various priorities; 
to provide subsidies on an approximately egalitarian basis and lower the cost of college 
for all students or to target subsidies toward a subset of students on the basis of need (i.e. 
income) or merit (i.e. ability). The prevailing HTHA trend within many states decreases 
the cost of college for lower-income and/or higher-ability students and allows costs to 
rise for any student ineligible for aid. This presumably alters the ability and income 
distribution of enrolled students as well as which institutions—high/low academic 
quality, high/low amenities—experience an increase or decrease in demand. In turn, 
HTHA presumably has a secondary effect of altering institutional expenditures in 
response to changes in demand pressure. And, if state higher education finance is altering 
the colleges chosen by students, it is necessarily altering the distances they migrate to 
pursue a degree. Might there be unintended consequences for student success? The 
remaining chapters set out to investigate these possibilities.  
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[3]  
STUDENT DEMAND AND STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION 
This chapter develops a theoretical model of student demand to demonstrate the effects of 
composition in state higher education subsidies. Existing models of the higher education 
market offer insight into the effects of subsidizing the price of college when demand for 
college differs across student ability and income (Hoxby, 1977, 2000; Epple et al., 2006, 
2013, Jacob et al., 2018), but the following work deviates in two notable ways. First, 
rather than model college quality as a single attribute related to academic quality (e.g. 
instruction, peer ability), college quality is conceived to consist of academic as well as 
non-academic resources referred to as amenities. This two-attribute conceptualization of 
college quality allows for heterogeneous demand for academic quality and amenities 
across levels of student ability and income that is evident in recent research (Jacob et al., 
2018). Second, features of eligibility and distribution unique to state subsidy programs 
are thoroughly examined, among which student ability and income are key factors. The 
theoretical results explain certain higher education market phenomena in a novel way and 
motivate numerous avenues for future research which are discussed in the concluding 
remarks. 
 The proceeding sections give a somewhat technical treatment to a straightforward 
idea regarding the relationship between state subsidies and college student demand, the 
broad strokes of which are helpful to describe at the outset. College goods and services 
can be categorized as either an educational resource or amenity. Student demand for 
educational resources is increasing in student ability, and student demand for amenities is 
increasing (or at least non-decreasing) in income. A shift of state funds from 
appropriations to need-based aid diverges prices among students on the basis of income, 
while a shift of state funds from appropriations to merit-based aid diverges prices among 
students on the basis of ability. Moreover, for students ineligible to receive aid, the price 
of public in-state college approaches the price of out-of-state or in-state private college, 
making these institutions more likely to be chosen among students who generally have 
higher demand for amenities, especially if merit-based aid is part of a state’s subsidy 
composition. In short, the HTHA trend in state subsidies present over the last 25 years 
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drives a divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities that has not 
been thoroughly examined. 
HETEROGENEOUS STUDENT DEMAND FOR COLLEGE INPUTS 
Assume students differ continuously along exogenous ability a and income y. Each 
college offers a package of educational inputs e, such as the quality and number of 
faculty, labs, and libraries, as well as non-educational, amenity benefits b, such as 
dormitories, cafeterias, and fitness facilities. Colleges differ continuously along these two 
inputs, both of which enter into student utility. Though colleges are discreet units, the 
higher education market is large and variable such that the college inputs over which 
students maximize utility—e and b—can be treated as continuous. The cost of attending a 
college given its bundle of e and b is denoted as P. Lastly, colleges set a minimum ability 
threshold for admission denoted 𝑎, for which there is a function 𝑔�𝑎� that maps to the 
quantity of per-student educational resources the institution supplies. 
 Since Manski and Wise (1983) college choice is generally modeled theoretically 
and empirically using some variant of McFadden’s (1973) choice model where a student 
chooses the institution that generates the greatest utility compared to all other feasible 
options, including the option of not attending college. Incorporating the terms described 
above choice can be represented by the following condition in which student i chooses 
college j if 
𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑖(𝑎𝑖),𝑏𝑖(𝑦𝑖),𝑑𝑖𝑖 , �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖�, 𝜖𝑖𝑖� ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖;  𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑖 (1) 
where d is the nonmonetary cost of migrating the distance between a student’s home to 
the college, �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖� is numeraire consumption of all other goods.
6 The error term 𝜖 is 
an idiosyncratic preference the student has for an institution and is assumed to be 
independent and identically extreme value distributed. Equation (1) leads to the 
estimation of the probability that student i attends feasible college j conditional on 
educational resources, amenities, ability, income, and price. 
 It is assumed student utility is increasing in educational resources 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
> 0 and 
amenities 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
> 0 at decreasing rates 𝜕2𝜕
𝜕2𝜕
< 0 and 𝜕2𝜕
𝜕2𝜕
< 0. Student ability and income are 
                                                 
6 The role of distance in college choice and success is explored in detail in Chapter 5. 
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included in the arguments for e and b in (1), respectively, due to the following 
assumptions regarding utility and student type: 
𝜕2𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 > 0     (2) 
and 
𝜕2𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 ≥ 0     (3) 
where (2) states the marginal utility of an additional unit of educational resources is 
increasing in ability, and (3) states the marginal utility of an additional unit of amenities 
is nondecreasing in income.7 It is therefore assumed that demand for educational 
resources is increasing in ability 
𝜕(𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕)
𝜕𝜕
 > 0     (4) 
 and demand for amenities is nondecreasing in income 
𝜕(𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕 
𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕)
𝜕𝜕
 ≥ 0.     (5) 
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the effect of these assumptions on demand between e and b 
as income increases—also known as the income expansion path (IEP)—between two 
hypothetical students. Student A has higher ability than student B. The solid lines 
illustrate demand if student preferences are homothetic (equations 3 and 5 equal 0). As 
income increases, the quantities demanded of e and b between students increasingly 
diverge with student A demanding a greater quantity of educational inputs relative to 
amenities and student B demanding greater quantities of amenities relative to educational 
resources. The dashed lines illustrate IEPs if demand for amenities is increasing in 
income. The quantity demanded of e and b is still divergent between students, but the 
quantity demanded of educational inputs relative to amenities is no longer constant.  
  
                                                 
7 The intuition for (2) being positive is that educational inputs contribute to the production of human 
resource capital and ability is the technology one possesses that serves as a multiplier in the production 
process. The intuition for (3) being positive is less clear. It could be due to students reaching a limit to how 
much educational resources they can consume, mistakes in distinguishing amenities from educational 
inputs while ability and income are positively correlated, or amenities being close substitutes with other 
goods but at a lower per-unit price due to cost sharing across students. Jacob et al. (2018) find no evidence 
of heterogenous demand for amenities by income when using a random coefficients model.  
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Figure 3.1 - Example Income Expansion Paths 
 
 
 There are 4,275 Title IV participating, 2-year-and-above, degree-granting 
institutions in the U.S. according to the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS). One could imagine these institutions placed in the figure above according to 
their per-student quantities of e and b, providing a virtual continuum of options that make 
marginal changes in demand possible. Intuitively, the probability that a student chooses  
to attend a particular institution is represented by its proximity to the student’s optimal 
choice within the two-good space in figure 3.1, allowing for randomness in choice due to 
idiosyncratic preferences for certain institutions. This optimal choice is the latent student 
demand for colleges’ attributes from which we observe a student’s choice of the college 
that most closely supplies the optimal quantity of educational and amenity inputs.8  
 The unsubsidized price of college can be represented by the following equation 
𝑃 = 𝑝𝑐(𝑒 + 𝑏)       (6) 
where 𝑝𝑐 is the per-unit price of e and b. Equation (6) asserts that educational resources 
and amenities are essentially inseparable in price, but their quantities can be separately 
observed. Moving forward the primary focus will be the effect of state subsidies on 𝑝𝑐 
and the subsequent effects on demand between e and b. State subsidies do not 
                                                 
8 An alternative theoretical approach is the (linear) attributes model (Lancaster, 1966) where students are 
limited to consumption between one institution and at least one other good contributing to two or more 
activities that directly generate utility. Features of the higher education market do not translate naturally to 
this model, however. For example, there is not a continuous quantity of the institution attached to price. 
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discriminate between the costs of e and b, thus they would not distort the price ratio 
between the two if (6) were modeled with two prices.9 
 From (1) it is obvious that subsidies decrease P at a given level of e and b, and 
therefore increases the likelihood that a student chooses the subsidized institution over 
the unsubsidized institution, all else equal. A change in 𝑝𝑐 operates like a change in 
income with respect to optimal choice of e and b as there is no substitution effect between 
the two to consider. In this case, a detailed analysis of choice between e and b as price 
changes would be unnecessary if subsidies were simply lump-sum provided to all 
students, as is the case with appropriations. Whatever the demand of e relative to b in a 
state is would not be altered, only the absolute quantities. However, it is the fact that 
grants are targeted on the basis of ability or income and that demand for e relative to b is 
heterogeneous in these dimensions that makes changes in 𝑝𝑐 due to allocative decisions 
across various subsidies lead to potentially novel results and important implications for 
policy.  
STATE SUBSIDIES 
A state has three modes of subsidy:  appropriations, need-based grants, and merit-based 
grants. The following assumptions are made regarding their provision:  1) the state 
allocates a total amount of funds between the three subsidies, thus making their 
respective allocations fully interdependent, 2) appropriations are delivered to in-state 
public institutions based on enrollment and fully pass through to reduce the cost of 
attendance by the amount allocated per-student, 3) need-based grants can be applied to 
only in-state public colleges, 4) merit-based grants can be applied to any in-state college, 
and 5) merit-based grants do not displace need-based grants.10   
                                                 
9 Some amenities are clearly separated in prices, such as room and board, while others are included in 
tuition. How many resource categories are separated from tuition as well as how many of them are 
mandatory versus à la carte varies across institutions.  
10 These assumptions are an approximation and the rules pertaining to grants vary across states as discussed 
in Chapter 2. In states where grants have a different funding source from appropriations, allocations are 
unlikely to be fully interdependent. Full pass-through of appropriations assumes colleges do not increase 
inputs. A majority of states’ primary need-based grant programs do restrict funds to public in-state colleges, 
while some states have separate need-based programs for private in-state colleges. Extenuating 
circumstances can lead to state grant funds being applicable to out-of-state colleges. Information on 
displacement between need- and merit-based grants is not readily available. At the federal level, Pell grants 
are not displaced by other funding sources.  
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 Let 𝑃[𝑂,𝑅,𝑈] denote a student’s total expenditure on college given income, prices, 
and quantities chosen of e and b. Also, let l denote state appropriations, m merit-based 
grants, and n need-based grants, all of which are expressed as per-student amounts. 
According to the above assumptions, students potentially face three alternative prices 
based on the type of college and grant eligibility, and given quantities of e and b, 
represented by the following equations: 
 
𝑃𝑂 = 𝑝𝑐(𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)       
𝑃𝑅 = [𝑝𝑐 − 𝑚(𝑎)](𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)           (7) 
𝑃𝑈 = �𝑝𝑐 − 𝑙 − 𝑚(𝑎) − 𝑛�𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦)��(𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)   
where PO is the total expenditure on college outside of the state, 𝑃𝑅 is the total 
expenditure on in-state private college, and 𝑃𝑈 is the total expenditure for in-state public 
college. 
 The amount of merit-based grant earned is a function of ability given by the 
following equation 
𝑚 = min {𝑚� , max [cm ∙ �𝑎 − 𝑎�, 0]}        (8) 
where 𝑚�  is the maximum merit-based award, c is a non-negative constant multiplier, and 
𝑎 is the minimum ability required to receive a merit-based award. Equation (8) means 
students either receive the maximum merit-based award, an amount that is a linear 
function of his ability above some minimum threshold, or no award. Let S denote the 
total population of students in a state and 𝑠𝑚 denote eligibility for a merit-based grant 
where 𝑠𝑚𝑖 = 1 if 𝑎𝑖 > 𝑎 and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the total number of students eligible 
for a merit-based grant is  
𝑆𝑚 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑅𝑈 > 𝑎𝑆𝑖=1         (9) 
where students are indexed by i. The superscripts R and U correspond with (7) in that 
only students attending in-state private or public institutions are eligible to receive a 
merit-based grant. Eligibility versus actual receipt of a grant is a technical distinction. 
Equation (9) could alternatively be written without the superscripts, thus broadening the 
definition of eligibility to include any students who could receive a grant depending on 
the type of institution chosen. This distinction is relevant when considering how much 
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funding a state is actually liable for allocating and involves college choice to be discussed 
in a later section. 
 A state can alter its program via the minimum ability threshold, which alters the 
number of eligible students, the maximum award, or the constant multiplier, both of 
which alter the amount each eligible student receives. As student ability increases, the 
amount awarded to them increases. Equation (8) assumes this relationship to be linear 
and so the marginal change in merit-based grants with respect to ability is 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
=
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 0        𝑖𝑖  𝑎 < 𝑎
𝑐𝑚  𝑖𝑖 𝑎 < 𝑎 < 𝑚�𝑐𝑚 + 𝑎0     𝑖𝑖    𝑚�
𝑐𝑚
+ 𝑎 < 𝑎        (10) 
which is simply the value of the constant multiplier. As the quantity of e demanded 
increases in a student’s ability (𝜕𝜕
∗
𝜕𝜕
> 0), the provision of a merit-based award 
simultaneously decreases 𝑝𝑐 by 𝑐𝑚, amplifying the divergence in demand for e and b 
between higher- and lower-ability students.  
 Figure 3.2 illustrates the effect of merit-based grants on choice between e and b 
among two hypothetical students in a state that also subsidizes via appropriations. 
Student A has lower ability than student B and is not eligible for a merit-based grant. 
Therefore, he faces the same budget constraint for out-of-state and in-state private 
colleges.11 Due to state appropriations, student A could consume greater e and b at a 
public institution. Student B faces the same constraint as student A does for out-of-state 
colleges but her higher ability earns a merit-based grant that allows her to consume 
greater quantities at in-state private institutions at point E as well as public institutions on 
top of the state appropriations at point F. Note also that the ability constraint is higher for 
student B than it is for student A and is nonbinding in this case. If the state market 
comprised only of the two students in figure 3.2, then the effect of merit-based grants on 
demand for higher education amplifies the divergence in quantities of e and b demanded.  
  
                                                 
11 It is important to note that, as in figure 3.2, these budget constraints do not exhaust all income. Therefore, 
a student could choose optimal e and b anywhere along the IEP depending numeraire consumption. This is 
why a point such as D can be optimal. If x was included in the figure, then point D would be at the 
intersection of the academic and the exhaustive budget constraint. The implicit assumption in these figures 
when comparing two students is they allocate the same portion of income to numeraire consumption.  
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Figure 3.2 - Effect of Merit-based Grant on Choice 
 
 
 The amount of need-based grants is a function of income and total expenditures 
on public in-state college given by the following equation 
𝑛 = min {𝑛�, max[𝑃𝑈 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦), 0]}         (11) 
where 𝑛� is the maximum need-based award and EFC is expected family contribution.12 
Equation (11) establishes that a student receives either the maximum need-based award, 
the amount necessary to offset the difference between total expenditure and EFC, or no 
award. Eligibility for a need-based grant is denoted as 𝑠𝑛𝑖 where 𝑠𝑛 = 1 if 𝑃𝑖𝑈 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸 and 
0 otherwise. The total number of students eligible for a need-based grant is therefore  
𝑆𝑛 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑈 > 𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑖)𝑆𝑖=1     (12) 
EFC is a fairly complex formula that involves student dependency, income, assets, and 
family size. For simplicity, let EFC follow the formula 
                                                 
12 As discussed in Chapter 2, need-based grant aid is determined by COA-EFC. COA includes costs not 
captured by P as it has been defined here, so (16) is only representative of how need-based aid is 
determined. This distinction should not make much difference on the demand side but potentially has 
important implications if the supply-side was considered. For instance, tuition at public institutions is 
partially controlled by state government in many cases whereas amenity categories are not. If a public 
institution cannot raise tuition enough to offset a reduction in state appropriations, it may be inclined to 
raise the cost of room or board to recoup lost revenue since these items are included in COA.   
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𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑦) = max [𝑐𝑛 �𝑦 − 𝑦� , 0]   (13) 
where 0 < 𝑐𝑛 < 1 and 𝑦 is a minimum income threshold. Therefore, the change in EFC 
with respect to income can be described by the following conditional equation 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
= � 0 𝑖𝑖 𝑦 < 𝑦
𝑐𝑛 𝑖𝑖 𝑦 > 𝑦     (14) 
 Holding numeraire consumption constant, 𝑃𝑈 in (11) changes for two reasons. 
The first is a change in per-unit price 𝑝𝑐. The marginal change in need-based grant 
awarded with respect to 𝑝𝑐 is 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝𝑐
= � 0 𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸1 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛�0 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛� < 𝑃𝑈    (15) 
meaning there is a one-to-one offset in price for those eligible for need-based grants up to 
the maximum award. a one-dollar decline in, say, appropriations would be offset by a one 
dollar increase in need-based grants for those eligible who do not reach the maximum 
award and attend a public institution. If colleges were allowed to price discriminate in 
this model, (15) motivates the concern that need-based grants enable colleges to extract 
greater rents. A college could simply raise its price of attendance on eligible students 
until the maximum award is reached.13 The second case in which there is a change in 𝑃𝑈 
is with a change in income. The change in EFC due to a change in income must also be 
considered. Doing so, the marginal change in need-based grant with respect to income is 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
= � 0 𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕
− 𝑐𝑛 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛0 𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 < 𝑃𝑈             (16) 
which implies there is less than a one-to-one offset for each dollar allocated toward 
college as income increases unless income is below the minimum threshold in which case 
𝑐𝑛 = 0.   
 Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of need-based grants on choice between e and b 
among the same hypothetical students in figure 3.2. The overall effect is similar to merit-
                                                 
13 Epple et al. (2013) demonstrate this result with respect to federal grant aid (i.e. Pell) and private 
institutions. Since states can limit the extent to which public universities raise tuition and many states limit 
the receipt of need-based grants to attendance at public institutions, this perverse incentive is less of a 
concern.  
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based grants in that the budget constraint shifts outward, potentially increasing the 
divergence in demand between e and b. However, since need-based grants are a function 
of income, which itself enters into the graph, how the budget constraint moves in 
response to price is somewhat more complicated.  
 The maximum need-based award 𝑛 establishes a floor beneath which every dollar 
allocated to e or b at an in-state public institution is fully matched for those students 
whose income is below the minimum threshold 𝑦.14 All of these low-income students 
share this minimum budget constraint, and since the funds cannot be allocated toward 
other goods, optimal choice falls on line Z regardless of preferences. Beyond line Z, each 
dollar allocated toward college is offset by a proportion equal to 1 − 𝑐𝑛. As a result, this 
proportion is equal to the amount an eligible student’s budget constraint expands. 
  Suppose line Y represents the budget constraint for an in-state public institution if 
there were no need-based grants and given an allocation to other goods. The budget 
constraint with a need-based subsidy expands outward by the percentage of each dollar 
offset by the grant to line Y′. However, in this example, the maximum award is reached  
Figure 3.3 - Effect of Need-based Grants on Choice 
 
                                                 
14 For example, dependent students in a family with an income below $25,000 automatically qualify for 
zero EFC. 
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at line Z′ beyond which a student receives no additional aid. Therefore, optimal choices 
are at points C and D along line Z′. Lines Y and Y′ move in tandem and whether optimal 
choice is on line Y′ depends whether it is above or below the maximum award constraint 
Z′. 
 Lastly, relative to grants, the allocation of state appropriations and their effect on 
student budget constraints are quite straightforward. Since appropriations are allocated to 
institutions, student income or ability obviously do not affect amounts directly. 
Appropriations are a lump-sum subsidy based on enrollment and all students who attend 
an in-state public institution are beneficiaries. Figure 3.2 already demonstrated the effect 
of appropriations on student budget constraints relative to other institution types. 
Regardless of the type of institutions for which grant funds can be applied, in-state public 
institutions have the outward-most budget constraints due to the additional reduction of l 
assuming its value is positive. The marginal change in the per-unit price of e and b with 
respect to l is equal to 1, and the change in quantity demanded depends on the marginal 
change of 𝑃𝑈 with respect to price. 
COMPOSITIONAL CHANGE IN SUBSIDIES 
As the previous section demonstrates, state government has numerous options to modify 
its subsidy programs for higher education, any of which fundamentally involve a change 
in level or composition. The overall increase or decline in state subsidies in higher 
education is an important policy issue that impacts how much students must personally 
pay for college as well as how institutions must fund themselves. The composition of 
state funds across different subsidy types, on the other hand, involves which students 
receive public funding and represents a policy decision to target public funds to a 
subpopulation of students on the basis of income or ability rather than a more egalitarian 
basis. The previous section examined how levels of each subsidy may affect student 
demand on a theoretical basis, but there are additional dynamics to consider regarding 
changes in subsidy composition, especially those that reflect actual trends. 
 Chapter 2 made clear that the dominant trend in state financing of higher 
education—in terms of how total funds are allocated across different types of subsidy— 
follows the high-tuition, high-aid (HTHA) model. Particularly during times of economic 
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stress, states decrease appropriations while largely maintaining or even increasing state 
grant aid. Moreover, these compositional changes tend to stick. Appropriations do not 
recover to pre-recession levels quickly if at all and grants appear more difficult to reduce 
once citizens have been entitled to them. 
 Let us now examine the potential impacts of an HTHA compositional change in 
state subsidies on student demand between e and b. It is assumed that the primary goal of 
a state that implements an HTHA policy is to reduce total spending on higher education 
by reducing appropriations while a proportion of the reduction may be reallocated to 
need- and/or merit-based grants. Let t denote the per-student amount subtracted from 
appropriations, v denotes the amount of t reallocated toward need-based grants, and w the 
amount of t reallocated toward merit-based grants. Together, v and w comprise the total 
replacement r, all of which can be described by the following equations 
𝑤 = 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
𝑡       
𝑣 = 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
𝑡           (17) 
𝑟 = 𝑤 + 𝑣        
where it must be the case that 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑆
𝑆𝑛+𝑆𝑚
𝑡     (18) 
to ensure the state spends less on higher education after the HTHA policy. The post-
HTHA expenditure given an optimal quantity of e and b for each type of institution is 
now 
𝑃′𝑂 = 𝑝𝑐(𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)        
𝑃′𝑅 = [𝑝𝑐 − (𝑚 + 𝑤)](𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)         (19) 
𝑃′𝑈 = [𝑝𝑐 − (𝑙 − 𝑡) − (𝑚 + 𝑤) − (𝑛 + 𝑣)](𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗)   
In other words, r is the total amount of funds a student receives in return for the reduction 
in appropriations.15 Also note that HTHA potentially increases the price only of in-
state public schools, while the price of in-state private schools potentially decreases.  
                                                 
15 It is assumed students/families do not receive additional income via lower state taxes allowed by the 
reduction in appropriations. Since HTHA is typically an attempt to balance the budget in times of fiscal 
stress, it seems fair to assume state taxes are not a serious omission in demonstrating impacts on demand, at 
least in the short-run. 
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If 𝑟 = 𝑡, then eligible students receive an amount of grant aid equal to the amount 
lost in appropriations (𝑃𝑅 = 𝑃′𝑅 and 𝑃𝑈 = 𝑃′𝑈 for all 𝑆𝑛 and 𝑆𝑚). However, another 
trend made clear in Chapter 2 is that the average increase in grant aid has not kept pace 
with the average decrease in appropriations. Therefore, it is likely that r is strictly less 
than its upper-bound in (18) and that 𝑟 < 𝑡 for a majority of students. Clearly, as r varies, 
so too do the effects of HTHA on student demand. Moreover, because w and v are not 
necessarily equal or change in proportion, and receipt of financial aid depends on student 
income and ability, effects can vary for any given value of r depending on the relation 
between v and w, as well as the ratio of total students to students eligible for each grant 
type. 
A few basic conclusions can be reached regarding state grant funding limitations 
according to the general HTHA case described by (17)-(19). First, in order for all eligible 
students to receive an amount of grant aid greater than or equal to the amount lost in 
appropriations (𝑟 ≥ 𝑡), then 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 ≤  𝑆. Therefore, the value of r relative to t is a 
policy decision that involves not only the proportion reallocated to grants but also the 
eligibility criteria that determines the size of recipient groups. If a state structures its 
grant programs such that 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 > 𝑆, then only for those eligible to receive both types 
of grant aid is it possible for 𝑟 ≥  𝑡. For all remaining students, the result is an increase in 
the price of in-state public higher education. If a state is concerned with achieving a 
particular value of r, it seems unlikely without strategically linking decisions between 
appropriations and grant aid policy. 
It is assumed that 𝑆𝑛 ≠ 𝑆𝑚, though it may possible for a state to structure its 
eligibility criteria so that the two are equal. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely the 
distribution of student ability and income would result in the two subsets being equal. 
Given the two subsets of students do not perfectly overlap, in order for all eligible 
students to receive an amount of financial aid greater than or equal to the amount lost in 
appropriations, then it must be the case that v = t and w = t, and thus 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
= 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
= 1. 
However, this would exceed the upper-bound of r in (18) if, say, 𝑆𝑛 + 𝑆𝑚 = 𝑆. 
Substituting (17) into (18) and algebraic rearrangement shows that it must be the case that 
𝑡 ≤
𝑆
𝑆𝑛+𝑆𝑚
  for all eligible students to receive aid greater than or equal to their loss in 
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appropriations. More generally and regardless of a particular goal for r, it must be the 
case that 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
𝑆𝑛 + 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑆𝑚 ≤ 𝑆     (20) 
in order for a state not to exceed the upper-bound of r, increasing its expenditures 
compared to before the HTHA policy. 
Values of w and v are not necessarily equal across all eligible students. They 
depend on the mechanisms through which a state chooses to alter its grant programs 
described by (8) and (11). For merit-based grants, a state can increase funding via the 
maximum award, the minimum ability threshold, or the rate at which the award increases 
in ability above the minimum threshold. Raising the maximum award increases the 
amount of merit aid received only for those who were above the maximum. Increasing 
the rate at which the award is increasing in ability does not change the number of eligible 
students but increases the amount received by each eligible student who was below the 
maximum. Lowering the minimum ability threshold increases the amount received by all 
eligible students not already above the maximum award and increases the number of 
eligible students. However, let us assume state government does not consider lowering 𝑎 
since doing so redefines the subset of students deserving of merit aid. Incorporating these 
conditions into the top equation of (17) results in the following equation for w 
𝑤 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
𝑡  𝑖𝑖  𝑎 + �𝑚+𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝜕�
�𝑐𝑚+
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕
𝜕�
< 𝑎
�𝑎 − 𝑎� �
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕
𝑡�   𝑖𝑖  𝑎 < 𝑎 < 𝑎 + �𝑚+𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝜕�
�𝑐𝑚+
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕
𝜕�0  𝑖𝑖  𝑎 < 𝑎
            (21) 
which reflects the increase in merit aid equal to the increase in the maximum award if 
student ability remains above the new maximum award, the increase in merit aid equal to 
the product of ability above the minimum and change in the rate of increase if student 
ability remains between the minimum ability and maximum award, and no increase in 
merit aid if student ability remains below the minimum ability threshold. Equation (21) 
makes clear that in order for w to equal t for all 𝑆𝑚 then 
𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕
 and 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
 must equal 1 as long 
as there are students with ability that earns above the maximum award. Also, it is 
important to note that based on (21) 𝑆𝑚 does not increase.  
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 The only way a state can modify its need-based grant directly according to (11) is 
through the maximum award. As a result of raising the maximum award, it is possible for 
eligible students to receive more funding. However, HTHA policy potentially affects the 
amount of aid received as well as the number of eligible students through changes in 𝑝𝑐. 
It is also worth noting that EFC remains constant as income is unaffected by the policy. 
Therefore, the final value of v depends on the interaction between the maximum award 
and any change in 𝑝𝑐 external of need-based aid. Incorporating these conditions into the 
second equation in (17) results in the following equation for v 
𝑣 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
𝑡  𝑖𝑖  𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 + 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
𝑡 < 𝑃𝑈 + 𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕
𝑡
𝑡 − 𝑤  𝑖𝑖  𝐸𝐸𝐸 < 𝑃𝑈 + 𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕
𝑡 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝑛 + 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤 < 𝑡0  𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑈 + 𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝜕
𝑡 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸     (22) 
where 𝜕𝑃
𝑈
𝜕𝜕
> 0 if 𝑤 < 𝑡 and vice versa.16 Equation (22) reflects the increase in need aid 
equal to the increase in the maximum award if total expenditure remains above the sum 
of EFC and the maximum award, the increase in need aid equal to the change in price if 
expenditures remain between EFC and EFC plus the new maximum award, or no aid if 
expenditures remain below EFC.  
 For those with expenditures between EFC and the sum of EFC and the maximum 
award, need-based grant aid operates in a way such that 𝑝𝑐 does not change; 𝑣 = 𝑡 − 𝑤, 
thus 𝑃𝑈 does not change. For those with expenditures above the maximum award, need-
based aid does not have this same automatic feature. In order for v to equal t for this 
subset it must be the case that 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
= 1.17  
 The bottom condition in (22) pertains to changes in 𝑆𝑛. Since any reduction in 
state spending through t is partially offset by an amount equal to the product of 𝜕𝑃
𝑈
𝜕𝜕
 and 
                                                 
16 
𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝑡
𝑡(𝑒∗ + 𝑏∗) and 𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝑡
= 1 − 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑡
. Unless 
𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝑡
= 1 ≡ 𝑤 = 𝑡 from (30), 𝜕𝑝𝑐
𝜕𝑡
> 0, thus 𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝑡
> 0. If 
𝑤 = 𝑡, then 𝜕𝑃𝑈
𝜕𝑡
= 0. 
17 Technically 𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜕
= 1 − 𝑤 but it is assumed states cannot target the maximum award to each individual 
based on what they receive via changes to merit-based grants. If merit-based grants were factored into 
COA, changes in merit aid would be internalized into the amount of need aid awarded.  
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𝑆𝑛, the change in 𝑆𝑛 is important in determining whether condition (20) is met.
18 To 
reiterate, a student is ineligible for a need-based grant if 𝑃𝑈 < 𝐸𝐸𝐸. Since expenditures 
increase as a result of t, this inequality will reverse for a subset of students with 
expenditures near their EFC. Specifically, the increase in 𝑆𝑛 is equal to  
∑ 𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝑈
𝜕𝜕
> 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑈𝑆𝑖=1     (23) 
or the sum of students whose change in expenditures is greater than the amount to which 
their EFC exceeded their original expenditure. 
IMPACT OF HTHA ACROSS STUDENTS SUBSETS 
 Having examined how values of v and w vary with respect to t depending on the 
grant program mechanisms a state may or may not modify, all potential subsets of 
students from the population S can now be described in terms of the impact HTHA has on 
the price of college as well as how prices compare across subsets post-policy. For each 
type of grant a student belongs to one of three groups:  ineligible, which is denoted with 
superscript c in accordance with standard set theory notation, eligible, and eligible but at 
the maximum award amount. Thus, there are nine subsets potentially affected by a 
compositional change in state subsidies. 
 Table 3.1 presents each student subset and the impact of HTHA on the per-unit 
price 𝑝𝑐 leaving implicit the subsidy values for l, m, and n that were already in effect 
prior to the policy. The first two subsets represent the least variable and arguably the 
most probable of HTHA outcomes in terms of price changes. There is a subset comprised 
of students who are ineligible for both types of grants—𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐—and a subset 
comprised of students who are ineligible for merit-based aid and eligible for need-based 
aid below the maximum award—𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛. For 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 the price increase of 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 is 
greater than or equal to any other subset of students. Provided a state does not cap its total 
funding for need-based grants, there is no change in 𝑝𝑐 for 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛.  
 The third and fourth rows include the only two subsets of students for whom the 
in-state public price cannot increase. If their merit-based aid is not sufficient to offset the 
                                                 
18 A state reduces the extent to which savings are offset if total funding for need-based grants is capped, 
providing no grant for students who apply once funding has been exhausted. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
only 24 percent of need-based grant programs funded all eligible students in 2016. 
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increase of t (𝜕𝑐𝑚
𝜕𝜕
 or 𝜕𝑚
𝜕𝜕
< 1), need-based aid offsets the remaining amount. If the 
increase in merit-based aid is greater than t, the price decreases. The direction of the price 
change for the remaining subsets is indeterminate and depends on the value of the 
relevant components of w and v relative to t. Among these remaining groups a few 
relational conclusions can be made regarding their post-HTHA prices. The price faced by 
𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 is necessarily less than or equal to the price faced by 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 due to the 
common merit subsidy and the former’s additional need-based subsidy. Similarly, the 
price change for 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 must be less than or equal to the price change experienced by 
𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛
𝑐.  
 The third column of table 3.1 compares the in-state private price change for each 
subset. Prices cannot increase for any subset and can potentially decrease for all but three 
subsets ineligible for merit-based aid. The private price change is invariably less than the 
 
Table 3.1 - Impact of HTHA on Prices Across Student Subsets 
  Price Change 
 Subset In-state Public In-state Private 
1 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡  𝑝𝑐  
2 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡   𝑝𝑐  
3 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + �𝑡 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡� − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
4 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + �𝑡 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡� − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
5 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
6 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
7 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
8 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐  
9 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡 − 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜕 𝑡  𝑝𝑐 − 𝜕𝑐𝑚𝜕𝜕 𝑡  
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public price change for subsets 1, 6, and 7. It should be noted these results are contingent 
on the assumption that merit-based aid can be applied to in-state private schools. Also, 
comparing per-unit price changes across public and private institutions only relates to the 
change in price differential; public institutions still have a lower per-unit price due to 
remaining state appropriations and the amount of need-based aid that are not applicable 
to private institutions. 
Combinations of student subsets and potential HTHA policy variations are 
numerous, but a few scenarios can be explored that highlight the boundaries of HTHA 
policy and its impact on the market. A realistic lower-bound might involve a case in 
which a state reduces appropriations and does nothing to increase funding through grants 
other than provide that which is needed for the automatic increase in need-based aid 
among those eligible and below the maximum award. An upper-bound might involve a 
case in which the state commits to providing every eligible student an increase in grant 
aid that is no less than the reduction in appropriations.19 Assuming no subsets overlap 
perfectly, the upper-bound policy requires w and v to equal t through all grant program 
mechanisms.  
 For the lower-bound case in which appropriations are reduced and only additional 
need aid for those below the maximum is provided, the nine subsets in table 3.1 collapse 
to two in terms of those that experience a price change. The three subsets eligible for 
need-based aid and below the maximum award (2, 3, and 4) experience no price change. 
The remaining subsets experience a price increase equal to t. Though there are only two 
price changes, the quantities demanded of e and b still vary across different subsets based 
on the levels of ability and income that determine their particular subset.  
 Figure 3.4 shows the impact of this lower-bound HTHA policy on four 
hypothetical students within different subsets. Student A is ineligible for merit-based aid 
and is above the maximum need-based award. The budget constraint for this student 
reduces by t and optimal choice is now at point A′. The student at point B has equal 
ability as student A but is eligible for additional need-based aid due to her total 
expenditure toward college relative to her EFC. The budget constraint is unaffected and 
                                                 
19 A precise upper-bound for r such as that stated in (27) is indeterminate thus far. It requires knowing the 
number of eligible students who actually receive aid based on institutional choice. 
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optimal choice remains at point B. Student C has equivalent income as student B but has 
higher ability that makes him eligible for merit-based aid. Therefore, student C’s budget 
constraint is higher than B by the amount of his merit award and experiences no change 
in price. Lastly, Student D has higher ability and income than all other students such that 
she is eligible for merit-based aid (whether at the maximum or not is inconsequential) and 
ineligible for need-based aid. Like student A, the budget constraint for student D reduces 
by t and optimal choice is now at point D′. 
 This example illustrates that there are two groups in terms of pre- and post-HTHA 
prices—those for whom the per-unit price increased and those for whom it did not 
change—but also two student types within the group that experienced the increase in 
price—a lower-ability, lower-income student and a higher-ability, higher-income student. 
By virtue of their characteristics, the two students’ demand for quantities of e and b 
respond differently to the same change in price. If preferences are homothetic (i.e. linear 
IEPs from the origin), then the decline in demand for b is greater for student A than D, 
and the decline in demand for e is greater for student D than A.  
 
Figure 3.4 - Effect of a Lower-Bound HTHA Policy 
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  This lower-bound HTHA case reduces to increasing the price for some students 
and not for others on the basis of income or rather their ability to pay for the quantity of 
higher education they would optimally consume. Obviously, this results in a decrease in 
market demand provided there is some elasticity in demand, but does it result in a 
divergence in the quantity of educational resources demanded relative to amenities, as 
was stated at the beginning of the chapter? In this specific example it does because of 
student D’s location on the graph relative to student A’s, which was arbitrarily chosen 
except for the parameter that student D must have greater demand for e than student A. 
The extent to which demand differs between the two students depends on the values of 
𝜕2𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 and 𝜕
2𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
, and whether an increase in the per-unit price equal to t results in a 
divergence in demand depends on 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
 for student D relative to 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕
 for student A. Only in 
the event that the two are equal does the ratio of demand for e to b remain the same after 
the HTHA policy. Thus, it is likely that the lower-bound HTHA results in a divergence. 
However, whether demand for educational resources relative to amenities is higher or 
lower is indeterminant. Furthermore, the magnitude of this divergence in the state market 
depends on the sizes of the subsets involved (1 and 5-9).  
 In the upper-bound HTHA case where a state commits to providing an increase in 
grant aid for all eligible students by an amount no less than the reduction in 
appropriations, the nine subsets of students in table 3.1 collapse to three in terms of a 
change in price. Subset 1 which is ineligible for both types of aid experiences an increase 
in price equal to t. The two subsets eligible for both types of aid and above the maximum 
need award (subsets 5 and 9) actually experience a decrease in price equal to t. Again, 
this result follows from the assumption that merit-based aid does not displace need-based 
aid on the basis of ability to pay (i.e. EFC). Therefore, these students receive both the 
increase in merit-based aid via the maximum award or multiplier and the increase in the 
maximum need award. Unless a state can identify students in these specific financial 
situations, the higher-ability, lower- or higher-income students that comprise these two 
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subsets benefit from this particular HTHA policy.20 The remaining subsets experience no 
price change. 
 Figure 3.5 illustrates the impact of this upper-bound HTHA policy on three 
hypothetical students belonging to different subsets. The high-ability, low-income of 
student A places him in the subset of students beyond the maximum of merit- and need-
based aid. The unit price for student A decreases by t and optimal choice is now at point 
A′. Student B belongs to the subset eligible for both types of aid below the maximum 
award, and thus experiences no price change. Lastly, the low-ability, high-income of 
student C places him in the subset of students who are ineligible for both types of aid. 
Therefore, the unit price increases by t and optimal choice shifts to point C′. 
 Unlike the lower-bound case, the upper-bound case involves a price increase and 
decrease across fewer student subsets, resulting in a more determinable effect. The two 
subsets that experience a decrease in price have higher-ability and lower income than the 
subset that experiences an increase in price. This policy scenario results in a divergence  
Figure 3.5 - Effect of Upper-Bound HTHA Policy 
 
                                                 
20 Though it is likely that students above the maximum of need-based award primarily includes lower-
income students, without a cap on the EFC eligible for need-based aid, a higher-income student could 
spend enough on college to exceed the maximum award.  
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in demand e and b among the subsets involved, specifically an increase in the ratio of 
educational resources-to-amenities. Again, the magnitude of this divergence in the state 
higher education market depends on the sizes of the student subsets. 
 For any subset in table 3.1 that experiences an increase in price, the price 
differential between in-state and out-of-state decreases. Shifting funds from 
appropriations to grants necessarily raises the in-state public price for students who are 
ineligible for grant aid. Describing this subset of students in terms of ability and income 
depends on the grant policy of a state. If a state has both need- and merit-based grants, 
these students are lower-ability and middle-to-higher-income compared to other students 
in the state. Consequently, these students have a higher demand for amenities and lower 
demand for educational resources than their peers. In other words, an HTHA 
compositional change decreases the financial incentive for this ineligible subset to remain 
in state. At the same time, public institutions in other states implementing HTHA policy 
have a financial incentive to attract more nonresident students in response to a decline in 
appropriations. Therefore, under certain circumstances HTHA policy can generate a 
positive feedback loop where states cross-haul their grant ineligible students who on 
average demand greater amenities. This suggests that the dominant trend in state 
financing of higher education may explain the disproportional increase in amenities 
among public postsecondary institutions. 
INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS AND DEMAND PRESSURE 
 Thus far, latent demand for college goods categorized by consumption amenity or 
educational resource has been the primary focus. Though these goods can be considered 
continuously distributed across the entire higher education market, the institutions that 
comprise the market supply these goods in somewhat discreet bundles.21 A student 
cannot marginally increase or decrease e or b as demonstrated above unless there exists 
                                                 
21 Even within discreet institutions amenities and educational resources can vary in a continuous fashion. In 
some cases, amenities are voluntary add-ons to attending college, such as dormitories and meal plans, both 
of which can offer variable pricing based on quantity. Though the quality of academic programs varies 
within institutions according to their educational resources, prices are mostly constant with the exception of 
mandatory fees that may be associated with a particular program. Variable educational resources are 
increasingly attached to variable pricing as institutions experiment with academic program-specific pricing.  
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an institution that supplies a marginally greater or lesser quantity of e or b. Inference 
regarding student demand for educational resources and amenities ultimately relies on 
observing college choice presented by equation (1). The array of institutions available for 
students choose determines many of the consequences of a compositional change in 
subsidies at the state level.  
 Holding the quantity of e and b supplied by an institution constant, the changes in 
price due to subsidies affect �𝑦𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖𝑖� in (1). Table 3.1 summarizes how HTHA can 
impact the probability students choose to attend one of the three types of institutions. Any 
increase in price lowers the likelihood a student within the affected subset attends an in-
state public or private institution and increases the likelihood of attending an out-of-state 
option or no college. The allocative decision a state makes across subsidies determines 
which subsets are affected, and in turn, determines whether demand for e relative to b is 
altered. 
 Intuitively, the probability that a student chooses to attend a particular institution 
is represented by its proximity to the student’s optimal choice within the two-good space 
examined in the previous figures. One could imagine all postsecondary institutions placed 
in the figures above according to their quantities of e and b, providing a virtual 
continuum of options that make marginal changes in demand possible. A vast majority of 
these institutions are outside of students’ home state, though, and are systematically more 
expensive per-unit due to various state subsidies, all else equal. Since a greater quantity 
of college goods can be consumed with in-state subsidies, it is likely that an in-state 
institution allows students to reach the greatest level of utility. Nevertheless, depending 
on the supply of in-state institutions, the number of feasible choices of e and b can be 
rather limited. This not only limits students’ probability of maximizing utility with an in-
state institution, but also limits the extent to which state subsidies can drive a divergence 
in demand within a state.22 If a state had only one institution, any divergence in demand 
would operate entirely across state borders, with subsets of students being more or less 
likely to attend in-state, but with no sorting possible across institutions within the state. 
                                                 
22 In a state like Wyoming where there is only one public 4-year institution, any effect on latent demand 
due to a compositional change in subsidies would be difficult to detect empirically through college choice. 
Coincidentally, states such as Wyoming, Montana, and Utah with limited institutional competition are 
among the states that allocate the greatest proportion of subsidies to appropriations. 
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 Figure 3.6 illustrates this conceptualization of college choice within the context 
of the demand model presented thus far using the upper-bound HTHA policy among four 
students within the same state. The various budget constraints do not exhaust income and 
correspond with the per-unit price conditional on type of institution, grant eligibility, and 
consumption of other goods. The dashed constraints represent price changes from the 
HTHA policy. The no college option is represented by point 1 at the origin in which case 
only other goods are consumed. Public institutions are represented by points 2, 3, and 4, 
distributed in a way to reflect a state that has a low-educational, low-amenity option 
(point 2), a middle-educational, high-amenity option (point 3), and high-educational, 
middle-amenity option (point 4). In-state private options are represented by points 4 and 
5, distributed in a way to reflect a state that has a middle-educational, low-amenity option 
(point 4) and an elite-educational, high-amenity option (point 5). 
 The top panel of figure 3.6 includes student A who belongs to the 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛 subset 
and student B who belongs to the 𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 subset. For student A, the increase in both 
types of aid to offset the reduction in appropriations results in options 4 and 5 now being 
below the student’s optimal share of income allocated toward college. Without the 
increase in aid, attending option 4 or 5 would require suboptimal consumption, 
particularly the substitution of other goods for e and b. The increase in aid allows greater 
numeraire consumption while attending the institution that was most proximate to 
optimal consumption prior to the policy change. Given the proximity of the out-of-state 
constraint to the origin it is unlikely that a better option exists outside of options 4 and 5. 
Option 4 is utility maximizing in terms of e and b, and thus would be assigned the highest 
probability of attendance. For student B, option 3 is now above the optimal share of 
income allocated toward college due to the reduction in appropriations. As a result, the 
probability of attending option 3 is reduced. The only other feasible in-state option is 
option 2. Surely there is an out-of-state option that would provide greater utility than 
option 2. In this scenario the reduction in appropriations has increased the likelihood that 
student B attends college out-of-state.  
 The bottom panel of figure 3.6 includes student C who belongs to subset 𝑆𝑚 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐 
and student D who belongs to the same subset as student B—𝑆𝑚𝑐 ∩ 𝑆𝑛𝑐—but has a higher 
income. Student C experiences no price change but the in-state options do not match well  
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with her optimal choices. Option 6 is not academically feasible, leaving options 4 and 5 
as providing the greatest utility among in-state options. It is likely an out-of-state option 
exists that would offer greater utility than the in-state options. This case highlights how 
merit-aid, despite reducing the per-unit price of in-state options, can be ineffective at 
retaining high-ability students within the state if there are not suitable institutions for 
eligible students. Student D experiences an increase in price for public options, reducing 
numeraire consumption if an in-state option is chosen but not significantly impacting his 
choice set. As is the case with higher-income students, there is likely an out-of-state 
option that best matches student D’s optimal choice of e and b. The HTHA policy 
increases the probability student D chooses an out-of-state institution and lowers the 
probability of choosing option 3. 
 Generalizing from these examples, a few insights can be reached regarding the 
expected impact of state subsidy composition on college access and choice. In doing so, it 
is assumed that for any student whose unsubsidized optimal choice of e and b is positive, 
there is an out-of-state institution that most closely matches their optimal choice. Thus, 
the reason approximately 80 percent of students attend in-state institutions is largely due 
to state subsidies as well as the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with 
distance.  
 The effect of state subsidies on college access and choice can operate in two 
distinct ways depending on the relationship between student demand and available in-
state options:  1) state subsidies make an in-state institution available that is otherwise 
unavailable, or 2) state subsidies lower the price of attending an available in-state 
institution but does not result in any new options. In the first case, state subsidies are 
expected to substantially increase the probability that an in-state institution is chosen. 
Furthermore, the likelihood that state subsidies have this effect is decreasing in student 
income and increasing in student ability, all else equal. In other words, the number of in-
state public or private institutions already available to students is increasing in income, in 
turn, making it less likely that state subsidies result in a new option. State subsidies 
cannot result in new options if remaining institutions are not academically feasible.23 
                                                 
23 On the supply-side, institutions may be incentivized to decrease admissions standards for such students. 
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 In the second case, the effect of subsidies is expected to be less pronounced. Each 
additional dollar in subsidies increases numeraire consumption if the available in-state 
institution is chosen. Therefore, the effect of the subsidy on the probability that a student 
chooses the available institution is a function of his marginal rate of substitution of the 
sum of e and b supplied by the institution for income. Given a diminishing return to 
income, the marginal effect of state subsidies on college choice is decreasing in income if 
the subsidies do not result in new options. Moreover, the likelihood that state subsidies do 
not result in new options is increasing in income and decreasing in ability.  
 Overall, compositional subsidy changes that target lower-income, higher-ability 
students are expected to have the greatest marginal impact on in-state access and choice 
among public institutions as well as in-state private institutions if grant aid can be applied 
to them, all else equal. This would seem to be the motivation for states employing mixed 
grant programs. Given a positive correlation between income and ability (Strenze, 2007), 
merit-based grants seem to be poorly designed by comparison insofar as they provide 
subsidies to high-income, high-ability students whose institutional choices are least likely 
to be affected. Furthermore, if demand for amenities is increasing in income, and if it is 
deemed undesirable for public funds to contribute to the consumption of amenities rather 
than educational resources, then merit-based grants seem poorly designed in this respect 
as well.  
 Need-based grants are poorly designed by comparison insofar as they provide 
subsidies to low-ability students for whom new options are academically infeasible. 
However, as long as at least one institution is academically feasible, increasing the 
maximum need-based award increases the probability an eligible student attends college 
as opposed to no college until the award reaches the COA of the institution. If higher-
income students are eligible for need-based grants due to no cap on EFC, then it is likely 
that such funds disproportionately contribute to the consumption of amenities, which may 
or may not be a desirable outcome.  
 Lastly, student demand for e and b is not only relevant in the context of college 
choice but throughout a student’s time spent pursuing a college degree at an institution. 
As figure 3.6 illustrates, observing a student’s choice of institution does not necessarily 
mean that institution supplies optimal quantities of e and b at the time of matriculation or 
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while the student is enrolled. Students spend several years at one or more institutions that 
match their optimal quantities of e and b to varying extents and have numerous 
opportunities to impose demand pressures on the institution they attend. Such pressure 
can include leaving an institution in the extreme case but also through daily usage of 
institutional resources, feedback on evaluation surveys, or advocacy and voting through 
shared governance mechanisms. Consideration of student demand in the manner 
presented above can help explain institutional supply beyond that which is aimed at 
competing for new students, namely their efforts to satisfy currently enrolled students.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This chapter presented a theoretical model of student demand for college using a 
two-attribute conceptualization of college quality and heterogenous demand for those 
attributes along dimensions of student ability and income. State governments’ allocative 
decisions across subsidy types fundamentally involve whether to target public funds 
based on these same student dimensions. Therefore, the mechanisms through which a 
state can modify its subsidies and alter prices for separate groups of students were also 
examined. The interaction between targeted price changes and heterogeneous demand for 
educational resources and amenities offers insights into the differential impacts of state 
subsidy composition in the higher education market that have not been thoroughly 
explored by scholars or considered by policymakers. The opportunity for research on the 
topics addressed in this chapter is substantial.  
 Fundamental questions remain regarding the multi-attribute conceptualization of 
postsecondary institutions. Estimating the relationship between every observable resource 
within institutions and students’ enrollment choices is fairly straightforward but does 
little to advance our understanding of student or social welfare without properly 
characterizing these resources as an educational or consumption attribute. Evidence that 
students are more likely to attend an institution with high investment in a student center 
and state subsidy policy increases market demand for such resources is limited in its 
ability to provide policy recommendations unless we know what a student center actually 
represents economically. This categorization of college resources according to the 
economic investment they represent is itself a significant empirical task.  
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 Moreover, it is unlikely that resources fall squarely into a single attribute or even 
that two attributes sufficiently characterize all institutional resources. Defining 
educational resources as anything that contributes to the value of a degree or increases 
labor market returns has sound economic footing within the human capital framework, 
but research is limited as to what underlying resources contribute to the value of a degree. 
Defining amenities as everything else that does not add value to a degree is exhaustive 
but possibly too rudimentary. At least some amenities presumably contribute toward 
student success even if success is narrowly defined as completing a degree. For instance, 
investment in student health services may not add value to a degree but may increase the 
likelihood a student realizes the value of said degree. Separating amenities further into 
those that increase the likelihood of degree completion may be necessary before policy 
recommendations can be made regarding public investment in higher education and 
student demand. 
 The role of the academic constraint in student demand for non-educational 
attributes could be the focus of further study. As was mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, it is not clear a priori why higher-income students would receive greater 
marginal return to amenities, all else equal. What empirical work exists suggests this is 
the case (Jacob et al., 2018). This finding could be due to the characterization of 
amenities just discussed. Perhaps demand for resources that increase the likelihood of 
success is increasing in income, which seems more intuitive than the claim that returns to 
a lazy river or climbing wall are increasing in income. Alternatively, research is fairly 
consistent in finding that low-income students are less likely to apply to institutions of 
academic quality that matches their ability (Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009; 
Hoxby & Avery, 2012; Hoxby & Turner, 2013). If higher-income students are more 
likely to reach a binding academic constraint, beyond which income can only be allocated 
toward amenities, then it would appear that demand for amenities is increasing in income. 
Which of these is the dominant explanation has implications for the investment incentives 
institutions face in a competitive market. 
 Regarding research on state subsidies in higher education, the above analysis 
highlights the need for detailed data at the student and state levels, first and foremost. 
One would need measures of student income and ability as well as comprehensive state 
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grant program information to adequately estimate effects of subsidy composition across 
the various student subsets according to their grant eligibility. Student-level income data 
is typically obtained by states once a student has completed the FAFSA, which introduces 
significant selection bias into inference pertaining to college-going behavior among a 
state’s high school graduates. Nationally representative longitudinal surveys contain 
student-level data for cohorts of high school graduates but have relatively small sample 
sizes that are not appropriate to use for state-level analysis.24 One would need to develop 
a procedure to normalize the various state subsidy features in order to generalize analysis 
to the national level. Furthermore, the detail necessary of state grant programs is not 
systematically collected or archived over time. 
 Available data does make state-level analysis of subsidy composition possible, 
much like the work done by Toutkoushian and Hillman (2012), but this masks specific 
effects on student subsets and can lead to fairly ambiguous policy implications. For 
example, in their 20-year panel of state subsidy and college enrollment, Toutkoushian 
and Hillman do not find evidence that the proportion of state subsidies allocated to need-
based aid affects in-state or out-of-state enrollment. This could suggest need-based aid is 
ineffective due to targeting students who are least likely to enroll in college. 
Alternatively, such a result could indicate that need-based aid is effective at offsetting 
price changes from other subsidies among eligible students. Without information on the 
underlying mechanics of subsidy distribution, confidence regarding the effects of subsidy 
composition is limited. 
 Using the theory presented in this chapter and the empirical evidence provided by 
future research, a more informed state strategy with respect to subsidy composition in 
higher education can begin to materialize. State objectives concerning subsidies in higher 
education can vary, including the maximization of enrollment, educational attainment, 
tax revenues, or public benefits. This chapter represents an initial step toward a better 
understanding of the student subsets affected by state subsidy composition and their 
demand for broad categories of institutional goods and services that likely affect any 
objective a state may have. 
                                                 
24 Inability to use NCES national surveys for state-level analysis is a primary motivation for the inaugural 
NPSAS 2018 survey which will be representative of all 50 states.  
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 Finally, the potential effects of state subsidy composition demonstrated above has 
implications for at least two more aspects of the higher education market and are the 
focus of the next two chapters:  institutional expenditures and college student migration. 
Assuming a competitive market in which institutional expenditures are responsive to 
student demand, the divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities 
driven by state subsidy composition should affect how institutions allocate revenues 
across budget categories related to these two attributes. Student migration, or the distance 
a student must travel to attend a particular institution, is another potentially important 
attribute not considered in this chapter. Given that state subsidies can alter college choice, 
they can alter the distances students migrate to attend college. The focus of Chapter 5 is 
to estimate the effect of distance on college-going behavior and degree completion as a 
way to link state subsidy policy to outcomes that are better understood in terms of their 
desirability compared to the uncertain desirability of student demand for educational 
resources versus amenities.   
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[4]  
STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURE DIVERGENCE 
The composition of state funding between appropriations, need-based aid, and merit-
based aid is an important policy lever states use to alter college prices for all or certain 
subsets of students. A multitude of studies examine student enrollment response to 
changes in the price of college (see Page & Scott-Clayton, 2016). Far fewer, by 
comparison, offer insight into how institutions respond to variation in government 
subsidies beyond changes to tuition levels. The previous chapter established the 
theoretical expectation that the composition of state subsidies alters the demand for 
educational resources relative to amenities. This chapter empirically examines whether 
state subsidy composition explains variation in institutional expenditures across budget 
categories in a manner that reflects expected changes in student demand. 
BACKGROUND 
 State government is generally the primary source of institutional revenue and 
certainly the primary source of public funding. However, as Chapter 2 discussed at 
length, state support of higher education has waned over time. Average state funding as a 
percent of total educational revenue among postsecondary institutions has declined from 
about 70 percent in 1992 to almost 50 percent in 2017, and just this year student tuition 
provides a greater percent of revenue than appropriations in a majority of states. Like any 
other organization, postsecondary institutions must respond and adapt to changes in their 
revenue sources. Broadly, the response to declining state revenues must involve either 
increasing tuition, decreasing costs, or both to the extent that alternative revenue sources 
are insufficient.25   
 Most existing research on institutional response to public funding pertains to 
tuition. Somewhat unsurprisingly, state funding and in-state tuition exhibit an inverse 
relationship (Koshal & Koshal, 2000). There is also consistent evidence that institutions 
raise nonresident tuition or the proportion of nonresident students to recoup revenue lost 
from a decline in appropriations (Mixon& Hsing, 1994; Rizzo & Ehrenburg, 2004; 
                                                 
25 Institutions may find alternative revenue sources to replace declining appropriations, such as research or 
philanthropy. Newfield (2016) provides strong arguments that institutions have pursued revenues via 
research and philanthropy, while neither are promising substitutions for appropriations. 
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Jaquette & Curs, 2015), resulting in crowding-out of low-income students (Jaquette, 
Curs, & Posselt, 2016) as well as resident students at selective research universities (Curs 
& Jaquette, 2017). Recent work finds that for every $1,000 reduction in state 
appropriations per student, the average student is predicted to pay an additional $257 per 
year using data from 1987 to 2014 and $318 since 2000 (Webber, 2017).  
 Regarding the relationship between tuition and grant aid, research has primarily 
focused on federal sources such as Pell Grants, which is strictly need-based. Evidence 
that institutions raise tuition in response to Pell Grants is mixed, ranging from no 
evidence of an increase, 17-50 cents per dollar among non-profit institutions, to as high 
as 78 cents on the dollar among for-profit institutions (McPherson & Shapiro, 1998; 
Singel & Stone, 2007; Cellini & Goldin, 2013; Turner, 2014). Long (2004a) examined 
tuition response to the broad state merit-based HOPE scholarship in Georgia and found 
evidence of tuition increases of 10 cents per dollar among public institutions and up to 30 
cents per dollar among private institutions.26 
 Overall, it seems a substantial portion of institutional response to public funding 
occurs through expenditures for which there is a significant lack of research. Study of the 
relationship between state subsidies and institutional expenditures is seemingly exclusive 
to the policy context of performance-based budgeting, which is at best tangential to the 
topic of interest in this work. Rabovsky (2012) finds institutions alter budget allocations 
between instruction and research in response to a portion of appropriation revenue being 
made conditional on student success. This provides at least some evidence that 
institutions will respond in ways other than tuition to increase or protect revenues. In the 
event a state shifts a sizeable portion of its public funds from appropriations to grant aid, 
knowing how institutions might be expected to alter expenditures could be of value to 
policymakers.  
 Finally, one should be careful not to assign private or social value judgments to 
institutional expenditures toward broad attributes such as educational resources or 
amenities. It is not clear what amenities actually include beyond that which does not 
directly contribute to the production of human capital, and we do not have a good 
                                                 
26 It is interesting to note that public institutions raised tuition through room and board fees. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, governmental control over public tuition may incentivize institutions to increase the prices of 
opt-in services that are not financed directly by tuition in order to recover lost appropriations revenue. 
 63 
understanding of what specific resources within an institution result in greater human 
capital. The national narrative surrounding amenities conjures posh dormitories and 
resort-like entertainment, but the conceptualization of amenities might also include 
services for physical and mental health, cultural enrichment, and extracurricular 
involvement. The measurement of institutional expenditures also limits our understanding 
of their return on investment, as expenditures are reported across only a few broad 
functional categories:  instruction, research, academic support, student services, and 
auxiliary enterprises. Research has shown that expenditures on student services have a 
greater impact on student persistence and graduation than instruction (Webber & 
Ehrenburg, 2010; Webber, 2012). Investment in student services is also associated with 
self-reported gains in several academic and soft social skills (Toutkoushian & Smart, 
2001).  
STATE SUBSIDY COMPOSITION AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURES 
From a broad state policy perspective, the considerations involved in higher 
education subsidy composition are not unlike those of vouchers at the K-12 level. 
Appropriations are distributed to institutions to subsidize the cost of college, while grants 
travel with the student and are received by the institution he or she attends. Arguments 
common in the voucher context, such as increased competition and limited mobility 
among disadvantaged students, also apply to the higher education context. Features 
unique to the higher education market require some unique considerations with respect to 
subsidy composition. Grants are awarded on the basis of need and/or merit, the latter of 
which disproportionately go to higher-income students. Competitive institutions 
(including public) can deny entry on the basis of ability or incorporate the receipt of grant 
aid into a student’s tuition or admission.27   
Though there is debate regarding the objective or mission of postsecondary 
institutions (e.g. profit, prestige, spending, educational attainment), it seems safe to 
assume any institutional objective involves the incentive to increase or preserve revenues, 
while the specific strategies employed to do so might vary according to institutional 
                                                 
27 The author recognizes the case can be made that similar features are present at the K-12 level just not as 
overtly. 
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objective. Setting perverse incentives and strategies in response to the provision of grant 
aid aside, there is some degree of institutional competition over students that mirrors the 
traditional economic market. Research suggests that the higher education market is 
competitive overall, with most institutions possessing limited market power (Epple et al., 
2006).  
In theory, state subsidy composition alters the dynamic of institutional 
competition. Appropriations are tied to enrollment and so do not incentivize competition 
over any specific in-state students. If appropriations decline, public institutional revenues 
decline. These institutions can respond to the loss in revenue by decreasing expenditures, 
which does not preserve revenues, or increasing tuition. To the extent tuition is increased 
in-state enrollment will decline. In order to preserve revenues, institutions must increase 
enrollment of out-of-state students or students who receive tuition discounts from state 
grants. Therefore, grants incentivize competition over specific subsets of students who 
are eligible based on income and/or ability. If student demand for the various types of 
resources colleges can provide systematically differ along income or ability, then changes 
in state subsidy composition can be expected to affect institutional expenditures. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that as states allocate a greater proportion of their total 
subsidies toward merit-based aid, demand increases among students with greater 
preference for educational resources compared to those who are ineligible for merit-based 
aid whose demand potentially declines. Given a positive correlation between ability and 
income though, merit-based aid may also increase demand among those who have greater 
preference for amenities if demand for amenities is increasing in income. The effect of 
merit-based aid may also depend on the selectivity of the institution. Highly selective 
institutions already attract higher-ability students and are likely less financially 
constrained when increasing educational resources. Therefore, more selective institutions 
are expected to increase expenditures on educational resources. By contrast, if there is a 
relationship between demand for amenities and income, less selective institutions may 
have a greater incentive to increase expenditures on amenities in response to merit-based 
aid. 
As states allocate a greater share of their total subsidies toward need-based aid, 
demand may increase among lower-income students who may have lower preference for 
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amenities than those who are ineligible. This depends on the nature of the increase in 
need-based share. If the increase is the result of offsetting the reduction in appropriations, 
demand should not change among those who do not reach the maximum award while 
demand decreases among those who do. If the increase in need-based share increases as a 
result of an increase in the maximum award, then demand among these lower-income 
students increases. The expenditure response to need-based aid would be largely 
indeterminant if not for the effect it has on those who are ineligible for need-based aid. 
Demand among these students declines. Again, given the positive correlation between 
income and ability, an increase in the share of need-based aid is expected to 
disproportionately decrease demand for educational resources and increase demand for 
amenities. The hypothesis follows that an increase in the share of need-based aid will 
increase expenditures toward amenities and decrease expenditures toward educational 
resources. This effect may also be sensitive to institutional selectivity. An increase in 
demand among lower-income students coupled with a decrease in demand among higher-
income students may incentivize selective institutions to actually decrease expenditures 
toward instruction as well as amenities if their demand is increasing in income.28 Similar 
to merit-based aid, an increase in the share of need-based aid is expected to increase 
expenditures toward amenities among less selective institutions given their constraint in 
raising educational resources. 
In addition to selectivity, effects are expected to differ across the control of the 
institution for two primary reasons. First, the ability to apply state grant aid to the cost of 
attendance often differs between private and public institutions. A greater proportion of 
total subsidies allocated toward grants should have no effect on private expenditure 
shares if a state only allows its grant funds to be used at public institutions. Second, state 
appropriations are not a source of revenue for private institutions. The tradeoff at the state 
level between appropriations and grants does not represent the same tradeoff in revenue 
sources for private institutions as it does for public institutions. HTHA-like policies are 
likely to be state revenue positive for private institutions if states allow grants to be 
applied to them. As demonstrated in chapter 2, though the relationship between 
                                                 
28 Provided there are budget categories related to attributes other than educational resources and amenities. 
Otherwise, an institution’s share of expenditures cannot decrease in both of only two categories.  
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appropriations and grants is not a perfect zero-sum tradeoff, increases in grants are 
generally accompanied by larger declines in appropriations. This overall loss in revenue 
among public institutions may manifest in expenditure shares. 
DATA 
To study the impact of state subsidy composition on institutional expenditures a panel 
data set of the IPEDS universe between 1990 and 2015 prepared by The Delta Cost 
Project is used. These data were supplemented with additional institutional variables 
collected from IPEDS. Information regarding state grant aid and appropriations were 
collected from the National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs 
(NASSGAP) and State Higher Education Finance (SHEF), respectively. Additional state 
demographic data were collected from the U.S. Census. Institutional finance data were 
adjusted using FTE, state finance data were adjusted using age 18-24 state population 
estimates, and all financial data were adjusted for cross-time comparison using the 2015 
Consumer Price Index.  
 Institutional selectivity is measured using Barron’s Selectivity Index acquired 
through the Equality of Opportunity Project (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 
2017). Selectivity categories in descending order include the following:  most 
competitive, highly competitive, very competitive, competitive, less competitive, 
noncompetitive. These were collapsed into two categories:  more competitive consisting 
of the first three groups, and less competitive consisting of the latter three groups. 
Selectivity is available for only public institutions and is time invariant in the data though 
selectivity is assumed to be fairly stable over time.  
 Dependent variables include institutional expenditure toward select operational 
categories as a share of total expenditures. Total operational expenditures are measured 
as the sum of total educational and general expenditures—a variable consistently reported 
in the Delta Cost Project data—and auxiliary enterprise expenditures. Total educational 
and general expenditures is equal to the sum of expenditures toward the following 
operational categories:  instruction, research, public service, academic support, student 
services, institutional support, plant operations and maintenance, and grants.29 
                                                 
29 See Appendix for a description of each category. 
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Expenditures on grants was subtracted from total expenditures because IPEDS did not 
differentiate the source of grants until 2002, thus avoiding a mechanical relationship 
between state grants and institutional expenditures.   
 The expenditure shares of particular interest include those representing 
expenditures toward educational quality and amenities. Based on their examination of 
financial data and discussions with higher education finance practitioners, Jacob et al. 
(2018) conclude that expenditures in instruction and academic support represent 
educational quality, while expenditures in student services and auxiliary enterprises 
represent amenities. Therefore, the analysis that follows focuses on expenditure shares of 
these four categories. The authors present their analysis with these four categories 
collapsed into their two respective attributes. Instead, this study analyzes the categories 
separately. Though instruction and academic support may be broadly described as 
measures of educational quality, they still represent distinctly different goods and 
services for which an institution may alter its shares differently in response to changes in 
state subsidies. The same rational applies to student services and auxiliary enterprises. 
Table 4.1 provides a brief description of the goods and services included in each of the 
four categories as well as how each category qualitatively represents spending on either 
educational quality or amenities. 
 The explanatory variables of interest include various measures of state 
expenditures on higher education subsidies, particularly the percentage of total subsidies 
allocated toward each subsidy type. The percentage of total subsidy allocated toward 
grant aid is a measure of the extent to which a state targets its subsidies by income and/or 
ability.30 The data include state appropriations between 1990 and 2015, and two 
typologies for grant aid available during different time periods. The first is expenditures 
on need-based aid and non-need-based aid between 1990 and 2015. Non-need-based aid 
includes programs that are not exclusively based on need, meaning they include a merit 
component but may also include a need component. NASSGAP began including an 
exclusively merit-based indicator in its data in 1999, enabling one to distinguish between 
                                                 
30 The grant aid percentage variables are not the same as those used in Chapter 3 to represent state subsidy 
composition. Percentages are used instead due to there being structural zeros in the data. There is not an 
agreed-upon method for dealing with zeros in compositional data that represent a structural absence of a 
component (Martin-Fernandez, Palarea-Albaladejo, and Olea, 2011). 
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Table 4.1 – Description of Expenditures on Education and Amenities 
Category Description Attribute 
Instruction 
General academic instruction expenses 
such as salaries and wages for all 
instructional employees. 
Education: directly tied to the aim 
of increasing human capital 
production 
   
Academic 
Support 
Activities and services that support 
instruction, research and public service 
such as libraries, academic administration 
(e.g. deans), and information technology. 
Education: partially tied to human 
capital production 
   
Student 
Services 
Admissions, registrar, student records, 
student activities, cultural events, student 
newspapers, intramural athletics, and 
student organizations. 
Amenities: primarily includes 
services that facilitate degree 
completion, enhance the college 
experience, or develop soft skills 
   
Auxiliary 
Enterprises 
Activities that are revenue generating, such 
as residence halls, food services, student 
health services, intercollegiate athletics, 
college unions, and college stores. 
Amenities:  primarily includes 
consumption goods and services 
largely available in the private 
sector 
   
need-based, mixed, and merit-based aid. The imprecision of non-need aid and mixed aid 
as subsidies distributed on the basis of income versus ability presents challenges for 
interpreting their effects in relation to the theoretical expectations previously discussed. 
These will be addressed as they arise. 
 The sample of institutions included in the Delta Cost Project data was refined in a 
few ways to obtain the analytic sample. Only non-profit public and private four-year 
institutions classified as baccalaureate colleges or above are included. Special focus (e.g. 
theology, medical, teachers), for-profit, and two-year institutions are considered too 
heterogeneous in mission, student body, and interaction with state subsidies to include in 
the sample. Institutions that opened or closed between 1990 and 2015 as well as those 
missing data in any year for all expenditure categories of interest or total expenditures are 
excluded. Institutions for which state subsidy data were unavailable are excluded. Lastly, 
institutions in the bottom one percentile of panel-wide average undergraduate enrollment 
or those that were recorded as having zero undergraduates in any year are excluded. The 
analytic sample includes a total of 1,059 institutions across 47 states and 26 years.  
 Table 4.2 displays summary statistics including overall mean, minimum, and 
maximum as well as the within-institution or state standard deviation. The top panel 
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Table 4.2 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Expenditure Shares     
Instruction 35.89 3.48 2.19 71.03 
Academic Support 8.41 2.10 0.05 47.28 
Student Services 10.78 2.50 0.17 61.43 
Auxiliary 15.34 3.15 0.00 69.21 
Grant Aid Percentages     
Need 4.35 1.63 0 26.8 
Non-need 2.08 2.99 0 32.02 
Mixed 0.92 1.71 0 16.64 
Merit 1.35 2.53 0 22.36 
Institution Controls     
FTE (1000s) 6.44 1.83 0.15 207.03 
Undergrad 0.99 0.08 0.01 2.9 
Public 0.38 0 0 1 
Selective 0.32 0 0 1 
State Controls     
Med. Inc (1000s) 55.27 3.64 33.48 81.02 
Poverty Rate 12.74 1.86 4.5 26.4 
Unemployment 5.62 1.55 2.3 13.78 
Pct. White 83.29 1.71 24.04 98.82 
Observations 27,534    
Institutions 1,059    
States 47    
Years 26    
 
includes institutional expenditure shares for the four categories of interest. On average 
instruction represents the largest expense among the four categories at 36 percent, while 
the others are between 8 and 15 percent. A minimum of zero spending on auxiliary 
enterprises seems possible, but the minimum values for the other categories are cause for 
some concern over the accuracy of the data. The sensitivity of the results to excluding 
extreme minimums in expenditure shares is examined in a later section. The second panel 
includes the percentage of total higher education subsidies allocated to various types of 
grant aid. Overall averages are rather low, but the maximum values indicate that some 
states allocate a considerable percentage of total subsidies to grants. 
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 Institutional control variables include total FTE, the ratio of the total headcount of 
undergraduate students to total FTE (Undergrad), an indicator for whether an institution 
is public, and an indicator for whether an institution is in the top three categories of the 
Barron’s selectivity index. FTE and Undergrad are included under the rationale that 
expenditure shares may vary with the size of the institution or as institutional revenues 
rely more heavily on undergraduate enrollment and the demand pressures they exert. 
Public and Selectivity are expected to moderate the effect of grant aid percentages on 
expenditure shares. State control variables include median household income, poverty 
rate, unemployment rate, and the percent of the population that is white. These are 
included as potential factors that affect grant aid and expenditure shares. 
METHODS 
Expenditures shares across operational categories are a function of institutional 
characteristics, some of which are observable and others that are not. It is likely that 
expenditure shares differ systematically across institutions based on unobservable 
characteristics. Therefore, an institution fixed effects identification strategy is used, 
which leverages the within-institution variation in expenditures. Since institutions belong 
to one state, this model also relies on within-state variation in state subsidies, as it is also 
likely that grant allocations vary systematically by unobserved state characteristics. The 
following reduced-form regressions are used to examine the effect of state subsidy 
composition on institutional expenditures: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜕 = 𝛽0 + (𝑁𝑖𝜕 × 𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜕)𝛽1 + (𝑁𝑁𝑖𝜕 × 𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜕)𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜕𝛽3 + 𝑍𝑖𝜕𝛽4 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜏𝜕 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖𝜕 (1) 
𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜕 = 𝛽0 + (𝑁𝑖𝜕 × 𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜕)𝛽1 + (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝜕 × 𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜕)𝛽2 + (𝑀𝑡𝑖𝜕 × 𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜕)𝛽3 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖𝜕𝛽4 + 𝑍𝑖𝜕𝛽5 + 𝜃𝑖 +
𝜏𝜕 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖𝜕             (2) 
where Y is the percentage of total operational expenditures allocated to a particular 
category i ∈ (instruction, academic support, student services, and auxiliary) for institution 
j in state s in year t. N, NN, Mx, and Mt represent the percent of total state subsidies 
allocated toward need, non-need, mixed, and merit, respectively. Each aid percentage is 
interacted with one of two time-invariant institutional controls:  public and selective. 𝛽1 
and 𝛽2 as well as 𝛽3 in (2) are the parameters of interest, which are identified off of 
within-state variation in the percentage of grant aid captured by the institution fixed 
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effect 𝜃𝑖  and variation in type of institution conditional on the panel-wide time trend 
captured by 𝜏𝜕. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for the fact that 
the explanatory variables of interest vary at the state level as well as serial correlation.31 
Equations (1) and (2) account for bias from endogenous variation in expenditures 
across institutions, but two additional threats to validity warrant brief discussion. First, 
the percentages of grant aid must not be a function of institutional expenditures. This 
reverse causality is unlikely. To the extent states deliberately alter subsidies to achieve 
policy goals—the evidence for which is minimal (Hossler, 1997; SRI International, 
2012)—there is little reason to suspect such decisions are based on how institutions 
allocate expenditures across operational categories. Second, variation in expenditures and 
grant aid percentages must not be a function of additional variables omitted from the 
model. Subsidies are likely affected by economic and demographic characteristics of the 
state, and it is possible that such factors also impact institutional expenditure shares. Z 
includes time-variant state household median income, unemployment rate, poverty rate, 
and percent of the population that is white in an attempt to mitigate this threat to validity. 
Lastly, X includes time-variant institutional controls FTE and undergraduate 
concentration. Institutional variables are not critical to validity but can improve the 
precision of the estimates.   
RESULTS 
Table 4.3 presents regression results for equation (1) for select variables.32 Each column 
represents a separate regression for one of four expenditure share categories. Grant 
percentages are separated into need and non-need aid and interacted with the indicator for 
public institution. Recall that instruction and academic support are considered 
expenditures on educational resources. Student services and auxiliary enterprises are 
considered expenditures on amenities. It is also important to note that significant 
                                                 
31 A compositional analysis model using log ratios of each expenditure category and grant type was not 
utilized for a few reasons. Compositional analysis transforms data in an attempt to obtain normally 
distributed variables, which is an appealing mathematical property with small sample sizes. Additionally, 
compositional analysis accounts for the negative correlation across dependent variables. In this case the 
sample size is not small and institutional expenditure shares of interest are not consistently negatively 
correlated. Therefore, simple linear regression was used for its ease in interpreting meaningful effect 
magnitudes. See Appendix for a sensitivity analysis. 
32  See Appendix for full results. 
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coefficients for the interaction terms indicate an effect among public institutions that is 
significantly different from the effect on private institutions along with the magnitude of 
the difference, not the effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. The latter is 
reported in the lower panel with the marginal effects heading. 
 Point estimates in Column 1 indicate there is no statistically significant evidence 
that the percent of total subsidy allocated toward either type of grant aid affects the share 
of expenditures on instruction among private institutions. However, the linear 
combination of the non-need coefficient and non-need public coefficient indicates a 1 
percentage point (1pp) increase in non-need relative to other subsidies leads to a decrease 
in instructional shares by 0.12pp among public institutions. With a mean instructional 
share of 35.89 percent this estimate corresponds to decline of 0.3 percent. Column 2  
Table 4.3 - Effect of Need and Non-need Aid on Expenditure Shares by Control 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Instruction Academic Support 
Student 
Services Auxiliary 
Grant Aid Estimates 
Pct. Need 0.0479 0.0416** 0.0582 -0.0327 
 (0.0533) (0.0125) (0.0341) (0.0291) 
Pct. Non-need 0.0866 0.0192 0.0489 -0.0351 
 (0.0431) (0.0201) (0.0277) (0.0285) 
Pct. Need x Public -0.1488 -0.0464 -0.1500* 0.1739* 
 (0.0739) (0.0423) (0.0562) (0.0667) 
Pct. Non-need x Public -0.2070** -0.0274 -0.0870* 0.0316 
 (0.0755) (0.0307) (0.0330) (0.0520) 
Public Institution Marginal Effects 
Need -0.1010 -0.0047 -0.0918 0.1412* 
 (0.0558) (0.0345) (0.0494) (0.0564) 
Non-need -0.1204* -0.0082 -0.0380 -0.0036 
 (0.0520) (0.0228) (0.0258) (0.0417) 
R-squared 0.191 0.104 0.381 0.039 
Observations 27534 27534 27534 27534 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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indicates that a 1pp increase in need aid increases the academic support share 0.04pp 
(0.5%) among privates, while the response among publics is not statistically significant. 
Based on the results in column 3, there is no evidence that private or public institutions 
alter student services shares in response to an increase in either type of grant relative to 
total subsidies. Lastly, the results in column 4 indicate that need aid affects the auxiliary 
share among public institutions. A 1pp increase in non-need aid leads to a 0.14pp (0.9%) 
increase.   
 Table 4.4 presents estimates for mixed and merit aid from equation (2) which 
distinguishes between mixed and merit grant aid within non-need aid from equation (1). 
To reiterate, these data span the years 1999 to 2015, thus some statistical power is lost 
compared to the above specification. The results in column 1 indicate a 1pp increase in 
mixed aid results in a 0.12pp (0.3%) increase in instruction shares among private 
institutions, while there is no evidence of a significant effect among publics. There is no 
evidence that either type of non-need aid impacts expenditure shares in the other three 
categories among private institutions. The results from equation (1) did not indicate an 
effect of non-need aid on student services, but in this specification, it appears there is an 
effect. Specifically, a 1pp increase in mixed aid relative to other subsidies leads to an 
increase of 0.5pp (0.5%) in the share of student services. 
 Overall, it is evident that the percentage of total subsidy allocated toward need or 
non-need aid affects expenditure shares of private and public institutions differently. In 
fact, both instances of a significant effect present among private institutions are positive 
and pertain to the two educational expenditure categories, while public institutions 
decrease shares pertaining to educational resources and increase shares toward amenity 
categories. An increase in the percentage of grant aid is the result of a higher allocation 
toward grant aid, a lower allocation toward appropriations, or both. Given that private 
institutions do not receive revenue via appropriations and as long as states allow some 
grant aid to be applied to private institutions, a higher grant percent allocation represents 
the potential to increase revenues by charging higher tuition to grant-eligible students. In 
order to increase enrollment among grant-eligible students, private institutions may shift 
expenditures toward functions that attract students. The results above suggest private 
institutions do this by increasing educational expenditure shares. 
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Table 4.4 - Effect of Mixed and Merit Aid on Expenditures Shares by Control 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Instruction Academic Support 
Student 
Services Auxiliary 
Grant Aid Estimates 
Pct. Mixed 0.1247*** 0.0058 -0.0546 -0.0258 
 
(0.0341) (0.0164) (0.0423) (0.0575) 
Pct. Merit 0.0394 0.0292 -0.0279 -0.0189 
 
(0.0684) (0.0171) (0.0301) (0.0185) 
Pct. Mixed x Public -0.0156 0.0028 0.1095* -0.0660 
 
(0.0438) (0.0403) (0.0479) (0.1369) 
Pct. Merit x Public -0.0758 -0.0694*** -0.0164 0.0736 
 
(0.0684) (0.0154) (0.0367) (0.0583) 
Public Institution Marginal Effects 
Mixed 0.1091 0.0086 0.0549** -0.0918 
 (0.0589) (0.0282) (0.0206) (0.0886) 
Merit -0.0365 -0.0403 -0.0443 0.0547 
 (0.0462) (0.0262) (0.0267) (0.0601) 
R-squared 0.020 0.009 0.181 0.019 
Observations 18003 18003 18003 18003 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
  
 Conversely, to the extent appropriations decline more than grants increase (about 
2:1 on average during this time period), an increase in grant percentages represents a 
decline in revenue among public institutions. Public institutions can recover lost state 
revenue by competing over grant-eligible students. The results above suggest they do so 
by shifting expenditures away from educational categories and toward amenities. 
Interpreting the specific types of grants involved will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section.   
 Table 4.5 presents the results from equation (1) using the selectivity indicator as 
the interaction term. These estimations include only public institutions. Selectivity is used 
as a measure of institutional market power. Expenditure shares among selective 
institutions are presumably less influenced by changes in student demand for goods in  
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Table 4.5 - Effect of Need and Non-Need Aid on Expenditure Shares by Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Instruction Academic  
Support 
Student  
Services 
Auxiliary 
Grant Aid Estimates 
Pct. Need -0.0609 -0.0073 0.0795 0.0927 
 (0.0595) (0.0474) (0.0513) (0.0712) 
Pct. Non-need -0.1065* 0.0194 0.0877* -0.0792 
 (0.0424) (0.0241) (0.0347) (0.0598) 
Pct. Need x Selective 0.1511 -0.0093 -0.0638 -0.1389 
 (0.1359) (0.0611) (0.0559) (0.1173) 
Pct. Non-need x Selective 0.0960* -0.0721 -0.0504 0.1400* 
 (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0339) (0.0623) 
Selective Institution Marginal Effects 
Need 0.0902 -0.0165 0.0157 -0.0462 
 (0.1188) (0.0346) (0.0362) (0.1043) 
Non-need -0.0105 -0.0527 0.0373 0.0607 
 (0.0255) (0.0342) (0.0210) (0.0375) 
R-squared 0.100 0.058 0.230 0.083 
Observations 10348 10348 10348 10348 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
services across the four operational categories because they have a greater abundance of 
applicants. The results suggest a 1pp increase in non-need aid leads to a 0.11pp (0.3%) 
decrease in instructional shares and a 0.09pp (0.9%) increase in student services shares 
among less selective public institutions. Though it is not definitively conclusive without 
analyzing every operational category, this result is indicative of a tradeoff between 
educational resources and amenities as the percentage of total subsidy allocated to non-
need grants increases. By contrast, there is no evidence that expenditure shares among 
selective public institutions are affected by changes in subsidy composition. 
 Table 4.6 presents results from equation (2) using the selectivity interaction 
among public institutions. It appears the decline in instructional shares from an increase 
in non-need aid in table 4.6 is driven by merit-based aid. A 1pp increase in the total  
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Table 4.6 - Effect of Mixed and Merit Aid on Expenditure Shares by Selectivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Instruction Academic 
Support 
Student 
Services 
Auxiliary 
Grant Aid Estimates 
Pct. Mixed 0.1330* 0.0185 0.1047* -0.1942** 
 (0.0611) (0.0315) (0.0460) (0.0605) 
Pct. Merit -0.0962* -0.0395 0.0295 -0.0072 
 (0.0469) (0.0304) (0.0252) (0.0766) 
Pct. Mixed x Selective -0.1090** -0.0474 -0.0928* 0.1959** 
 (0.0329) (0.0375) (0.0403) (0.0631) 
Pct. Merit x Selective 0.1137* 0.0155 0.0118 0.0190 
 (0.0517) (0.0289) (0.0350) (0.0946) 
Selective Institution Marginal Effects 
Mixed 0.0240 -0.0289 0.0119 0.0018 
 (0.0618) (0.0270) (0.0125) (0.0798) 
Merit 0.0175 -0.0240 0.0413 0.0117 
 (0.0439) (0.0324) (0.0428) (0.0616) 
R-squared 0.094 0.029 0.183 0.106 
Observations 6766 6766 6766 6766 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. Sample includes only 
public institutions 1999-2015. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
subsidy allocated to merit-based aid results in a 0.10pp (0.3%) decline in instructional 
shares among less selective public institutions. Interestingly, a 1pp increase in mixed aid 
leads to a 0.13pp (0.4%) increase in instructional shares. Regarding the increase in 
student services present in the above estimation, it appears that mixed aid is driving this 
result. A 1pp increase in mixed aid leads to a 0.10pp (1%) increase in student services 
shares as well as a 0.19pp (1.4%) decline in auxiliary shares. As in the previous  
estimation, there is no evidence that mixed or merit aid percentages impact expenditure 
shares among more selective public institutions. It appears that more selective institutions 
are generally insulated from any changes in demand pressure state subsidy allocations 
may generate. 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
The timing of effects in equations (1) and (2) are difficult to model precisely. 
Specifically, whether institutional expenditures in year t are a function of state subsidies 
in the same year may be a source of some misspecification. On one hand, state funding 
for higher education can involve negotiations between state officials and institutions, so 
institutions may have an accurate expectation of state subsidies for year t and can develop 
their own budget in year t accordingly. On the other hand, the extent to which 
institutional expenditures can react to state budgets the same year is likely constrained 
and may instead be a function of state budgets in previous years. Only within-state 
variation in subsidies is used to explain within-institution variation in expenditures, so 
differences across state budget processes, such as annual versus biennial budget cycles, is 
not so much a concern. 
The sensitivity of results to using lagged explanatory variables was examined. 
Regressions generating results in tables 4.4-4.7 were run using state subsidies lagged one 
year and again with two-year lags. The point estimates for one-year lags are qualitatively 
similar to those already reported but statistical significance is lost in many cases. 
Virtually all statistical significance is lost using two-year lags. Together, this is 
interpreted as evidence that institutional expenditures in year t primarily reflect state 
subsidies in year t, rather than state subsidies in previous years. 
Compositional analysis is an alternative estimation strategy when variables of 
interest are proportions (Aitchison, 1986). Compositional analysis involves in this case 
the institutional expenditure shares being transformed. There are three compositional 
transformations, each with strengths and weaknesses, but it seems researchers in the field 
of budget and finance typically choose the additive log-ratio transformation. This 
involves dividing each share by a common base category, such as instruction, then using 
the natural log of each ratio as the dependent variable. State subsidies could also be 
modeled as a composition, but there are many cases where the proportion of a particular 
grant allocation is equal to zero. There is not an agreed-upon method for dealing with 
zeros in compositional data that represent a structural absence of a component (Martin-
Fernandez, Palarea-Albaladejo, and Olea, 2011).   
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Nevertheless, the fixed effects estimation reported in tables 4.4-4.7 was repeated 
using additive log transformed dependent variables. The signs of estimates are the same 
and statistical significance is generally consistent with the results already reported. 
Statistical significance varies some in cases with marginally significant estimates in the 
tables above. The only notable difference between estimations pertains to the tradeoff 
between instruction and auxiliary reported in table 4.3. Using compositional dependent 
variables, an increase in non-need aid still leads to a decline in instruction, while the 
positive effect of need aid on auxiliary is no longer significant. Instead, an increase in 
non-need aid increases the share of student services. Therefore, as states shift subsidy 
allocations toward grants, evidence of a tradeoff between educational resources and 
amenities remains but the type of grants involved in the tradeoff differ using 
compositional dependent variables.33  
As reported in table 4.2, the minimum expenditure shares for instruction, 
academic support, and student services are extremely low. This causes concern over data 
accuracy and the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of institutions with such low 
expenditure shares in the categories of interest. These cases are particularly problematic 
if low shares are systematically subject to extreme increases that could lead to upwardly 
biased estimates. The analysis reported in tables 4.4-4.7 was repeated using the sample 
truncated at the first percentile of expenditure shares. The results were similar in sign, 
significance, and magnitude as those previously reported. Then, institutions with missing 
observations due to the truncation were excluded from the panel entirely. The results 
were again similar to those already reported.  
DISCUSSION 
Table 4.7 summarizes the directional effects of grant proportions on expenditure shares 
from the above analysis to aid interpretation. The hypotheses made at the beginning of 
this chapter were predicated on the relationship between state subsidies, student demand, 
and institutional response to demand pressures. As states shift funds away from 
institutions and toward subsets of students, student demand for various goods and 
services should more strongly reflect the demand of grant recipients. Since need-based 
                                                 
33 See Appendix for estimates. 
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grants target lower-income students who generally have lower academic achievement and 
given that increases in need-based grants primarily operate to offset increases in cost, it 
was unclear how institutional expenditure shares might respond to greater demand among 
need grant recipients if their demand increases at all.  
 Instead, the effect of an increase in the proportion of need-based aid was predicted 
to be driven primarily by those who are ineligible for need-based aid. The higher-income 
students ineligible for need-based aid have greater demand for amenities than their lower-
income peers who do not experience as much of an increase in price. To compete for 
these higher-income students, it was predicted that institutions would increase 
expenditure shares toward amenities and decrease expenditure shares in educational 
resources. This is precisely the outcome reflected in the results of the analysis, 
particularly among less selective public institutions that have the least market power. The 
distinction between student services and auxiliary enterprises is also important here. 
While shares in student services increase, so too do auxiliary shares. Goods and services 
in the latter category are far more related to the traditional consumption goods included in 
discussions regarding amenities in higher education. 
 Given the imprecision of non-need aid as it relates to the types of students who 
are eligible since it can contain both mixed and merit programs, it is not surprising that 
the results are largely insignificant across categories with the exception of a decline in 
Table 4.7 - Directional Effects of State Grant Proportions on Expenditure Shares 
Private         
Public 
Instruction 
Academic 
Support 
Student 
Services 
Auxiliary 
Need Grants                       
Non-need Grants     
Mixed 
 
   
Merit     
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instructional shares among public institutions. Merit-based aid targets higher-ability 
students who generally have higher income as well, thus the predicted effect of a greater 
proportion of total subsidies allocated to merit-based aid on expenditure shares was also 
somewhat unclear. On one hand, greater demand among higher-ability students should 
lead to an increase in expenditure shares related to educational resources. On the other 
hand, recipients of merit-based grants are disproportionately higher-income, so the result 
may also be an increase in shares related to amenities. 
 The existence of mixed grant programs offers valuable insight into this ambiguity. 
Recipients of mixed grants are higher-ability and lower-income, thus eliminating the 
overlap in demand present with merit-based aid. Therefore, an increase in the proportion 
of total subsidies allocated to mixed aid should result in greater expenditure shares 
related to educational resources and lower shares related to amenities. Again, the results 
reflect this, especially among less selective public institutions. The distinction between 
student services and auxiliary enterprises is important here as well. Greater proportions of 
mixed aid lead to institutions increasing expenditure shares toward student services 
related to college access and completion, such admissions, advising, and extracurricular 
activities—the types of services perhaps preferred among lower-income, higher-ability 
students—and decreasing shares related to consumption goods preferred by higher-
income students. Conversely, greater proportional allocation in merit-based aid results in 
public institutions decreasing instruction. Coupled with the mixed aid effect on 
instruction, this suggests the change in demand generated by merit-based aid is primarily 
driven by higher-income students wither greater preference for amenities. However, the 
increase in amenity shares that should accompany the decline in instruction is no 
statistically significant.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the last three decades total state support for higher education has declined but 
support in the form of grant aid has increased. For public colleges and universities, the 
decline in state revenues requires them to increase revenues via other sources, such as 
tuition, or decrease expenditures. Based on responses in tuition levels to variation in state 
support, it seems public institutions do both (Webber, 2017). Coupled with a rise in grant 
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aid, the higher education market becomes increasingly competitive, placing state funds in 
the hands of subsets of student for whom institutions are financially incentivized to 
attract to their campus. Rather than examine tuition, this chapter asked whether trends in 
state subsidies affect how institutions allocate their financial resources across operational 
categories that interact most with students. Specifically, given the divergent demands for 
educational resources versus amenities with respect to student ability and income that the 
HTHA model may amplify, it was predicted institutions would systematically alter 
expenditure shares in ways that reflect this divergence.   
 The broad conclusion of the analysis is that targeting state subsidies on the basis 
of student income and/or ability rather than appropriations leads less selective public 
institutions to diverge their expenditure shares between educational resources and 
amenities. Targeting subsidies on the basis of income only results in a decrease in 
instruction and an increase in student services and auxiliary enterprises. Targeting 
subsidies on the basis of income and ability results in an increase in instruction and 
student services but a decrease in auxiliary enterprises. Targeting subsidies on the basis 
of only ability results in a decline in instruction but the tradeoff with amenities is 
inconclusive. Together, these results reflect a divergence in institutional expenditures 
with respect to educational quality and amenities, the cause of which is claimed to be an 
underlying compositional change in student demand driven by HTHA trends in state 
subsidies.  
 This analysis does not make claims regarding the consequences to private or 
social welfare from a tradeoff in expenditure shares between educational quality and 
amenities. There is not sufficient knowledge of the impacts of institutional spending 
across operational categories on the returns to a degree and degree completion to conduct 
a cost-benefit analysis on a dollar taken from instruction to add to student services or 
auxiliary enterprises. Readers may be inclined to assume shifting expenditures away from 
instruction and toward student services is a negative outcome, but existing research has 
found investment in student services to have a more positive impact on degree 
completion than investment in instruction, especially among students at less selective 
institutions (Webber & Ehrenburg 2010; Webber, 2012). However, perhaps the degrees 
students are more likely to complete have less value as a result of disinvestment in 
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instruction. Also, to the author’s knowledge there has been no systematic analysis of the 
effects of auxiliary enterprises on student outcomes. These are important topics for future 
research. 
 This analysis also contributes to the large literature concerning the effects of state 
financial aid on college student outcomes. Evidence is mixed as to whether broad merit-
based aid increases college completion (Dynarski, 2008; Henry, Rubenstein, & Burglar 
2004; Bruce & Carruthers, 2011; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Sjoquist & Winters, 2012). 
Though there is mixed evidence that need-based aid increases student access (Perna & 
Titus, 2004; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, & Trostel, 2009), there is fairly consistent evidence of 
increased persistence (Bettinger, 2004; Goldrick-Rab, Harris, Kelchen, & Benson, 2012), 
while gains in college completion appear to be concentrated among higher-ability 
students who receive need-based aid (Castleman & Long, 2013). The explanations for 
these results are numerous and nuanced, but this analysis is the first to offer evidence that 
grant aid’s impact on institutional expenditure shares may be an important mediating or 
moderating factor.  
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[5]  
STUDENT MIGRATION, SUCCESS, AND THE ROLE OF STATE SUBSIDIES 
The focus in previous chapters has been to theoretically or empirically examine policy 
pertaining to state subsidy composition and its impact on the higher education market. In 
brief, the argument has been made that the dominant trend of reallocating appropriations 
to grant aid drives a divergence in demand between educational resources and amenities 
across students of various incomes and abilities. Empirical evidence has been presented 
that supports this causal claim in the form of college-going patterns among students and 
institutional expenditures in response to changes in subsidy composition.  
 Student migration is a critical aspect of the higher education market that has yet to 
be incorporated into this discussion. Though student migration can be defined in a few 
different ways, it fundamentally involves the travelling of some distance between the 
student’s point of origin and the institution of her choice. Virtually every study to include 
the distance between students’ location and postsecondary institution has found it to 
impose a cost that deters access and choice. When public policy such as state subsidy 
composition affects college access and choice the distances students migrate to attend 
college are altered. The effect of distance on college student success is therefore a 
relevant line of inquiry when considering potential unintended consequences of state 
subsidy composition.  
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct a more thorough analysis of the 
relationship between distance and college-going between initial enrollment and 
completion of a degree than what currently exists in the literature. Building off of 
Chapter 3, a theoretical framework incorporating distance into the processes of choice 
and persistence is developed, demonstrating how distance might be expected to affect the 
likelihood that a student completes a degree at her institution of choice. The effect of 
distance on persistence and completion is estimated separately for students seeking an 
associate's versus a bachelor's degree. College transfer behavior is also examined as it 
relates to distance. 
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TRENDS IN DISTANCES MIGRATED TO ATTEND COLLEGE 
There are two lines of research that commonly incorporate the distance between students’ 
location and a set of postsecondary institutions. First, various measures of distance have 
been used as a source of exogenous variation in educational attainment to estimate its 
monetary and social returns. These studies find distance to be a significant predictor of 
attainment but do not examine the underlying mechanisms. Second, scholars include 
distance in studies of student migration or college access and choice. These studies 
consistently find distance to impose a cost that deters the enrollment outcome of interest 
but do not examine whether student success is impacted. 
 Moreover, the effect of distance on college-going behavior has changed over 
time. Studying college choice among student cohorts in 1972, 1982, and 1992, Long 
(2004) finds the deterrence of distance has decreased each period. Hoxby (1997) finds a 
similar decline from 1949 to 1994 and proposes several explanatory factors, one of which 
is policy that expands students’ feasible set of institutions, such as interstate tuition 
reciprocity agreements. In turn, the role of distance in college access and choice 
diminishes. As policy alters the distance students migrate to attend college, policymakers 
should be concerned whether distance subsequently imposes a cost on students while 
attempting to complete a degree.  
 If distance to an institution has become less of a deterrent to college choice over 
time, how does this change manifest when observing the actual distances students 
migrate to attend college? Intuitively, one would expect more students to migrate greater 
distances as a result. Each year, the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) surveys 
a nationally representative sample of incoming freshmen. Survey participants are asked, 
"How many miles away is your institution from your permanent home?" and given a set 
of ranges for answers: less than 10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, over 500. Results from the 
past 40 years of this survey item were collected in order to examine trends in distances. 
 Panels A and B of Figure 5.1 show 5-year moving averages of the distances 
migrated between 1975 and 2015 as a percentage of all freshman attending public 
universities and 4-year colleges, respectively. For public universities, the most steadily 
changing range is over 500 miles, which has risen from approximately 5 to 15 percent of 
freshmen. The other ranges have remained relatively the same with mild fluctuations  
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Figure 5.1 - Distances Migrated to College, 1975-2015 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
 86 
 
until around 2008, at which point all ranges of distance change more noticeably. During 
this time, the percentage of freshman traveling less than 50 and over 500 increased, while 
the proportion traveling between those extremes decreased. Distances migrated by 
students attending public 4-year colleges exhibit similar trends. 
 Panel C shows 5-year moving averages of the distances migrated by all freshmen 
attending private universities. Given that states do not subsidize the cost of private 
institutions for their residents, the private sector of higher education is more competitive 
on a national scale compared to the public sector. This is evidenced by the much higher 
percentage of freshmen migrating over 500 miles. Still, as is the case with public 
institutions, the percentage of freshmen migrating over 500 miles has risen fairly 
consistently from approximately 29 to 38 percent. The percentage of freshmen migrating 
100 miles or less was about the same in 2015 as 1975. The percentage of freshmen 
migrating between 100 and 500 miles dropped precipitously from 2007 to 2015 at which 
point the percentage of freshmen migrating 50 or less and over 500 show noticeable 
increases. 
 Although conclusions should be drawn with caution from these data, it does 
appear more students are migrating greater distances over time. In both public and private 
sectors, the percentage of students migrating over 500 miles exhibits a clear upward 
trend. Another pattern emerging from these trends is the possible impact the Great 
Recession had on distances migrated. Among public and private universities especially, 
the trends exhibit distinct changes around 2008 in which the percentages of freshmen 
migrating distances of each extreme -- 50 or less and over 500 miles -- increase. Overall, 
the above figures demonstrate that the distances students migrate to attend college in the 
U.S. are subject to fluctuations. Based on the literature, these fluctuations are likely due 
to a combination of changes in student preferences and exogenous changes in the higher 
education market. 
DISTANCE AND COLLEGE ENROLLMENT 
 College enrollment can involve several different outcomes. Access typically 
concerns enrollment opportunity and policy’s ability to promote equality. College choice 
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concerns the determinants or consequences of enrolling in one institution over others. 
Student migration, though also about choice, is primarily concerned with students 
crossing borders in making their choice. 
 Virtually every study to incorporate distance into college enrollment has found it 
to be a deterrent. A dearth of proximate institutions hinders access (Hillman & 
Weichman, 2016), particularly among the socioeconomically disadvantaged (Turley, 
2009). Analyzing enrollment of nationally representative samples, the probability a 
student chooses to enroll at an institution is decreasing in distance (Long, 2004). Distance 
also deters interstate migration (Gossman, 1967; McHugh & Morgan, 1984; Kyung, 
1996; Hoxby, 1997; Cooke & Boyle, 2011) and is a significant determinant of intrastate 
migration flows between high schools and colleges; even more so than tuition in some 
cases (McConnell, 1965; Kariel, 1968; Ullis & Knowles, 1975; Leppel, 1993; 
Ordovensky, 1995; Ali, 2003; Alm & Winters, 2009).  
 It is clear distance imposes a substantial cost on students that impacts the 
decision-making process of initial enrollment. The cost of distance is easily conceived as 
financial in nature but its potential to impose a psychological or social cost should also be 
considered (Tinto, 1987; Ovink & Kalogrides, 2015). In either case, it is unlikely such 
costs disappear after enrollment, but rather persist for as long as a student attends a 
particular institution. Whether or the extent to which distance subsequently impacts 
student persistence, transfers, or degree completion are not addressed in the above 
literature. 
DISTANCE AND COLLEGE COMPLETION 
Since Card (1993), distance has been used as an instrumental variable (IV) to address the 
endogeneity of educational attainment in estimating wages or other returns (Kane & 
Rouse, 1995; Kling, 2001; Currie & Moretti, 2003; Carneiro & Taber, 2004; Dee, 2004; 
Doyle & Skinner, 2016). Unlike K-12, the prevailing thought is families do not locate 
based on the quality of proximate postsecondary institutions.34 If it can be demonstrated 
that distance affects attainment, then distance provides a source of exogenous variation in 
                                                 
34 Rouse (1995) and Careiro and Heckman (2002) find some evidence that distance to postsecondary 
institutions is correlated with family characteristics and academic ability. Caution should be used in 
claiming strict exogeneity of distance.  
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attainment. Though studies that use this method are primarily interested in a second-stage 
outcome, they must first estimate the effect of distance on attainment. 
 Additionally, the measurement of distance and attainment among the IV studies 
varies. For instance, Card (1993) uses the presence of a four-year institution within a 
county and finds this proximity increases the years of school 0.32 to 0.38 years. In 
contrast, Dee (2004) finds that living within 100 miles of a community college does not 
affect the attainment of an associate's degree but does increase the attainment of a 
bachelor's degree by 3.2 percent. Indeed, Doyle and Skinner (2016) demonstrate that 
attainment estimates are sensitive to the type of distance measurement used.  
A small set of literature has examined the relationship between distance and 
degree completion more directly. Rouse (1995) uses miles to the nearest institution by 
type and finds that an increase of 10 miles to a four-year college decreases years of 
schooling by a miniscule amount, while distance to a community college has no effect on 
years of education when family background is included. Leigh and Gill (2003) argue that 
it is important to control for a student's desired amount of schooling. In doing so, they 
find proximity to a community college increases educational attainment by 0.4 to 1.0 
years among individuals desiring a bachelor's degree. 
Overall, it is apparent distance affects attainment but how? Is the effect driven 
entirely by the local average treatment effect on attendance? That would suggest once a 
student is induced into college by a change in distance, any remaining distance would 
have no effect on subsequent success. The relationship between distance and success is 
mostly a black box in the existing literature. Little is known as to whether the distance a 
student ultimately migrates to attend college impacts elements of success, such as 
persistence, transfers, and degree completion. 
POLICY CONTEXT 
Public policy can alter the distances student migrate to attend college, and thus the 
effect of distance on success is a policy issue. For example, federal programs like the 
College Scorecard aim to broaden students' college search beyond nearby institutions, 
drawing criticism for ignoring student mobility (Turley, 2009; Hillman & Weichman, 
2016). State government is also interested in altering student migration. An explicit goal 
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achieved by broad state merit aid programs is to prevent high-achieving students from 
migrating out of state (Toutkoushian, 2012). Additionally, a decrease in appropriations 
increases the likelihood that students enroll out of state (Perna & Titus, 2004) and leads 
state institutions to increase the proportion of nonresident enrollees (Jaquette & Curs, 
2015) or raise admissions standards for resident students (Epple et al., 2013), thus 
reducing more proximate seats for students. 
Perhaps the most direct case of policy affecting distance is the placement of 
institutions. Although the spatial distribution of postsecondary institutions—especially 
public and nonprofit—is quite static, Long and Kennedy (2012) find that an average of 
0.77 college credits could be gained if all states located institutions optimally. This 
generally involves moving four-year institutions to densely populated areas and two-year 
institutions away from those areas, which runs somewhat counter to the literature on 
community college proximity. 
 A less direct but relevant policy lever affecting distance is the delivery of state 
subsidies shifting increasingly toward financial aid rather than appropriations. Much like 
tuition reciprocity agreements, this change in subsidy composition degrades the tuition 
differentials between state borders. However, instead of intentionally expanding the 
market for all students, students who are ineligible for state financial aid—lower-ability 
and/or higher-income—are most affected. If the distances students migrate to attend 
college negatively impact success, then large scale policies involving state subsidies may 
reduce success among specific subsets of students along income and ability. 
DISTANCE, COLLEGE CHOICE, AND SUCCESS 
Given that a student has decided to pursue a degree and a particular institution to 
attend, how might distance be involved in the process of persisting at that institution until 
completing a degree? The impact of distance can be conceptualized in at least three ways. 
First, there is the financial cost of traveling a distance. Second, there is the cost to 
available time. Lastly, there is the cognitive effect of being a certain distance from home. 
As with enrollment and choice of institution, persistence is a discrete choice 
problem. Each college j among all feasible colleges J offers a package of goods 
consisting of academic quality q and amenities b. Academic quality represents the 
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characteristics of an institution that generate returns to education or add value to a degree. 
Amenities include all other characteristics of an institution that provide utility to a student 
through consumption. Student i persists at college k in period t so long as the utility he 
receives is greater than the utility of attending any other college or entering the 
workforce, represented by the equation,  
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜕 = �1 𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑖𝑖𝜕(𝑅𝑖𝜕(𝑒𝑖𝜕),𝑏𝑖𝜕) ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑖𝜕 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑖𝑖𝜕 ≤ 𝐼𝑖𝜕0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 ,  
 (1) 
where s is the indicator for persistence, R is the return to a degree from the institution, 
and P is the price of college k that must remain within the student’s budget constraint I.  
There must be at least one factor involved in persistence that is not involved in the 
process of choice. Otherwise, there would be no reason to separately consider 
persistence. The price of attendance is obviously such a factor, as price can change after 
choice such that s equals zero in a later period. Price is not the only reason students fail to 
persist though. Academic performance can be so low that the institution does not allow 
the student to persist. Less extreme than forced exit is that a student’s academic 
performance lowers the value of the degree being pursued such that persistence is no 
longer utility maximizing. In both cases, GPA is a useful measure of academic 
performance. 
 Incorporating GPA motivates a modification to equation (1). The return to a 
degree is an increasing function of academic quality and GPA. Let us assume the 
difference in academic quality between institutions does not change so much as to 
meaningfully affect persistence after choice. Therefore, while attending an institution, the 
return to a degree depends solely on a student's GPA g, while overall utility also involves 
leisure l, resulting in the utility function 
𝑈𝑖𝑖𝜕 = (𝑔𝑖𝑖𝜕, 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝜕).     (2) 
In a given time period T, a student allocates time between academic work w, leisure l, and 
commuting c between his residence and campus, or formally, 
𝑇 = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝑖.     (3) 
 GPA is a function of the quantity of time allocated to academic work, academic 
ability, and a random component signifying the uncertain relationship between time 
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allocated to academic work and GPA. Academic ability a is the marginal productivity of 
academic work 𝜕𝑔𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑖
. The following equation formally defines GPA, 
𝑔𝑖𝜕 = 𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑖𝜕 + 𝜖𝑖,     (4) 
where the random component 𝜖 is assumed to be additive and normally distributed 
𝑁(0,𝜎2). Distance from home d, academic quality, and time allocated to leisure impact 
marginal academic productivity. For instance, one hour of work at a community college 
increases GPA more than one hour of work at an elite university. Regarding leisure, at 
the very least a student must allocate some time toward sleep in order for academic work 
to be productive. The effect of distance is not as clear since some students benefit from 
distance, while others have difficulty coping with it. These factors enter into equation (4) 
like a tax, and by substituting w with equation (3), GPA can be represented by the 
following equation: 
𝑔𝑖𝑖𝜕 = 𝑎𝑖�1 − 𝜏(𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑖, 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝜕)�(𝑇 − 𝑙𝑖𝑖𝜕 − 𝑐𝑖𝑖𝜕) + 𝜖𝑖𝑖,   (4) 
where 0 ≤ 𝜏 ≤ 1 , 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
⋛ 0, 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
> 0, and 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑
< 0. Finally, defining the GPA below which 
exit from the institution is either forced or voluntary as 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜕 = max {𝑈𝑖𝑖𝜕 ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘,𝑔0}, 
then persistence becomes the conditional equation,  
𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜕 = �1 𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑖𝑖𝜕 ≥ 𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜕 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑖𝑖𝜕 ≤ 𝐼𝑖𝜕0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 .    (5) 
 Figure 5.2 displays a hypothetical allocation under these assumptions. GPA is on 
the vertical axis, and leisure is on the horizontal axis. The constraint is fixed at total time 
T along the horizontal axis. The point at which a student's GPA causes the utility of a 
degree to no longer be greater than any alternative, leading the student to exit the 
institution is represented by line e. The figure displays a scenario in which a student 
maximizes utility at points (g*, l*).  
 Unless a student relocates on or near campus in a later time period, both distance 
and academic quality were determined in the choice process. A brief outline of the choice 
process completes the framework relevant in this study. At this stage, distance is an input 
for academic quality and amenities. At zero distance, a student acquires zero quality and 
amenities. Provided the utility maximizing institution is neither most proximate nor most 
distant to the student, quality and amenities are increasing in distance at a decreasing rate. 
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Increasing distance allows a student to attend institutions of increasing quality or 
amenities, and there is a distance at which the institution of highest quality and amenities 
is available. Distances beyond this point do not increase the quality or amenities 
attainable.  
 Put simply, a student will choose an institution with quantities of academic 
quality and amenities that provides greater utility than all other institutions provided he  
can persist there academically and financially. More formally, the discrete choice follows 
the equation, 
𝐸ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑈𝑖𝑖�𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑖),𝑔𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑞𝑖, 𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑖𝑖)),𝑏𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑖)� > 𝑈𝑖𝑖 ∀ 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑖𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑒𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝑖 .    (6) 
Equation (6) aligns with the college-going behavior observed in the market. Proximity 
increases the likelihood that students will enroll and choose a particular institution. Some 
institutions, if feasible, provide sufficiently high utility to be chosen at any distance. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of under matching is not only due to financial constraints 
but also preferences for amenities and leisure, or the uncertainty of academic 
performance and risk aversion.  
 Figure 5.2 also shows how institutional choice affects the probability of 
persistence. Attending a college of farther distance away or higher quality rotates the 
constraint downward, resulting in a new allocation (g', l*).35 Now there are fewer feasible 
allocations of work and leisure that lie above e. As the constraint approaches e, the 
probability of persistence decreases at any allocation of g and l.  
 Recall that the return to a degree is increasing in quality. This is represented by 
the new exit line e' where a degree from the higher quality institution remains the best 
option at lower GPA values. The return to a degree from an institution relative to all other 
options is represented by the vertical distance between g and e. So long as the cost of 
distance or quality to GPA (g* - g') is less than the benefit gained (e -e'), then distance 
and quality increase the probability of persistence. Due to the diminishing return to  
Figure 5.2 - Academic Labor-Leisure Model 
                                                 
35 The figure illustrates quasi-linear utility such that distance does not affect time allocated to leisure, but as 
long as there is not perfect substitutability between academic effort and leisure, g is decreasing in d. 
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distance on quality—and academic productivity if positive at all—the cost eventually 
exceeds the benefit and decreases the likelihood of persistence. 
 If assumptions are made regarding students’ academic ambition prior to choice as 
well as the quality of institutions across type, then additional propositions can be made 
with respect to distance and college-going behavior. Suppose students decide to pursue 
an associate’s or bachelor’s prior to choice of institution. Let us also assume that 
academic quality does not vary with respect to associate’s degrees. That is to say the 
return to an associate’s degree is equal across all institutions. Conversely, there is a strict 
ranking in academic quality with respect to bachelor’s degrees among four-year 
institutions. 
 Under these assumptions, a student seeking an associate’s degree maximizes its 
return by attending the most proximate institution unless the cost of migrating to a more 
distant two-year institution is less than the difference in tuition compared to the most 
proximate four-year institution. Otherwise, migrating any farther than the minimum 
distance is due solely to a student’s marginal rate of substitution of quality for amenities. 
Therefore, the effect of distance on persistence or degree completion is expected to be 
non-positive on average. The cost of distance to time is attributable to the act of 
commuting. Given that most associate’s degree seekers attend community colleges that 
do not have residence halls, the effect of distance is due to cost to time rather than 
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academic ability since such students presumably live at home. In general, distance is 
expected to have a larger impact on persistence among these students.  
 For students seeking a bachelor’s degree, a student migrates the minimum 
distance that attains a utility-maximizing quantity of academic quality and amenities. The 
relationship between distance and choice of institution is expected to be weaker 
compared to those seeking an associate’s degree. If a student relocates to campus, thus 
eliminating the cost of commuting, any effect of distance is primarily through academic 
ability. Such a distinction would be possible to estimate if data included residential 
choices of students. Given the relationship between distance and quality, the effect of 
distance on persistence is expected to be negative quadratic. 
 In sum, estimating the effect of distance—or any factor—on student success at an 
institution involves a two-stage decision process resulting in the student being observed 
at that institution:  degree type enrollment and institutional choice. How these sources of 
selection bias are empirically modeled has important implications for external validity. 
This will be discussed in more detail following the next section.  
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Data for this study were obtained from the Kentucky Center for Education and 
Workforce Statistics (KCEWS), which administers the state’s P-20 database. The analytic 
sample contains four cohorts of all graduates from Kentucky public high schools between 
2008-09 and 2011-12 academic years. The first cohort aligns with the first year in which 
comprehensive data is available. Data contain the 2015-2016 academic year, enabling 
four years of in-state college-going behavior to be observed for the most recent cohort.36  
The data contain time-invariant demographics of sex and race as well as time-
variant information on limited-English-proficiency (LEP), special education (SPED), 
gifted, and free and reduced-price lunch (FRPL), all of which reflect a student’s status in 
their senior year. High school academic achievement is available via ACT scores, final 
high school GPA, the number of Advanced Placement classes taken, and college credits 
                                                 
36 A notable limitation of the data is out-of-state college matriculates are not observed unless they applied 
for financial aid in Kentucky. Approximately 8 percent of all Kentucky college matriculates go out of state. 
The data capture about 1 percent. The missing students are presumed to be an atypical subgroup that whose 
absence in the data should not impact results or policy implications.  
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earned in high school. The geographic coordinates of students’ high school and all 
Kentucky public and private nonprofit two-year and four-year institutions available 
through IPEDS were used to calculate the geodesic distance based on the Vincenty 
computational formula. Observations missing one or more of these variables were 
dropped, resulting in a 6 percent reduction and a total of 149,183 high school graduates in 
the full sample.  
Table 5.1 provides sample means of demographic and high school variables for 
the full sample of graduates in Column 1 and college matriculates in Column 2. Between 
2009 and 2012, 66 percent of public high school graduates (93,617) enrolled in college 
within two years. The group of matriculates is less male, more affluent, took more AP 
classes, and had higher ACT and GPA achievement. Matriculates do not differ much 
along racial composition, and actually earned slightly more college credits while in high 
school. Lastly, proximity to the nearest two-year and four-year institution is roughly 
equivalent between the groups at 16 and 14 miles, respectively. 
Several postsecondary variables are of interest. Among those who enrolled in 
Kentucky, 95 percent are identified as seeking an associate’s, bachelor’s, or are 
undeclared. The college student sample was reduced to include only these students. 
Relevant outcomes include college persistence to the second year of college as well as 
completion of a degree within four years for all cohorts and six years for the first two 
cohorts (2009-10).  
Table 5.2 reports sample means of postsecondary variables for all students in all 
four cohorts in Column 1, only those seeking an associate’s (Group A) or bachelor’s 
degree (Group B) in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Columns 4-6 report means for the 
same groups but only for the first two cohorts for which six years of data are available. 
Since these are all recent high school graduates, very few students attend part-time, 
which is highest among Group A at 20 percent. No one in Group B attended two-year 
institutions, which suggests one cannot declare as seeking a bachelor’s degree. Students 
who attend a two-year school with intentions to attain a bachelor’s are either in Group A 
or in the full sample that includes undeclared students. 
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Table 5.1 - Sample Means of High School Variables 
 Graduates Matriculates 
 (1) (2) 
Male 49.33 44.25 
White 85.35 85.16 
Black 9.36 9.24 
Hispanic 2.12 1.93 
FRPL 41.67 34.52 
SPED 1.59 0.66 
LEP 0.50 0.29 
Gifted 23.36 29.68 
ACT 18.89 20.14 
GPA 2.90 3.11 
AP Classes 1.37 1.73 
College Credits 1.51 1.66 
Enrolled 66.18 100.00 
Nearest 2-year 16.64 16.19 
Nearest 4-year 14.63 14.31 
Unemployment 9.84 9.79 
Students 149,183 93,601 
Notes:  Sample for Column 1 includes all Kentucky 
public high school graduates between academic years 
2008-09 and 2011-12, and Column 2 includes all 
graduates who enrolled at an in-state postsecondary 
institution within two years and sought an associate’s, 
bachelor’s or were undeclared. 
 
Approximately 80 percent of all students persisted to the second year. This rate 
falls to 67 percent for Group A and rises to 87 percent for Group B. About 36 percent 
attained either an associate’s or bachelor’s degree during the time period, which is 
deflated due to limited number of years the two most recent cohorts are observed. The 
four-year graduation rate was 31 percent among all students, while the six-year rate was 
43 percent among the first two cohorts. Six-year graduation rates were 31 and 53 percent 
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for Group A and B, respectively. Not all students attain the degree they initially sought. 
About 9 percent of Group A attain a bachelor’s, while 4 percent of Group B attained an 
associate’s instead. Lastly, all students travelled an average of 40 miles to attend college, 
but migration differs between degree seeking groups. Group A travelled 26 miles, 
roughly half the distance travelled by students in Group B at 53 miles.   
Table 5.3 takes a closer look at sample means related to distance and college-
going behavior.  Approximately 29 percent of all students attended the institution nearest 
to them. As expected, substantially more students in Group A attend the nearest school 
(40 percent) than those in Group B (22 percent). This disparity is even greater when the 
type of institution is considered. Almost 70 percent of students in Group A attended the 
nearest two-year school, while 9 percent attended the nearest  
Table 5.2 - Sample Means of Postsecondary Variables 
 All Cohorts (2009-12)  First Two Cohorts (2009-10) 
 All Group A Group B  All Group A Group B 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Part-time 10.07 19.61 1.23  9.77 18.31 1.13 
Full-time 89.93 80.40 98.78  90.23 81.71 98.87 
Two-year 37.51 85.43 0.00  37.98 84.57 0.01 
Four-year 62.49 14.57 100.00  62.02 15.44 100.00 
Persisted 78.59 67.11 87.41  80.05 69.57 88.57 
Associate's 8.58 15.91 3.38  9.20 16.82 3.92 
Bachelor's 27.72 6.55 42.82  31.86 8.82 49.24 
Graduated 27.74 24.09 30.61  42.80 30.67 52.74 
Distance 39.96 24.15 52.89  39.62 24.51 52.75 
Nearest 2-year 16.19 16.52 16.28  16.19 16.73 16.35 
Nearest 4-year 14.31 16.79 12.70  14.29 16.94 12.63 
Students 93,601 29,983 50,023  47,826 14,602 24,849 
Notes:  Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who enrolled into an in-state 
postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), bachelor’s (Group B), or were undeclared. 
Graduated for all cohorts includes 4-year rates, and 6-year rates for the last two cohorts. 
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Table 5.3 - Means related to distance and success 
 All Cohorts (2009-12) 
 All Group A Group B 
Attended nearest 29.34 39.99 21.65 
Attended nearest 2-year 35.62 69.61 0.00 
Attended nearest 4-year 18.28 9.33 25.59 
Persisted and transferred 14.37 11.43 15.69 
Transferred closer 59.91 41.21 68.86 
Upward transfer 13.96 43.43 0.00 
Graduated at same school 88.11 91.98 85.92 
Graduated at closer school 26.21 16.76 30.67 
Observations 93,601 29,983 50,023 
Notes: Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who 
enrolled into an in-state postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s, 
bachelor’s, or were undeclared. Percentages of indented variables are relative 
to the main variable above.  
 
four-year school. By contrast, only 26 percent of Group B attended the nearest four-year 
school. Among the 80 percent of students who persisted to the second year, 14 percent 
transferred to a difference school and transfers were more prevalent among students in 
Group B than Group A. Among those who transferred, 60 percent transferred to a more 
proximate institution. This rate rises to nearly 70 percent for Group B compared to 41 
percent of Group A. Transfers are defined as upward if done from a two-year to a four-
year school, which among Group A students who transferred 43 percent did so. Lastly, 
among those who graduate, most do so at the school they initially matriculated, though 14 
percent of Group B students graduated at a difference school and 31 percent of them did 
so at a more proximate school.      
Kentucky is somewhat smaller than the median of states, ranking 37th in land area 
that spans approximately 420 miles east-to-west and 182 miles north-to-south. Also, 
Kentucky ranks 28th in public institutions per capita. Though the data include only in-
state college students, 80 percent of all college students in the nation enrolled in state as 
of 2012. Therefore, the sample represents a large majority of college-going behavior 
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among the population. Furthermore, an important advantage of these data compared to a 
national survey is the statistical power gained from the higher number of observations. 
For instance, the three national surveys administered decades apart used by Long (2004) 
have about 1,000 four-year college observations each and even fewer at the two-year 
level. Alm and Winters (2009) stress the importance of intra-state migration but use 
school level data in Georgia.   
Figure 5.3 provides some visual context to the study showing the approximate 
location of Kentucky public colleges and universities and the percentage of county 
population above age 25 with an associate's degree or higher by quintile. Perusal of the 
shading and locations suggests there is a positive correlation between proximity and 
attainment, just as existing literature suggests. In order to make conclusions concerning 
the causal relationship between distance and success, more rigorous analysis is required. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Kentucky County Population 25+ with Associate's or Higher 
 
METHODS 
Assuming linearity in parameters, the effect of distance on college outcome y for student 
i at college j can be estimated by the reduced-form equation 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑑ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑖     (7) 
where d is distance between the student’s high school h and chosen institution, X is a 
vector of student demographics and high school achievement variables reported in Table 
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1 and 𝜖 is idiosyncratic error. Because we cannot observe marginal academic productivity 
nor students’ residential choices in the data, the effect of distance in (7) captures 
financial, cognitive, and temporal mechanisms. Though the effect of distance is expected 
to be negative on average, the contribution of particular mechanisms is unclear.  
 Based on theory in the previous section, insight into mechanisms can be gained if 
additional assumptions are made. If we assume students choose what level of degree to 
pursue before choosing a college, rather than the proximity affecting the level pursued, 
then the type of degree sought can be included as a valid explanatory variable. If we 
assume further that students seeking an associate’s degree commute, while student’s 
seeking a bachelor’s degree relocate, then a difference in the effect of distance between 
the two groups reflects the difference between temporal and cognitive mechanisms. 
Making this distinction also requires the assumption that the marginal financial cost of 
distance is the same between both groups, which seems reasonable. Separate estimations 
are conducted by type of degree sought that include a quadratic distance term to examine 
nonlinearities between the two groups. This approach requires the sample be reduced by 
14 percent to include only degree-seeking students.37 
 Since distance is specific to the chosen institution the outcomes in y require 
careful defining that deviates from how college success is typically reported. For 
instance, graduation rates are reported regardless of transfers. Using a binary outcome for 
degree completion at any institution would inaccurately estimate the effect of distance. 
Therefore, the primary outcome of interest for y is referred to as success, which is defined 
as completing a degree at the institution in which a student initially matriculated. Almost 
25 percent of all degree-seeking matriculates met this definition of success in four years, 
and 35 percent of those in the first two cohorts were successful within six years. Another 
outcome of interest is persistence to the second year. Unlike degree completion, all 
cohorts can be included in the analysis without requiring a time constraint. As with four- 
and six-year success, a student is coded as having persisted if he attends the same 
institution in the second year that he initially chose to attend in the first year.  
                                                 
37 Almost all students in the sample not identified as seeking one of the two degrees are labeled undeclared. 
It is not clear what the educational ambitions of these students include, as attendance at two-year versus 
four-year institutions is not significantly different.  
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 The potential issue with estimating equation (7) is students select into the 
institution, jointly determining the value of d that is observed. Depending on the variables 
included in X, the claim that distance migrated is uncorrelated with the error term may be 
dubious. A potential solution to omitted variable bias in (7) is  
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑖 = 𝛾1𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑔𝑖         (8) 
where index g is incorporated to distinguish type of degree and 𝛼 is the institution fixed 
effect. The inclusion of institution fixed effects estimates 𝛾 using within-institution 
variation in distance across students and controls for endogenous variation in the outcome 
of interest across institutions. In other words, (8) estimates the effect of distance using 
students who pursued the same degree, chose to attend the same institution, and whose 
success is impacted by the same unobservable characteristics of the institution.  
 Again, depending on controls, distance even within institution may be 
endogenous. A student who migrates a long distance may have an unobservable affinity 
for that particular institution. Such a case seems more likely among four-year institutions. 
Additionally, perhaps greater distance is associated with higher motivation, which could 
apply to students attending four- or two-year institutions. In either instance, assuming 
affinity or motivation is positively associated with success, the direction of the omitted 
variable bias is positive. However, this is not a concern so long as one is willing to 
assume unobservable characteristics associated with distances migrated to an institution 
are time-invariant, as the fixed effect averages such factors out in the error term. 
Therefore, (8) is used as the base model to estimate the effect of distance on success and 
to compare with results of the dual-lambda selection correction method described below.   
 A variation of the dual-lambda method developed by Vijverberg (1995) is used 
that corrects for selection bias resulting from a two-stage choice with multiple 
alternatives. Vivjerberg (1995) shows that Lee’s (1983) method for correcting selection 
bias due to a prior choice with multiple alternatives is poorly suited if there is more than 
one choice involved in the process. For example, scholars estimate wage equations 
correcting for labor force participation, while others correct for migration choices. Both 
participation and migration are likely interrelated; Vivjerberg models labor participation 
as conditional on location. Critically, if the biases work in opposite directions, then bias 
may not be detected at all. The dual-lambda method accounts for selection over multiple 
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interrelated choices with any number of alternatives and allows one to estimate the two 
selectivity effects separately. 
 Estimating student success at a particular institution is quite similar to the above 
example. College students are observed at an institution as a result of two choices: 1) they 
chose to pursue either an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, and 2) they chose to attend that 
institution among numerous alternatives. It is highly likely steps 1 and 2 are interrelated, 
which is supported by patterns in the data described in the previous section. A large 
majority of student’s seeking an associate’s degree attend a community college, while 
those seeking a bachelor’s degree almost exclusively attend a public or private four-year 
school. Furthermore, less than 0.5 percent of students seeking an associate’s attended a 
private four-year school. Therefore, estimation proceeds under the assumption that 
probabilities of college choice are conditional on the type of degree pursued.  
 Using the dual-lambda method, estimating the effect of distance on success 
involves a linear probability model for the following equation 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑖2 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝜎1𝑖𝜕𝜆𝑖|𝑔 + 𝜎2𝑔𝜕𝜆𝑔 + 𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑖       (9) 
where 𝜆𝑖|𝑔 is an extension of the Inverse Mills Ratio (Heckman, 1978) that corrects for 
selection of college j conditional on degree type g, 𝜆𝑔 corrects for selection of degree 
type, and 𝜎 is the estimated parameter for each selection term. Rejection of the null for 𝜎 
indicates the presence of selection bias, while negative values indicate positive bias and 
vice versa. If 𝜎1𝑖𝜕 < 0, then students pursuing that type of degree who choose institution 
j are more likely to succeed than the population of college students, and if 𝜎2𝑔𝜕 < 0, then 
students who choose to pursue that type of degree are more likely to succeed than the 
population of college students.  
 Given the discrete nature of college-going behavior outlined in the previous 
section, a multinomial logit is used to estimate the probability of seeking an associate’s or 
bachelor’s degree as well as a Kentucky postsecondary institution conditional on type of 
degree. The probability student i pursuing degree g chooses to attend institution j=1 
among all alternatives J is estimated via the functional form Pr (yig = 1) = exp�𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑔1� / (exp(𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑔1) + ⋯+ exp(𝛽𝐽𝑋𝑖𝑔𝐽) ).             (10) 
 103 
The estimated probabilities are used to calculate the values for 𝜆 in (9). 38 
 Identification of each 𝜆 relies on including variables in the first-stage multinomial 
logit that predict either type of degree or institution and can be excluded from the second-
stage. Variables used to predict type of degree include the county unemployment rate and 
the percent of the county adult population with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Given the 
evidence that individuals do not sort based on proximity to postsecondary institutions, the 
distance between students and each institution is considered to be exogenous. Therefore, 
a gravity model measure commonly found in migration research is used as an IV for 
choice of institution that quantifies the pull each institution exerts on each student based 
on its size and proximity, or 
𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗2 ,      (11) 
where E is the enrollment at institution j. 
BASE MODEL RESULTS 
Table 5.4 shows the estimated effect of distance on four- and six-year success (i.e. 
completed a degree from initially chosen institution) as well as two-year persistence at 
the same school for those seeking an associate’s degree in Columns 1-2 (Group A) and 
bachelor’s degree in Columns 3-4 (Group B). Distance is modeled as a quadratic or 
logarithmic function for both groups. The sample mean for each outcome is displayed at 
the top of each set of estimates.  
 According to the results in Column 1, there is no evidence that distance affects 
four-year success among those in Group A if modeled as a quadratic. However, Column 
2 suggests the effect of distance on four-year success is statistically significant if modeled 
logarithmically. On average, a one-percent increase in distance decreases the likelihood 
of four-year success 0.007 percentage point among students seeking an associate’s degree 
at the same institution. Based on a sample mean of 22 percent, this represents a 0.03 
percent decrease. Average distance among these students is 23 miles with a standard 
deviation of 27 miles. Therefore, the results suggest that a student seeking an associate’s 
degree at a particular institution who travels one standard deviation greater distance has a 
                                                 
38 See Appendix for the formulas used to construct the values of lambda 
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Table 5.4 - Effect of Distance on Success 
 Group A Group A Group B Group B 
 Quadratic Log Quadratic Log 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Four-year Success [0.2213]  [0.2538]  
Distance  -0.0045 -0.0067* 0.0065*** 0.0078** 
(10 miles or 1%) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0026) 
Distance2 0.0002  -0.0002*  
 (0.0002)  (0.0001)  
Mean Distance 23.11  54.20  
Students 28,111 28,111 40,685 40,685 
Six-Year Success [0.2581]  [0.4518]  
Distance -0.0058 -0.0068 -0.0023 -0.0067 
(10 miles or 1%) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0037) 
Distance2 0.0003  0.0001  
 (0.0003)  (0.0001)  
Mean Distance 24.16  54.07  
Students 13,605 13,605 20,263 20,263 
Two-Year Persistence [0.5956]  [0.7546]  
Distance -0.0126*** -0.0153*** -0.0102*** -0.0184*** 
(10 miles or 1%) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0024) 
Distance2 0.0004  0.0004***  
 (0.0002)  (0.0001)  
Mean Distance 23.11  54.20  
Students 28,111 28,111 40,685 40,685 
Student Controls Y Y Y Y 
Institution FE Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Notes:  Sample includes all graduates of Kentucky public high schools who enrolled into 
an in-state postsecondary institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), or bachelor’s 
(Group B) degree. Success is defined as completing a degree at the institution initially 
chosen. Persistence excludes those who transferred. A one-unit change for quadratic 
models is 10 miles. The unit change for log models is one percent. For example, Column 
2 indicates a one-percent increase in distance decreases the likelihood of four-year 
success by 0.007 percentage point. The sample mean for each outcome and group is 
displayed in italicized brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the high school-
institution pair level. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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3-percentage point (14 percent) lower probability of completing a degree at that 
institution within four years. 
 Among those seeking a bachelor’s degree, both quadratic and log models of 
distance are statistically significant, though the quadratic model in Column 3 has slightly 
higher explanatory power. Furthermore, theory suggests the effect of distance is not 
monotonically positive as Column 4 indicates. At the average distance of 54 miles among 
students seeking a bachelor’s degree, an increase of 10 miles raises the probability of 
completing a degree at the initially chosen institution within four years by 0.4 points (1.5 
percent). Due to the significant negative quadratic, the effect of distance becomes 
negative at approximately 160 miles. 
 The top panel of Figure 5.4 plots the predicted probabilities of four-year success 
among those in Group B as a function of distance holding other covariates constant at the 
mean. The point estimates display a quadratic effect, rising until 150 miles and slightly 
lower at 250 miles. However, the estimates are imprecise at these more extreme 
distances, making the negative effect of distance inconclusive. The bottom panel 
contrasts the point estimates between the 50-mile increments in Panel A. The contrasts 
for 200 and 250 miles are statistically insignificant. Therefore, while the effect of 
distance on four-year success is nonlinear, it cannot be concluded with sufficient 
statistical confidence that the likelihood of success eventually declines.  
  The bottom-third of estimates in table 4.4 represent the effect of distance on 
persistence to the second year at the same institution. There is no evidence that distance 
has a quadratic effect on persistence among those seeking an associate’s degree. As 
theory predicts, the effect is strictly negative. The models in Columns 1 and 2 are 
virtually equivalent in explanatory power, and so the linear estimate is used to interpret 
results. According to Column 1, an increase of 10 miles decreases the probability that a 
student seeking an associate’s persists at the same institution by 1.3 percentage points (2 
percent). Furthermore, a student seeking an associate’s degree at a particular institution 
who travels one standard deviation greater distance has a 3.2 percentage point (5.4 
percent) lower probability of persistence. 
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Figure 5.4 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Four-year Success, Bachelors 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
  
Notes:  Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 4, Column 3. 
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of four-year success at various distances 
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in 
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance. 
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 According to the preferred model in Column 3 migrating 10 miles in addition to 
the average 54 miles decreases the probability of persistence among students seeking a 
bachelor’s degree at the same institution by 0.6 points (0.8 percent). The effect of 
distance on two-year persistence becomes positive at approximately 130 miles. Figure 
5.5 displays the predicted probabilities of persistence by distance migrated in the top 
panel along with contrasts in the bottom panel. Unlike four-year success, there is 
significant evidence that distance has a quadratic effect on persistence. At 50 and 100 
miles, distance lowers persistence among students at the same institution seeking a 
bachelor’s. At 200 and 250 miles, distance increases persistence.  
 The probability that a student transferred in the second year and the difference in 
distance between transferred institutions were estimated using the quadratic model. Table 
5.5 reports the results separately between Groups A and B. Column 1 indicates at the 
mean distance of 24 miles, an additional 10 miles increases the likelihood of transfer by 
1.4 percentage points (18 percent) among those seeking an associate’s degree. As before, 
there is no evidence of a quadratic effect among this group. For those seeking a 
bachelor’s degree in Column 2, an additional 10 miles at the mean distance increases the 
probability of transfer by 1 point (7 percent), and there is significant evidence of a 
negative quadratic effect.  
 Among those students who transferred in their second year, does the distance they 
initially migrate affect whether they transfer to a more proximate or distance institution? 
The bottom half of table 5.5 reports estimates for this question. For Group A students 
who attended the same institution and transferred in their second year, migrating 10 miles 
farther than average decreased the distance to the transferred school by 12 miles. For 
Group B, students transferred 10 miles more proximate to their high school. In other 
words, short-to-intermediate distances increase the probability that students transfer in 
their second year, and those students are more likely to transfer closer to home.39 
 
 
                                                 
39 The point estimates should be interpreted with caution because part of the effect is likely mechanical. 
Since only in-state students are observed, the farther a student migrates, there are necessarily fewer options 
that are more distant. 
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Figure 5.5 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Persistence, Bachelors 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
  
Notes:  Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 4, Column 3. 
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of persistence at various distances 
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in 
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance. 
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Table 5.5 - Effect of Distance on Transfers 
 Group A Group B 
 Quadratic Quadratic 
 (1) (2) 
Transferred [0.1114] [0.1400] 
Distance (10 miles) 0.0196*** 0.0165*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0012) 
Distance2 -0.0005* -0.0006*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Mean Distance   
Students 18,854 35,699 
   
Distance Transferred [12.15] [-35.17] 
Distance (10 miles) -14.6309*** -11.4999*** 
 (1.2372) (0.5513) 
Distance2 0.3167*** 0.0966*** 
 (0.0903) (0.0289) 
Mean Distance 35.61 64.80 
Students 2,055 4,792 
Student Controls Y Y 
Institution FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Sample for transferred includes all graduates of Kentucky public 
high schools who enrolled into an in-state postsecondary 
institution and sought an associate’s (Group A), or bachelor’s 
(Group B) degree. Transferred is defined as attending a 
different institution in the second year. Sample for distance 
transferred includes only those who did transfer in their second 
year. Distance transferred is calculated as distance to second-
year school minus the distance to the initially chosen school. 
The sample mean for each outcome and group is displayed in 
italicized brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the high 
school-institution pair level. 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
DUAL-LAMBDA SELECTION CORRECTION RESULTS 
Results of the first-stage analysis indicate that both the unemployment rate and the 
percent of adult-age population with a bachelor’s degree or higher at the county level are 
significant predictors of which degree a student pursues. Also, for each degree group, the 
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constructed pull variable is a significant predictor of which institution a student attends.40  
Table 5.6 reports the estimated effect of distance on four- and six-year success as well as 
persistence for Groups A and B. Also included are the estimates for group and institution 
selection corrections.41 The estimates for Group A are substantially different under this 
specification compared to the base model. Among those seeking an associate’s degree, a 
10-mile increase in distance decreases the probability of four-year success by 1 
percentage point, six-year success by 1.6 percentage points, and persistence by 1.7 
percentage points. There is a small, positive quadratic effect on persistence, but as was 
the case in Figure 3, the linear prediction is imprecise at extreme distances. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that the probability to persist actually becomes positive at 170 miles 
and greater.  
 The only outcome for which there is significant evidence of bias among Group A 
is persistence. Based on the group selection estimate, those who choose to pursue an 
associate’s are less likely to persist than if a random draw of college matriculates were 
assigned to pursue an associate’s. Based on the institution selection estimate, conditional 
on choosing to pursue an associate’s, there is evidence of positive selectivity, meaning 
there are institutions in the group for which the students choosing them are more likely to 
persist than a random draw of those seeking an associate’s degree. A separate estimation 
on the subsample of community colleges revealed that students seeking an associate’s 
and choose to attend a community college are more likely to persist than a random draw 
of students seeking an associate’s degree. There is no such evidence for students in 
Group A who attend four-year universities. 
 For those seeking a bachelor’s degree in Column 2, the estimates are fairly similar 
for four-year success, though the quadratic term is no longer significant. Notably, the six-
year success estimates are significant when correcting for selection bias. The effect of 
                                                 
40 See Appendix for first-stage results. 
41 For brevity, results for each institution conditional on each degree, which would include 32 separate 
estimations, are not reported. Instead, separate estimations are run for each type of degree as was done in 
the previous section but pooled across institutions. This enables a more direct comparison between the two 
specifications. Interpretation of the group selection correction term is straightforward, indicating whether 
those who choose a particular type of degree are more or less likely to achieve the outcome than a random 
draw of the population. However, the institution selection correction term is not a direct comparison 
between those who choose an institution conditional on type of degree and a random draw of the 
population, but rather a group-wide average of institution selection bias. 
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Table 5.6 - Effect of Distance on Success with Selection Correction 
 
Group A Group B 
 
(1) (2) 
Four-year Success 
  Distance (10 miles) -0.0101** 0.0053* 
 
(0.0036) (0.0024) 
Distance2 0.0004 -0.0002 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
Group Selection 0.1874 -0.1724*** 
 
(0.1215) (0.0283) 
Inst. Selection -0.1102 0.2596*** 
 
(0.1422) (0.0396) 
Students 28,111 40,685 
Six-Year Success 
  Distance (10 miles) -0.0163** -0.0138*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0031) 
Distance2 0.0005 0.0005*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0001) 
Group Selection 0.3021 -0.1746*** 
 
(0.1751) (0.0407) 
Inst. Selection -0.1368 0.0415 
 
(0.1843) (0.0603) 
Students 13,605 20,263 
Persistence 
  Distance (10 miles) -0.0173*** -0.0175*** 
 
(0.0049) (0.0019) 
Distance2 0.0005* 0.0006*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0001) 
Group Selection 0.6342*** -0.1011*** 
 
(0.1452) (0.0207) 
Inst. Selection -0.6523*** 0.0093 
 
(0.1526) (0.0276) 
Students 28,111 40,685 
Student Controls Y Y 
Institution FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Notes: Sample is the same as in Table 4. Bootstrapped 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered by high school-
institution dyad.  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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distance is in the opposite direction compared to four-year success, as was the case with 
persistence in the base specification as well as this specification. A student who travels an 
additional 10 miles than the average is less likely to succeed within six years by almost 1 
percentage point. Similarly, traveling 10 miles greater than average lowers persistence by 
slightly over 1 percentage point. Across all outcomes in Table 6 for Group B, there is 
significant evidence of group selection bias. Those who choose to pursue a bachelor’s 
degree are more likely to succeed within four and six years, as well as persist, than the 
population of college matriculates. The only evidence of institution selection bias pertains 
to four-year success. This means there are institutions in the group (i.e. four-year 
universities) for which the students choosing them are significantly less likely to succeed 
within four years than a random draw of those seeking a bachelor’s degree. 
 The top panel of Figure 5.6 plots the predicted probabilities of six-year success 
among those in Group B as a function of distance holding other covariates constant at the 
mean. The point estimates display a quadratic effect, decreasing until 150 miles and then 
increasing at 200 and 250 miles. The bottom panel contrasts the point estimates between 
the 50-mile increments in Panel A. The contrasts 50 and 100 miles indicate that the 
marginal effect of distance is significantly negative. At 150 and 200 miles, the marginal 
effect is not statistically different than zero. However, at 250 miles the marginal effect of 
distance is significant and positive. Therefore, it can be concluded with sufficient 
statistical confidence that the likelihood of six-year success eventually increases as a 
function of distance. 
 Lastly, Table 5.7 reports the effects of distance on transfers correcting for 
selection bias and are similar to those reported in Table 5. Those in Group A who travel 
greater distances are more likely to transfer their second year and attend a more 
proximate institution. Those in Group B who travel greater distances are also more likely 
to transfer until 130 miles, at which point the probability of transferring begins to 
decrease. Among those who do transfer, greater distance to the initially chosen school 
results in transferring to a more proximate school. Once again, there is only evidence of 
selection bias among those in Group B relative to transfers. 
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Figure 5.6 - Marginal Effects of Distance on Six-year Success, Bachelors 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Figures illustrate the effects of distance estimated in Table 6, Column 2. 
Panel A provides predicted probabilities of 4-year success at various distances 
holding covariates constant at their mean. Panel B contrasts the point estimates in 
Panel A, showing the marginal effect and significance at each distance. 
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Table 5.7 - Effect of Distance on Transfers with Selection Correction 
 
Group A Group B 
 
(1) (2) 
Transferred 
  Distance (10 miles) 0.0173*** 0.0156*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0014) 
Distance2 -0.0004 -0.0006*** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0001) 
Group Selection 0.0196 0.0542** 
 
(0.1449) (0.0187) 
Inst. Selection 0.0229 -0.1124*** 
 
(0.1608) (0.0267) 
Students 18,855 35,699 
Distance Transferred 
  Distance (10 miles) -14.3529*** -9.7714*** 
 
(1.6255) (0.8113) 
Distance2 0.3115*** 0.0474 
 
(0.0813) (0.0332) 
Group Selection 29.7594 14.9426 
 
(37.7131) (12.2438) 
Inst. Selection -39.6310 9.3355 
 
(43.7760) (14.2132) 
Students 2,055 4,792 
Student Controls Y Y 
Institution FE Y Y 
Year FE Y Y 
Notes:  Sample is the same as Table 5. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are clustered by high school-institution 
dyad. 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Among the results, interpreting the effect of distance among those seeking an associate’s 
degree is the most straightforward. For this group of college-going students distance 
imposes a cost that lowers the likelihood they persist or complete a degree at the 
institution in which they initially matriculated, especially when controlling for their 
choice to pursue an associate’s degree. These findings are consistent with the theory 
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outlined in the prior section. Limitations in the data do not enable us to identify the 
mechanisms driving the cost, but some speculations can be made. 
 Given that 75 percent of those in Group A attended a college within 31 miles of 
their high school, it seems reasonable to assume any effect distance may have on 
marginal academic productivity does not play a significant role in the examined 
outcomes. Additionally, the financial situation for most students is likely stable while in 
school, and the financial costs associated with distance are presumably the same as when 
considering attending a particular college. Thus, the financial cost of distance may not 
play a significant role either.42 Therefore, it may be reasonable to suggest the negative 
effect of distance on students in Group A is driven primarily by the cost to time from 
commuting. The fact that an additional 10 miles can reduce persistence by nearly 2 
percentage points suggests commuting is a substantial factor.  
 The quadratic effect of distance on success among those seeking a bachelor’s 
degree makes interpretation somewhat more nuanced, but overall the results for this 
group are congruent with the theory as well. At distances that are representative of most 
of the sample—between 90 and 95 percent—distance imposes a cost that lowers the 
likelihood of persistence and completing a degree within six years and increases the 
probability they transfer. Again, the effects are especially detectable when controlling for 
their choice to pursue a bachelor’s degree. However, the negative effect of distance is 
diminishing and for the small proportion of students who migrate relatively extreme 
distances to attend their college of choice, they are just as likely to succeed as those who 
migrated very little distance to attend the same college.  
 This positive quadratic relationship suggests distance is an input that allows 
students to access higher quality institutions. On average, students who migrate great 
distances have selected into an institution that provides greater utility compared to those 
students who migrate moderate distances. As a result, the costs associated with distance 
are offset. For those in Group A, no such relationship is evident, suggesting that quality 
of institutions when pursuing an associate’s degree does not differ or sufficiently so to 
ever offset the costs.  
                                                 
42 In a limited attempt to examine the financial cost of distance, an interaction between distance and FRPL 
was included in an alternative specification. The estimate was not significant and did not change the results. 
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 Figures 3-5 also provide some insight into the cost of distance as it relates to time 
commuting versus either cognitive or financially. The negative effect of distance is 
greatest at short distances. Again, this suggests that commuting is a substantial factor of 
success. Though to a lesser magnitude, the effect of distance remains negative at 
distances where most students presumably relocate to live on or near campus. Of course, 
relocation does not eliminate the need to commute for those who do not live on campus, 
so it may still be a factor. Nevertheless, those who migrate 100 miles are 1 point less 
likely to persist than those who migrate 50 miles. Relocation is likely necessary at both 
distances, so something in addition to commuting is contributing to the negative effect of 
distance.  
 The most perplexing result is the reversed relationship between distance and four-
year success among those seeking a bachelor’s degree, which is present in both the base 
and selection bias correction specifications. If distance reduces two-year persistence and 
completing a degree within six years, what explains distance increasing the likelihood of 
completing a degree within four years? It is worth noting that only 29 percent of students 
seeking a bachelor’s complete any degree within four years regardless of transferring to a 
different institution. In fact, completing a degree at the same institution is only slightly 
lower at 25 percent.  
 One explanation then is students in Group B who complete a degree at the same 
institution within four years made an optimal choice. These students knew which 
institution was best for them. In this case, distance is primarily an input that enables them 
to attend their optimal institution. This would also explain why there is weak evidence of 
a negative quadratic that is no longer significant when correcting for selection. The costs 
associated with distance do not offset the benefit of attending a students’ optimal college.  
 As is the case with any human behavior, describing college-going is complex. 
Based on a rich literature, we can be fairly certain that proximity to institutions of higher 
education increases educational attainment on average. It is also clear that the 
relationship between distance and attainment is at least partially attributable to the fact 
that the likelihood of enrolling in college at all increases with proximity to a college. But 
how might distance affect attainment after a student has decided to enroll and attend a 
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particular institution? What are the implications for policy that alter the distances students 
migrate to attend college? 
 Controlling for selection bias resulting from choosing type of degree and 
institution, within-institution variation in distance has a significant effect on whether 
students remain at the institution in the second year and complete a degree within six 
years. For what describes a majority of college-going in the U.S.—recent graduates who 
attend an in-state institution—distance has a negative effect on success at short-to-
intermediate distances. This effect is linear for those seeking an associate’s degree, but 
for bachelor’s degree-seekers, distance enables them to access institutions of higher 
quality that offset the costs associated with distance.  
 With policy aimed at increasing college enrollment and success, and in light of 
the evidence in this study, it is worth noting that 65 percent of individuals in the U.S. live 
within 51 miles of a public college and less than 20 percent live within 51 miles of a 
public four-year institution (Akers & Soliz, 2015). More students living farther away will 
need to attend college, or colleges will need to be placed more proximate to them. The 
former is clearly more feasible. In doing so, policy needs to consider that students who 
migrate greater distances to attend college may be less likely to succeed there. 
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[6]  
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this work was to examine the policy and impacts of state higher education 
subsidies across different modes of delivery in ways that contribute to existing research. 
The primary means of achieving this goal was to extend the discussion surrounding state 
subsidies from their effects on college access, choice, and success to their effects on 
demand for the underlying goods and services provided by institutions that mediate such 
outcomes. Specifically, focus was directed at the interaction between two phenomena:  1) 
on average, the delivery of state subsidies has become increasingly on the basis of student 
income and/or ability over the last 25 years, and 2) student demand for educational 
resources and amenities differs across dimensions of ability and income. The impact of 
this trend in state subsidy composition in relation to heterogeneous demand across 
students has not been thoroughly examined. 
 Chapter 3 theoretically examined the response in student demand to changes in 
state subsidy composition, focusing on the various mechanisms through which a state can 
alter its provision of subsidies and the corresponding student subsets affected. The 
general conclusion from this analysis is that HTHA policy drives a divergence in demand 
between educational resources and amenities, especially in states with merit-based grant 
programs, but crucially depends on three factors:  1) the specific program mechanisms a 
state uses to increase grant funding, 2) the relative sizes of each student subset 
determined by a state’s grant program eligibility criteria, and 3) the state’s array of 
institutional choices with respect to educational resources and amenities from which 
affected student subsets can choose. The chapter provides theoretical motivation for 
several avenues of empirical research in the future, which are discussed in the chapter’s 
conclusion. 
 Chapter 3 also has implications for normative theory and represents an initial step 
toward a better understanding of optimal state subsidy composition. No matter a state’s 
objective in subsidizing higher education—maximizing public benefits, tax revenue, 
political party support, educational attainment—the allocation of subsidies across the 
different modes of delivery is an important policy lever to achieve its objective. It seems 
reasonable to assume student subsets do not contribute to a state’s objective identically, 
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thus linking state subsidy composition to the various subsets affected can help inform 
state policy how to more effectively and efficiently achieve its objective. Of course, such 
steps cannot be taken until there is a better understanding of what institutional goods and 
services should be considered an educational resource, an amenity, or some other 
category that is relevant to student outcomes.  
 Chapter 4 empirically examined the effect the percentage of total state subsidies 
allocated to grants has on institutional expenditure shares. The expectation was that 
institutions will allocate resources across operational categories in ways that reflect the 
divergence in demand discussed in Chapter 3. The results support this hypothesis, 
primarily among less-selective public institutions, which are most sensitive to student 
demand pressure. An important task for future research on this front is to strengthen 
causal inference by identifying the beginning and/or end of substantial state grant 
programs and analyzing their effect on institutional expenditure shares.  
 In addition to providing empirical support for the theory presented in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 contributes to research concerning the effect of state financial aid on college 
student outcomes, particularly completion of a degree. It is of considerable interest to 
scholars and policymakers whether state subsidies impact college completion. Whether 
state subsidies simultaneously affect institutional expenditure shares, which in turn 
impact college completion, has not been considered previously. A more comprehensive 
analysis of institutional expenditures and their impact on student outcomes is needed in 
order to make recommendations concerning state subsidy composition on this basis. 
 Lastly, Chapter 5 is somewhat peripheral to the subject of state subsidies but 
nevertheless examines an important aspect of college-going behavior that state subsidies 
can alter—the distance students migrate to attend college. This chapter contributes to 
existing research in three ways:  1) establishing a theoretical basis upon which to expect 
distance to affect college student success after choosing to attend an institution, 2) 
estimating the effect of distance on the likelihood a student completes a degree at the 
institution he or she initially matriculated into, and 3) explores the dual-lambda selection 
correction method as a way to account for the multiple processes involved in college 
choice. The results suggest distance has a negative, linear effect on the success of those 
seeking an associate’s degree, which may reflect the impact of commuting. The effect of 
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distance on success among those seeking a bachelor’s degree according to the results is 
more nuanced and somewhat open to interpretation. At a minimum, there is a clear 
distinction between the effects of short, intermediate, and long distances on success. 
Again, this is arguably due to differences between commuting and relocating to college, 
which is a valuable topic for future research.  
 As state budgets become increasingly strained, most state governments have 
restructured their financing of higher education in a way that lowers appropriations in 
exchange for subsidies targeted on the basis of student income or ability. Moreover, there 
is little evidence such decisions are made in a strategic manner. Though the topic of 
public benefits from higher education is still debated, the fact that these subsidies exist 
suggests state governments expect a return on this investment. As long as provision of 
higher education remains neither fully private or public, which types of students receive 
subsidies and how much they receive will continue to be critical questions for issues of 
college access, choice, and success that no doubt impact states’ returns on investment. 
While much public attention is paid toward levels of subsidies, this work attempted to 
show that the extent to which states target subsidies on the basis of income or ability 
relative to appropriations is an important part of these question. 
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APPENDIX A:  DESCRIPTION OF COLLEGE EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES 
Instruction 
A functional expense category that includes expenses of the colleges, schools, 
departments, and other instructional divisions of the institution and expenses for 
departmental research and public service that are not separately budgeted. Includes 
general academic instruction, occupational and vocational instruction, community 
education, preparatory and adult basic education, and regular, special, and extension 
sessions. Also includes expenses for both credit and non-credit activities. Excludes 
expenses for academic administration where the primary function is administration (e.g., 
academic deans). Information technology expenses related to instructional activities are 
included if the institution separately budgets and expenses information technology 
resources (otherwise these expenses are included in academic support). 
Research 
A functional expense category that includes expenses for activities specifically 
organized to produce research outcomes and commissioned by an agency either external 
to the institution or separately budgeted by an organizational unit within the institution. 
The category includes institutes and research centers, and individual and project 
research. This function does not include nonresearch sponsored programs (e.g., training 
programs). Also included are information technology expenses related to research 
activities if the institution separately budgets and expenses information technology 
resources (otherwise these expenses are included in academic support.) 
 
Academic support 
A functional expense category that includes expenses of activities and services that 
support the institution's primary missions of instruction, research, and public service. It 
includes the retention, preservation, and display of educational materials (for example, 
libraries, museums, and galleries); organized activities that provide support services to 
the academic functions of the institution (such as a demonstration school associated with 
a college of education or veterinary and dental clinics if their primary purpose is to 
support the instructional program); media such as audiovisual services; academic 
administration (including academic deans but not department chairpersons); and 
formally organized and separately budgeted academic personnel development and 
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course and curriculum development expenses. Also included are information technology 
expenses related to academic support activities; if an institution does not separately 
budget and expense information technology resources, the costs associated with the 
three primary programs will be applied to this function and the remainder to institutional 
support. 
 
Student services 
A functional expense category that includes expenses for admissions, registrar activities, 
and activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students emotional and physical 
well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social development outside the context 
of the formal instructional program. Examples include student activities, cultural events, 
student newspapers, intramural athletics, student organizations, supplemental instruction 
outside the normal administration, and student records. Intercollegiate athletics and 
student health services may also be included except when operated as self - supporting 
auxiliary enterprises. Also may include information technology expenses related to 
student service activities if the institution separately budgets and expenses information 
technology resources (otherwise these expenses are included in institutional support.) 
 
Institutional support 
A functional expense category that includes expenses for the day-to-day operational 
support of the institution. Includes expenses for general administrative services, central 
executive-level activities concerned with management and long-range planning, legal 
and fiscal operations, space management, employee personnel and records, logistical 
services such as purchasing and printing, and public relations and development. Also 
includes information technology expenses related to institutional support activities. 
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APPENDIX B:  COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Chapter 4 examined the effect of state subsidies on institutional expenditure shares as 
proportions of total educational and general expenditures. The following analysis is 
aimed at checking the sensitivity of the results to compositional analysis. To do so, the 
expenditure shares s for the four operational categories i of interest at each institution j—
instruction, academic support, student services, and auxiliary enterprises—were first 
transformed to a composition c using the additive logarithmic transformation (alr): 
𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛 �𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑘𝑗� ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1 −∑𝑠𝑖𝑖.  
 Analysis was repeated for equations (1) and (2) using the compositional 
dependent variables. Coefficients for select variables are reported in the figures below 
along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients are exponentiated so that the 
interpretation of the x-axis is the percent change in the ratio due to a 1-unit increase in the 
explanatory variable. It is important to reiterate that the significant coefficients 
corresponding to the interaction terms indicate a significant difference from the base 
term, not a significant effect of the explanatory variable itself. A test of the linear 
combination of the base term and the interaction must be conducted to determine a 
significant marginal effect. Notable differences were discussed in the Sensitivity Analysis 
section of Chapter 4. 
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Figure A.1 – Effect of Need and Non-need by Control 
 
 
Figure A.2 – Effect of Mixed and Merit by Control 
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Figure A.3 – Effect of Need and Non-need by Selectivity 
 
 
Figure A.4 – Effect of Mixed and Merit by Selectivity 
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APPENDIX C:  DERIVATION OF DUAL LAMBDAS 
The following procedure was proposed by Vijverberg (1995) to derive dual lambdas that 
control for selection bias when the choice is the result of two interdependent processes. 
Vijverberg used dual lambda selection correction to estimate wage equations conditional 
on migration and employment participation. Chapter 5 adopts this procedure to estimate 
the likelihood of college student success conditional on degree choice and college choice. 
Notation is adapted to be consistent with Chapter 5. 
𝜆𝑖|𝑔 =  −𝜙(𝐴𝑗|𝑔𝑛 Φ�(1−𝜌2)−0.5�𝐴𝑔𝑛−𝜌𝐴𝑗|𝑔𝑛 ��𝜌𝑔𝑗  
𝜆𝑔 =  −𝜙(𝐴𝑔𝑛Φ�(1−𝜌2)−0.5�𝐴𝑗|𝑔𝑛 −𝜌𝐴𝑔𝑛��𝜌𝑔𝑗  
where 𝜌 is a correlation coefficient between the two selection biases 
𝜌 = �Φ−1�𝐸�𝜂𝑖|𝑔��Φ−1�𝐸�𝜂𝑔��ℎ�𝜂𝑖|𝑔, 𝜂𝑔� 𝑑𝜂𝑖|𝑔 𝑑𝜂𝑔 
and 𝐴𝑛 is a normal distribution transformation of the estimated probabilities that a student 
chooses to pursue degree g or attends college j conditional on g 
𝐴𝑖|𝑔𝑛 = Φ−1[𝑝𝑖|𝑔] 
𝐴𝑔
𝑛 = Φ−1[𝑝𝑔] 
which are also used in the calculation of 𝜌 by substitution of the 𝜂 terms.  
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APPENDIX D – FIRST-STAGE DUAL LAMBDA ESTIMATES 
 Degree Choice 
 Joint Test of Pull on Institutional Choice 
𝝌𝟐 
 
Bachelor's   Associate’s Bachelor’s 
Unemployment 0.0740***     
 
(0.0069)   1400.24*** 207.68*** 
Bach or Higher 10.6323***     
 
(0.1799)     
Distance 0.4537***     
 
(0.0071)     
Distance2 -0.0139***     
 (0.0004)     
Male Dummy 0.2829***     
 (0.0220)     
Black 0.0247     
 (0.0395)     
Hispanic -0.0676     
 (0.0762)     
Asian 0.6176***     
 (0.1170)     
FRPL -0.2623***     
 (0.0229)     
SPED -0.5733***     
 (0.1623)     
LEP -1.2449***     
 (0.2553)     
Gifted 0.0207     
 (0.0261)     
ACT 0.2246***     
 (0.0038)     
Final GPA 1.0533***     
 (0.0231)     
AP Classes 0.0826***     
 (0.0056)     
Credits -0.0351***     
 (0.0036)     
      
Observations 68797     
Notes: ***p<0.001 
  
 128 
REFERENCES 
Abel, J. & Deitz, R. (2014). Do the benefits of college still outweigh the costs? Delaney, J. A. 
& Doyle, W. R. (2011). State spending on higher education: Testing the balance wheel 
over time. Journal of Education Finance, 36(4), 343–368.  
Aitchison, J. (1982). The statistical analysis of compositional data. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 139-177. 
Akers, B. & Soliz, A. (2015). Mapping the market for higher education. Brookings Institute. 
Ali, M. K. (2003). Analysis of enrollment: A spatial-interaction model. The Journal of 
Economics, 29(2), 67–86. 
Alm, J. & Winters, J. V. (2009). Distance and intrastate college student migration. Economics 
of Education Review, 28(6), 728–738. 
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special 
reference to education. University of Chicago Press.  
Bennett, W. J. (1987). Our greedy colleges. New York Times, 18(A27). 
Bettinger, E. (2004). How financial aid affects persistence. In College choices: The economics 
of where to go, when to go, and how to pay for it (pp. 207-238). University of Chicago 
Press.  
Bowen, W. G., Chingos, M. M., & McPherson, M. S. (2009). Crossing the finish line: 
Completing college at America's public universities (Vol. 52). Princeton University 
Press. 
Braxton, J. M. (2000). Reworking the student departure puzzle. Vanderbilt University Press.  
Breneman, D. (1981). Strategies for the 1980s. In Mingle, J. (Ed.), Challenges of 
Retrenchment. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.  
Canton, E. & Vossensteyn, H. (2001). Deregulation of higher education: tuition fee 
differentiation and selectivity in the us.  
Card, D. (1993). Using geographic variation in college proximity to estimate the return to 
schooling. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Cellini, S. R., & Goldin, C. (2013). Does Federal Student Aid Raise Tuition? New Evidence 
on For-Profit Colleges. NBER Working Paper, 17827. 
Cheslock, J. J. & Hughes, R. P. (2011). Differences across states in higher education finance 
policy. journal of education finance, 36(4), 369–393.  
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., Saez, E., Turner, N., & Yagan, D. (2017). Equality of Opportunity 
Project. Data Table 10. Retrieved from http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/data/ 
Chingos, M.M., & Baum, S. (2017). The federal-state higher education partnership. Urban 
Institute. Washington D.C. 
Cooke, T. J. & Boyle, P. (2011). The migration of high school graduates to college. 
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 33(2), 202–213. 
 129 
Cooper, P. (2016). Federal Student Loans Will Cost Taxpayers $170 Billion. Forbes. 
Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/prestoncooper2/2016/04/10/federal-student-
loans-will-cost-taxpayers-170-billion/#148413ef62a9 .  
Corazzini, A. J., Dugan, D. J., & Grabowski, H. G. (1972). Determinants and distributional 
aspects of enrollment in us higher education. Journal of Human Resources, 39–59. 
Curs, B. R., & Jaquette, O. (2017). Crowded Out? The Effect of Nonresident Enrollment on 
Resident Access to Public Research Universities. Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 39(4), 644-669.  
Dee, T. S. (2004). Are there civic returns to education? Journal of Public Economics, 88(9), 
1697– 1720.  
Delaney, J. A. & Doyle, W. R. (2011). State spending on higher education: Testing the 
balance wheel over time. Journal of Education Finance, 36(4), 343–368.  
DesJardins, S. L., Dundar, H., & Hendel, D. D. (1999). Modeling the college application 
decision process in a land-grant university. Economics of Education Review, 18(1), 117–
132.  
Dickler, J. (2017). Student loan interest rates edge higher and higher. CNBC. Retrieved 
from https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/18/student-loan-interest-rates-edge-higher-and-
higher.html. 
Dill, D. D. (1997a). Accreditation, assessment, anarchy? Standards and quality in higher 
education, 37(15).  
Dill, D. D. (1997b). Higher education markets and public policy. Higher education policy, 
10(3-4), 167–185.  
Doyle, W. R. (2006). Adoption of merit-based student grant programs: An event history 
analysis. Educational evaluation and policy analysis, 28(3), 259–285.  
Doyle, W. R. (2010). Does merit-based aid “crowd out” need-based aid? Research in Higher 
Education, 51(5), 397–415.  
Dynarski, S. (2002a). The behavioral and distributional implications of aid for college. 
American Economic Review, 92(2), 279–285.  
Dynarski, S. (2002b). The consequences of merit aid (No. w9400). National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Eagan, K., Stolzenberg, E., Bates, A., Aragon, M., Suchard, M., & Aguilar, C. (2015). The 
American freshman: National norms of 2015. Higher Education Research Institute.  
Epple, D., Romano, R., Sarpca, S., & Sieg, H. (2013). The US market for higher education: A 
general equilibrium analysis of state and private colleges and public funding policies. 
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Fitzpatrick, M. D. & Jones, D. (2012). Higher education, merit-based scholarships and post- 
baccalaureate migration. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 130 
Goldrick-Rab, S., Harris, D. N., & Trostel, P. A. (2009). Why financial aid matters (or does 
not) for college success: Toward a new interdisciplinary perspective. In Higher 
education: Handbook of theory and research (pp. 1-45). Springer, Dordrecht. 
Goldrick-Rab, S., Harris, D., Kelchen, R., & Benson, J. (2012). Need-based financial aid and 
college persistence experimental evidence from Wisconsin. 
Gossman, C. S. (1967). Migration of college and university students in the united states.  
Greene, K. V. (1994). The public choice of non-resident college tuition levels. Public Choice, 
78(3-4), 231–240.  
Groen, J. A. (2004). The effect of college location on migration of college-educated labor. 
Journal of Econometrics, 121(1), 125–142.  
Gumport, P. J. & Pusser, B. (1995). A case of bureaucratic accretion: Context and 
consequences. The Journal of Higher Education, pages 493–520.  
Hansen, W. L. & Weisbrod, B. A. (1969). The distribution of costs and direct benefits of 
public higher education: the case of California. Journal of human resources, pages 176–
191.  
Hansen, W. L. & Weisbrod, B. A. (1971). On the distribution of costs and benefits of public 
higher education: Reply. The Journal of Human Resources, 6(3), 363–374.  
Hearn, J. C. & Longanecker, D. (1985). Enrollment effects of alternative postsecondary 
pricing policies. The Journal of Higher Education, pages 485–508.  
Heller, D. E. (2002). The policy shift in state financial aid programs. In Higher education: 
Handbook of theory and research, pages 221–261. Springer.  
Heller, D. E. & Marin, P. (2002). Who should we help? the negative social consequences of 
merit scholarships.  
Heller, D. E. & Marin, P. (2004). State merit scholarship programs and racial inequality. Civil 
Rights Project at Harvard University (The).  
HERI (2016). Data Archives. Retrieved from https://heri.ucla.edu/heri-data-archive/  
Hillman, N. & Weichman, T. (2016). Education deserts: The continued significance of 
”place” in the twenty-first century. Technical report, American Council on Education 
Center for Policy Research and Strategy.   
Hoenack, S. A. (1971). The efficient allocation of subsidies to college students. The American 
Economic Review, pages 302–311.  
Hossler, D., Lund, J. P., Ramin, J., Westfall, S., & Irish, S. (1997). State funding for higher 
education: The Sisyphean task. Journal of Higher Education, pages 160–190.  
Hoxby, C. M. (1997). How the changing market structure of us higher education explains 
college tuition. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Hoxby, C. M. (2000). The effects of geographic integration and increasing competition in the 
market for college education. NBER Working Paper, 6323.  
Hoxby, C. M., & Avery, C. (2012). The missing" one-offs": The hidden supply of high-
achieving, low income students (No. w18586). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 131 
Hoxby, C., & Turner, S. (2013). Expanding college opportunities for high-achieving, low 
income students. Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper, (12-
014). 
Hurlburt, S. & Kirshstein, R. J. (2012). Spending: Where does the money go? A Delta data 
update, 2000-2010. Delta Cost Project at American Institutes for Research.  
Jacob, B., McCall, B., & Stange, K. M. (2013). College as country club: Do colleges cater to 
students' preferences for consumption? (No. w18745). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Jaquette, O. & Curs, B. R. (2015). Creating the out-of-state university: Do public universities 
in- crease nonresident freshman enrollment in response to declining state appropriations? 
Research in Higher Education, 56(6), 535–565.  
Jaquette, O., Curs, B. R., & Posselt, J. R. (2016). Tuition rich, mission poor: Nonresident 
enrollment growth and the socioeconomic and racial composition of public research 
universities. The Journal of Higher Education, 87(5), 635-673. 
Johnson, W. R. (2006). Are public subsidies to higher education regressive? Education, 1(3), 
288– 315. 
Kane, T. J. (1995). Rising public college tuition and college entry: How well do public 
subsidies promote access to college? Technical report, National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
Kane, T. J. (2006). Public intervention in post-secondary education. Handbook of the 
Economics of Education, 2:1369–1401.  
Kane, T. J., Orzag, P. R., & Gunter, D. L. (2003). State fiscal constraints and higher education 
spending: The role of Medicaid and the business cycle. Higher Education, 12(11.1), 1–1.  
Kariel, H. G. (1968). Student enrollment and spatial interaction. The Annals of Regional 
Science, 2(1), 114–127.  
Koshal, R. K. & Koshal, M. (2000). State appropriation and higher education tuition: what is 
the relationship? Education Economics, 8(1), 81–89.  
Kyung, W. (1996). In-migration of college students to the state of New York. The Journal of 
Higher Education, pages 349–358.  
Larson, E. (1997). Why colleges cost too much. Time Magazine, 149(11). 
Leigh, D. E. & Gill, A. M. (2003). Do community colleges really divert students from earning 
bachelor’s degrees? Economics of Education Review, 22(1), 23–30.  
Leppel, K. (1993). Logit estimation of a gravity model of the college enrollment decision. 
Research in Higher Education, 34(3), 387–398. 
Long, B. T. (2004a). How do financial aid policies affect colleges? the institutional impact of 
the Georgia Hope scholarship. Journal of Human Resources, 39(4), 1045–1066. 
Long, B. T. (2004b). How have college decisions changed over time? an application of the 
conditional logistic choice model. Journal of Econometrics, 121(1), 271–296.  
 132 
Long, B. T. & Riley, E. (2007). Financial aid: A broken bridge to college access? Harvard 
Educational Review, 77(1), 39–63.  
Mak, J. & Moncur, J. E. (2003). Interstate migration of college freshmen. The Annals of 
Regional Science, 37(4), 603–612. 
Manski, C. F., Wise, D. A., & Wise, D. A. (1983). College choice in America. Harvard 
University Press.  
McConnell, H. (1965). Spatial variability of college enrollment as a function of migration 
potential. The Professional Geographer, 17(6), 29–37.  
McFadden, D. (1973). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. 
McHugh, R. & Morgan, J. N. (1984). The determinants of interstate student migration: A 
place- to-place analysis. Economics of Education Review, 3(4), 269–278. 
McMahon, W. W. (2009). Higher learning, greater good: The private and social benefits of 
higher education. JHU Press.   
McPherson, M. S., & Schapiro, M. O. (1998). The student aid game. 
McPherson, M. S., Schapiro, M. O., & Winston, G. C. (1993). Paying the piper: Productivity, 
incentives, and financing in US higher education. University of Michigan Press.  
Medsker, L. L. & Tillery, D. (1971). Breaking the Access Barriers: A Profile of Two-Year 
Colleges. ERIC.  
Melguizo, T. (2011). A review of the theories developed to describe the process of college 
persistence and attainment. In Higher education: Handbook of theory and research, 
pages 395–424. Springer.  
Mixon, F. G. (1992a). Factors affecting college student migration across states. International 
Journal of Manpower, 13(1), 25–32.  
Mixon, F. G. (1992b). A public choice note on college student migration. International 
Journal of Manpower, 13(3), 63–68.  
Mixon, F. G. & Hsing, Y. (1994). The determinants of out-of-state enrollments in higher 
education: A tobit analysis. Economics of Education Review, 13(4), 329–335. 
NASSGAP (2016). Annual Survey Data. Retrieved from https://www.nassgapsurvey.com  
Newfield, C. (2016). The great mistake: How we wrecked public universities and how we can 
fix them. JHU Press.   
Noorbakhsh, A. & Culp, D. (2002). The demand for higher education: Pennsylvania’s 
nonresident tuition experience. Economics of Education Review, 21(3), 277–286. 
Oliff, P., Robyn, M., & Thiess, R. (2017) Federal Support for Higher Education Comes from 
Spending Programs and the Tax Code. The Pew Charitable Trusts. Retrieved 
from http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2017/03/07/federal-
support-for-higher-education-comes-from-spending-programs-and-the-tax-code.  
Ordovensky, J. F. (1995). Effects of institutional attributes on enrollment choice: Implications 
for postsecondary vocational education. Economics of Education Review, 14(4), 335–
350.  
 133 
Orsuwan, M. & Heck, R. H. (2009). Merit-based student aid and freshman interstate college 
migration: Testing a dynamic model of policy change. Research in Higher Education, 
50(1), 24– 51.  
Ovink, S. M. & Kalogrides, D. (2015). No place like home? familism and Latino/a–white 
differences in college pathways. Social science research, 52:219–235.  
Page, L. C., & Scott-Clayton, J. (2016). Improving college access in the United States: 
Barriers and policy responses. Economics of Education Review, 51, 4-22. 
Paulsen, M. B. (2001). The economics of human capital and investment in higher education. 
The finance of higher education: Theory, research, policy, and practice, pages 55–94.  
Martin-Fernandez, J.A., Palarea-Albaladejo, J., & Olea, R.A. (2011). Dealing with zeros. In 
Pawlowsky-Glahn, V., & Buccianti, A. (Eds.), Compositional data analysis: Theory and 
applications. John Wiley & Sons. 
Pechman, J. A., Hansen, W. L., & Weisbrod, B. A. (1970). The distributional effects of public 
higher education in California: A review article.  
Perna, L. W. & Titus, M. A. (2004). Understanding differences in the choice of college 
attended: The role of state public policies. The Review of Higher Education, 27(4), 501–
525. 
Rabovsky, T. M. (2012). Accountability in higher education: Exploring impacts on state 
budgets and institutional spending patterns. Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, 22(4), 675–700.   
Rizzo, M. & Ehrenberg, R. G. (2004). Resident and nonresident tuition and enrollment at 
flagship state universities. In C.M. Hoxby (Ed.), College choices: The economics of 
where to go, when to go, and how to pay for it (303–354). University of Chicago Press.  
Rizzo, M. J. (2006). State preferences for higher education spending: A panel data analysis, 
1977- 2001. What’s happening to public higher education, pages 3–36. 
Rouse, C. E. (1995). Democratization or diversion? the effect of community colleges on 
educational attainment. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13(2), 217–224.   
SHEEO (2016). State Higher Education Finance. Retrieved 
from http://www.sheeo.org/projects/shef-—-state-higher-education-finance  
Singell Jr, L. D., & Stone, J. A. (2007). For whom the Pell tolls: The response of university 
tuition to federal grants-in-aid. Economics of Education Review, 26(3), 285-295. 
Sjoquist, D. L. & Winters, J. V. (2015). State merit-based financial aid programs and college 
attainment. Journal of Regional Science, 55(3), 364–390.  
SRI International. (2012). States’ Method of Funding Higher Education:  Report for the 
Nevada Legislature’s Committee to Study the Funding of Higher Education. Arlington, 
VA. 
Strenze, T. (2007). Intelligence and socioeconomic success: A meta-analytic review of 
longitudinal research. Intelligence, 35(5), 401-426. 
Tinto, V. (1987). Leaving college: Rethinking the causes and cures of student attrition. ERIC. 
 134 
Toutkoushian, R. K. & Smart, J. C. (2001). Do institutional characteristics affect student gains 
from college? The Review of Higher Education, 25(1), 39–61.   
Toutkoushian, R. K. & Shafiq, M. N. (2010). A conceptual analysis of state support for higher 
education: Appropriations versus need-based financial aid. Research in Higher 
Education, 51(1), 40–64.  
Tuckman, H. P. (1970). Determinants of college student migration. Southern Economic 
Journal, pages 184–189.  
Turley, R. N. L. (2006). When parents want children to stay home for college. Research in 
Higher Education, 47(7), 823–846.  
Turley, R. N. L. (2009). College proximity: Mapping access to opportunity. Sociology of 
Education, 82(2), 126–146.  
Turner, S. (2004). Going to college and finishing college. explaining different educational 
out- comes. In College choices: The economics of where to go, when to go, and how to 
pay for it, pages 13–62. University of Chicago Press.  
Turner, L. J. (2014). The road to Pell is paved with good intentions: The economic incidence 
of federal student grant aid. College Park, MD: University of Maryland, Department of 
Economics. Retrieved April 15, 2016. 
Ullis, J. J. & Knowles, P. L. (1975). A study of the intrastate migration of Washington college 
freshmen: A further test of the gravity model. The Annals of Regional Science, 9(1), 112–
121. 
Webber, D. A. (2012). Expenditures and postsecondary graduation: An investigation using 
individual-level data from the state of Ohio. Economics of Education Review, 31(5), 615–
618.  
Webber, D. A. (2017). State divestment and tuition at public institutions. Economics of 
Education Review, 60, 1-4. 
Webber, D. A. & Ehrenberg, R. G. (2010). Do expenditures other than instructional 
expenditures affect graduation and persistence rates in American higher education? 
Economics of Education Review, 29(6), 947–958.  
Williams, G. (1996). The many faces of privatisation. Higher Education Management, 8(3), 
39–57. Windham, D. M. (1976). Social benefits and the subsidization of higher 
education: A critique. Higher Education, 5(3), 237–252. 
Yu, H., & Mixon, F. G. (1996). A regional study of net migration rates of college students. 
The Review of Regional Studies, 26(2), 197. 
Zhang, L. & Ness, E. C. (2010). Does state merit-based aid stem brain drain? Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 32(2), 143–165. 
Zimmerman, S. D. (2014). The returns to college admission for academically marginal 
students. Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711–754. 
Zinth, K. & Smith, M. (2012). Tuition-setting authority for public colleges and universities. 
Technical report, Education Commission of the States.  
 135 
Zipf, G. K. (1946). The p 1 p 2/d hypothesis: on the intercity movement of persons. American 
sociological review, 11(6), 677–686. 
 136 
VITA 
Alex E. Combs 
________________________________________________________________________ 
EDUCATION 
2014 Master of Public Administration (MPA) 
 The Martin School of Public Policy and Administration 
 University of Kentucky 
2009 B.A., Political Science; Philosophy Minor; Honors Scholar 
 Eastern Kentucky University 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
2018-2019 Temporary Professor & Research Analyst,  
  University of Kentucky 
2015-2018 Research Assistant, 
  University of Kentucky 
2013-2014 Research Fellow, 
  Council of State Governments 
2010-2013 Associate Director of Educational Leadership, 
  Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc. 
2009-2010 Consultant, 
  Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc. 
SCHOLASTIC AND PROFESSIONAL HONORS 
Graduate School Academic Year Fellowship (2015, 2016) 
Graduate School Travel Grant (2015, 2016, 2017) 
Daniel Reedy Award for Outstanding MPA Paper (2014) 
Second Place, Policy Solutions Challenge USA (2014) 
Pi Alpha Alpha National Honor Society (2014) 
PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS 
Combs, A.E., Foster, J., & Toma E.F. (Forthcoming) Local response to school finance 
equalization:  Wealth or place? Journal of Public Finance and Management 
 
